New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Golden Eagle Entertainment $ENT

Golden Eagle Entertainment

July 22, 2020

Suffice it to say, high correlation to the airline and cruiseline industries is a credit negative these days. A few months ago Speedcast — a provider of information technology services and (largely satellite-dependent) communications solutions (i.e., cybersecurity, content solutions, data and voice apps, IoT, network systems) to customers in the cruise, energy, government and commercial maritime businesses — discovered this the hard way and free fell into bankruptcy court. There’s still no resolution of that case. Similarly, Global Eagle Entertainment Inc. ($ENT), a business that generates revenue by (i) licensing and managing media and entertainment content and providing related services to customers in the airline, maritime and other “away-from-home” nontheatrical markets, and (ii) providing satellite-based Internet access and other connectivity solutions to airlines, cruise ships and other markets, couldn’t avoid trouble once COVID-19 shutdown its core end users. No monthly recurring revenue model can save a company when its clients are effectively closed for business AND there’s $855.6mm of funded debt to service. Not to state the obvious.

Things may get worse before they get better. The company’s largest customer is Southwest Airlines Co. ($LUV) (21% of overall revenue) and it has a pretty bearish take on …

TO READ THE REST OF THIS POST, YOU MUST BE A PETITION MEMBER. YOU CAN BECOME ONE HERE.


  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Dorsey)

  • Capital Structure: $85mm RCF, $503.3mm TL, $188.7mm second lien notes, $82.5mm unsecured convertible notes.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (George Davis, Madeleine Parish, Ted Dillman, Helena Tseregounis, Nicholas Messana, Eric Leon) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Michael Nestor, Kara Hammond, Betsy Feldman)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC

    • Investment Banker: Greenhill & Co. Inc.

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition First Lien Admin Agent & DIP Agent: Citibank NA

      • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (David Griffiths, Bryan Podzius)

    • Ad Hoc DIP & First Lien Lender Group: Apollo Global Management, L.P., Eaton Vance Management, Arbour Lane Capital Management, Sound Point Capital Management, Carlyle Investment Management LLC, Mudrick Capital Management, BlackRock Financial Management, Inc.

      • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Scott Greenberg, Michael Cohen, Jason Goldstein) & Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Laura Davis Jones, TImothy Cairns)

    • Second Lien Agent: Cortland Capital Market Services LLC

    • Second Lien Noteholders: Searchlight Capital Partners LP

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Alan Kornberg, Michael Turkel, Irene Blumberg, Elizabeth Sacksteder) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Daniel DeFranceschi, Zachary Shapiro)

    • Southwest Airlines Inc.

      • Legal: Vinson & Elkins LLP (William Wallander, Paul Heath, Robert Kimball, Matthew Struble) & Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP (Lucian Murley)

    • AT&T Corp.

      • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (Brian Lohan) & Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Derek Abbott, Brett Turlington)

    • Terry Steiner International

      • Legal: Loeb & Loeb LLP (Daniel Besikof, Geneva Shi)

    • Telesat International Limited

      • Legal: Hodgson Russ LLP (Garry Graber)

    • Nantahala Capital Management LLC

      • Legal: King & Spalding LLP (Arthur Steinberg, Scott Davidson) & The Rosner Law Group LLC (Frederick Rosner, Jason Gibson)

🧀 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - CEC Entertainment Inc. 🧀

CEC Entertainment Inc.

June 24, 2020

For our rundown, please go here.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Isgur)

  • Capital Structure: $1.089b funded debt ($760mm TL, $108 RCF, $6mm LOC, $215.7mm notes)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Alfredo Perez, Andrew Citron, Rachael Foust, Scott Bowling)

    • Board of Directors: David McKillips, Andrew Jhawar, Naveen Shahani, Allen Weiss, Peter Brown, Paul Aronzon

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Chad Coben)

    • Investment Banker: PJT Partners LP (Jamie O’Connell)

    • Real Estate Advisor: Hilco Real Estate LLC

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • PE Sponsor: Queso Holdings Inc./AP VIII CEC Holdings, L.P. (Apollo)

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP

    • First Lien Credit Agreement Agent: Credit Suisse AG, Cayman Islands Branch

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Eli Vonnegut) & Rapp & Krock PC (Henry Flores, Kenneth Krock)

    • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Lenders: American Money Management Corp, Arbour Lane Capital Management, Arena Capital Advisors LLC, Ares Management LLC, Bank of Montreal, BlueMountain Capital Management, Carlson Capital LP, Catalur Capital Management LP, Citibank NA, Credit Suisse AG, Deutsche Bank New York, Fidelity Management & Research Co., Fortress Investment Group LLC, GS Capital Partners LP, Hill Path Capital, Indaba Capital Fund LP, ICG Debt Advisors, Jefferies Financ LLC, J.H. Lane Partners Master Fund LP, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, MSD Capital LP, MSD Partners LP, Octagon Credit Investors LLC, Par Four Investment Management LLC, RFG-Clover LLC, Second Lien LLC, UBS AG, Wazee Street Capital Management, Western Asset Management Company LLC, WhiteStar Asset Management, ZAIS Group LLC

      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Philip Dublin, Jason Rubin, Marty Brimmage Jr., Lacy Lawrence)

    • Indenture Trustee: Wilmington Trust NA

      • Legal: Reed Smith LLP (Kurt Gwynne, Jason Angelo)

    • Ad Hoc Group of ‘22 8% Senior Noteholders (Longfellow Investment Management Co. LLC, Prudential Financial Inc., Resource Credit Income Fund, Westchester Capital Management)

      • Legal: King & Spalding LLP (Matthew Warren, Lindsey Henrikson, Michael Rupe)

      • Financial Advisor: Ducera Partners LLC

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors: Wilmington Trust NA, The Coca-Cola Company, National Retail Properties, Performance Food Group, Washington Prime Group, NCR Corporation, Index Promotions

      • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (Eric Wilson, Jason Adams, Lauren Schlussel & Womble Bond Dickinson LLP (Matthew Ward)

7/17/20 Dkt. 352.

⛽️ New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Templar Energy LLC ⛽️

Templar Energy LLC

May 31, 2020

Templar Energy LLC (and six affiliates, the “debtors”), an Oklahoma City-based independent oil and gas exploration and production company that operates primarily in the Greater Anadarko Basin of Western Oklahoma and the Texas Panhandle, filed a prepackaged plan of liquidation early Monday morning — the culmination of a multi-year effort to stave off the inevitable.

A quick flashback. Four years ago oil and gas companies were collapsing into bankruptcy left and right. After oil and gas prices fell hard, the oil and gas tide rolled out and left a lot of investors stranded naked on the beach. Most funds were of the view that this was just a hiccup. One fund after another raised billions after billions of dollars thinking that energy was “where it’s at.” We now know how off-kilter that thesis was.

Some companies back then were luckier than others. Thanks in large part to its relatively simple and highly concentrated capital structure and a clear demarcation of value based on prevailing commodity prices of the time, in September 2016, Templar Energy was able to consummate an out-of-court restructuring that extinguished $1.45b of second lien debt. Repeat: $1.45 BILLION of second lien debt — a tremendous amount of value destruction a mere four years after the company’s formation. Of course, as with all things there are nuances here. “Value destruction” is a relative phrase that applies to the par holders of the debt when originally issued. Certain second lien lenders who participated in the out-of-court restructuring may very well have purchased the paper for cents on the dollar once the par guys had to pull the ripcord. Destruction there, therefore, is a function of price. There’s no way to know (from publicly available information) whether any of the original holders of second lien paper came out ahead upon receiving $133mm in cash and 45% of the equity in exchange for their second lien paper. It’s certainly possible that some did.

It’s also highly probable that some didn’t. Take Ares Management LLC, Bain Capital and Paulson & Co. Inc. for instance; they each participated in a rights offering for participating preferred equity in the company in exchange for $220mm dumped into this turd (plus $145mm placed by legacy equity holders). Given that the RBL IS NOW IMPAIRED here, clearly that equity check hasn’t borne fruit. It was also used to pay the aforementioned $133mm of cash recovery so … suffice it to say … this does not seem like one that the aforementioned funds will be referencing in future LP-oriented marketing materials.

Emanating out of that ‘16 transaction is the debtors’ current $600mm RBL. This time around, it is the fulcrum security. The debtors note, “Critically the claims under the RBL Facility are deeply impaired.” And the RBL lenders have no intention of owning the assets — predominantly leases with various oil and gas mineral owners covering non-exclusive working interests in approximately 2,165 oil and gas wells over approximately 273,400 continuous acres of property. Let’s be clear here: first lien lenders generally aren’t in the business of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracking. Of course, right now, the debtors aren’t really in the business of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracking. At least technically speaking. Given where oil and gas prices are — thanks Putin/MBS on the supply side, COVID-19 on the demand side — the debtors aren’t even conducting any drilling. Typically they operate anywhere up to 13 rigs at a time. All of which is to say that the lenders’ position explains why this is a sale + plan of liquidation case rather than a second debt-for-equity play.*

To aid the debtors’ attempts to continue pre-petition sale efforts post-petition, certain of the RBL Lenders have committed to a $37.5mm DIP (with a 0.5-to-1 $12.5mm rollup). Pursuant to a restructuring support agreement, the RBL lenders have agreed to receive their pro rata share of any net sale proceeds and all remaining cash held by the debtors’ estates as of the plan effective date minus (i) cash needed to repay the DIP, (ii) wind down funds, and (iii) monies placed into a professional fee escrow. Royalty owners, materialman and mechanics’ lienholders will be paid in full. General unsecured claimants and equity will get wiped.

*We should note — to hammer home the point — that one of the events that hammered the debtors’ liquidity position was the RBL lenders’ April 1, 2019 redetermination down of the RBL borrowing base to $415mm. This regularly scheduled redetermination analysis created an immediate $22mm “deficiency payment” liability for the debtors as it had $437mm borrowed at the time. The debtors stopped making those payments in November 2019. They’ve been in a state of forbearance with the RBL lenders ever since.

$37.5mm DIP with $12.5 rollup

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge )

  • Capital Structure:

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Paul Basta, Robert Britton, Sarah Harnett, Teresa Li) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, Jaime Luton Chapman, Tara Pakrouh)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC

    • Investment Banker: Guggenheim Securities LLC (Morgan Suckow)

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Agent ($37.5mm): Bank of America NA

    • Consenting RBL Lenders

      • Legal: Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (Amy Kyle, Andrew Gallo) & Richards Layton & Finger PA

      • Financial Advisor: RPA Advisors LLC

    • Large Class A equityholders: Ares Management LLC, Paulson & Co. Inc., Bain Capital, Lord Abbett, Archview Investment, Bank of America, Seix Advisors, Bardin Hill/Halcyon Loan Invest Management, Oppenheimer Funds

🔋New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Exide Holdings Inc.🔋

Exide Holdings Inc.

May 19, 2020

Georgia-based Exide Holdings Inc. and four affiliates (the “debtors”), among the world’s largest producers and recyclers of lead-acid batteries used in cars, boats, golf carts and more, filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the District of Delaware earlier this week. The filing sparked an entire industry to ask “is it a Chapter 22 or a Chapter 33?” The answer, depending upon your look-back period, is the latter. The fairer answer is probably the former and even that was 7 years ago with emergence 5 years ago (PETITION Note: the Exide Creditors’ Liquidating Trust had to make a notice of appearance in these new cases so, there’s that). Going back nearly two decades seems to be an impossible standard to hold any business to but 5-7 years seems much fairer.

Since we’re discussing labels, here’s another one: failure. Per the debtors:

Notwithstanding the Company’s efforts to implement its business plan following its emergence from the 2013 Chapter 11 Case and the support of its new owners and lenders, the Company continued to face liquidity, performance, and operational challenges that were more persistent and widespread than anticipated. Coupled with adverse industry and market factors as well as substantial environmental costs, these challenges have resulted in reduced liquidity.

Sooooo…that sucks. We admit it: we were hoping that this was a disruption story. That Elon Musk and the increasingly large cohort of lithium-ion battery using OEMs pushing out electric vehicles were putting the lead-acid battery manufacturers out to pasture. But that is not a state reason for this chapter 3…uh…chapter 2…uh, whatever the f*ck this is. Rather, the debtors state that their post-emergence liquidity issues stem from (a) mounting environmental remediation costs and litigation, (b) rising production costs (PETITION Note: because the debtors shut two recycling facilities, they are now subject to pricing pressures from outside manufacturers rather than just using their own recycled inputs), (c) operational inefficiencies caused by legacy mixed-use facilities, and (d), of course…wait for it…COVID-19. Duck for COVID-cover folks! The debtors say that the pandemic’s impact on demand for product is the cherry on top.

The debtors’ capital structure doesn’t help. Look at this beaut:

With that much funded debt, the debtors’ leverage ratio stands at 9.2x. Debt service averages approximately $26.8mm/year.

So, confronted with all of these factors, the debtors have been engaged in a marketing process since 2018. The continued deterioration of the business, however, ultimately led to a restructuring path and now the debtors intend to use the bankruptcy process to effectuate a sale of (i) the entire business or (ii) the Americas business and/or (iii) the sale of its Europe/Rest-of-World business or (iv) a liquidation (PETITION Note: the debtors fall into chapter 11 largely separated into four main business groups). The Ad Hoc Group has submitted a binding credit bid for the Europe/ROW business group which will serve as a stalking horse bid; they have also committed $15mm in DIP financing to service certain non-debtor affiliates in Europe with an additional $25mm DIP commitment for the administration of the cases coming from Blue Torch Capital LP. The debtors hope to go “effective” by the end of August: this means that everyone has a lot of work to do to try and and locate a buyer for the rest of the debtors’ businesses in the interim.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Sontchi)

  • Capital Structure:

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Ray Schrock, Jacqueline Marcus, Sunny Singh, Samuel Mendez, Alyssa Kutner, Jason Hufendick) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Daniel DeFranceschi, Zachary Shapiro, Brendan Schlauch)

    • Independent Directors: Alan Carr, William Transier, Harvey Tepner, Mark Barberio

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: Ankura Consulting (Roy Messing)

    • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition ABL Agent: Bank of America NA

      • Legal: Otterbourg PC (Daniel Fiorillo, David Morse, Jonathan Helfat)

    • Indenture Trustee

      • Legal: Arent Fox LLP (Andrew Silfen, Jordana Renert)

    • DIP Agent ($40mm): Blue Torch Capital LP

      • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Robert Klyman, Matthew Bouslog, Michael Farag) & Cole Schotz PC (Norman Pernick, Patrick Reilley)

    • Ad Hoc Group

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Alice Belisle Eaton, Robert Britton, Eugene Park, Claudia Tobler, Jacqueline Rubin, Douglas Keeton, David Weiss, David Giller) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, Sean Greecher, Andrew Magaziner, Ian Bambrick)

    • Large equityholders: Mackay Shields LLC, AllianceBernstein LLP, D.E. Shaw Galvanic Portfolios LLC, Neuberger Berman Group LLC

    • Exide Creditors’ Liquidating Trust

      • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (Dane Kane, Konstantinos Katsionis)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC

Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC

May 7, 2020

Dallas-based Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC, Bergdorf Goodman Inc. and 22 other debtors filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the Southern District of Texas late this week. If anyone is seeking an explanation as to why that may be outside the obvious pandemic-related narrative, look no farther than this monstrosity:

Screen Shot 2020-05-08 at 4.51.32 PM.png

A quick reality check: that $5b capital structure isn’t attached to an international enterprise with hundreds or thousands of stores. You know, like Forever21. Rather, that horror show backs a 68 store business (43 Neiman Marcus, 2 Bergdorf, 22 Last Call). Ah….gotta love the good ol’ $5b leveraged buyout.

This case is all about “BIG.”

Big capital structure stemming from a big LBO by two big PE funds, Ares Capital Management and CPP Investment Board USRE Inc.

Big brands with big price tags. PETITION Note: top unsecured creditors include Chanel Inc., Gucci America, Dolce and Gabbana USA Inc., Stuart Weitzman Inc., Theory LLC, Christian Louboutin, Yves Saint Laurent America Inc., Burberry USA, and more. There is also a big amount allocated towards critical vendors: $42.5mm. Nobody messes with Gucci, folks. Here’s a live shot of a representative walking out of court confident that they’ll get their money:

Gucci.gif

Big fees. More on this below.

Big, complicated — and controversial — multi-year re-designation and asset stripping transactions that were part of the debtors’ (and now non-debtors’) elaborate strategy to restructure out-of-court by kicking the can down the road. This is undoubtedly going to stir a big fight in the case. More on this below too.

Big value destruction.

Here is what will happen to the pre-petition capital structure under the proposed term sheet and restructuring support agreement filed along with the chapter 11 papers — a deal that has the support of 78% of the term lenders, 78% of the debentures, 99% of the second lien notes, 70% of the third lien notes, and 100% of the private equity sponsors:

Screen Shot 2020-05-08 at 4.51.32 PM.JPG

The Asset-Based Revolving Credit Facility and FILO Facility will get out at par. There’ll be a $750mm exit facility. Beyond that? All that red constitutes heaps and heaps of value that’s now essentially an option. It’s a bet that there is a place in the future for brick-and-mortar luxury department stores. Pursuant to the deal, the “Extended Term Loans” will get the lion’s share of equity (87.5%, subject to dilution). The rest of the capital structure will get small slivers of reorganized equity. General unsecured creditors will get “their pro rata share of a cash pool.” The private equity sponsors will get wiped out but for their hoped-for liability releases.

Back to those big fees. The biggest issue for this week was the debtors’ proposed $675mm new money DIP credit facility (that comes in junior to the existing ABL in priority…in other words, no roll-up here). The DIP is essentially 13% paper chock full of fees (including a backstop fee payable in “NewCo equity” at 30% discount to plan value). One disgruntled party, Mudrick Capital Management, a holder of $144mm of the term loan, appears to have beef with Pimco and other DIP backstop parties — saying that the backstop agreement is inappropriate and the DIP fees are outrageous, likening the fee grab to a COVID hoarding mentality — and therefore felt compelled to cross-examine the debtors’ banker as to the reasonableness of it all. If you’ve ever imagined a kid suing other kids for not picking him for their dodgeball team, it would look something like this did.

And so Lazard’s testimony basically boiled down to this:

“Uh, yeah, dude, nobody knows when the economy will fully open up. The company only has $100mm of cash on the petition date. And IT’S NOT OPERATING. That money is enough for maybe 3 weeks of cash burn given that the debtors intend to continue paying rent (unlike most other retailers that have filed for bankruptcy lately). Damn pesky high-end landlords. Anyway, so we’ll burn approximately $300mm between now and when stores are projected to reopen in July/August. No operating cash flow + meaningful cash burn = risky AF lending environment. It’s unprecedented to lend into a situation with a cash burn that, while it pales in comparison to something like Uber, is pretty damn extreme. Look at the J.Crew DIP: it ain’t exactly cheap to lend in this market. There are no unencumbered assets; there certainly isn’t a way to get junior financing. And a priming fight makes no sense here given the impossibility of showing an equity cushion. So stop being an entitled little brat. There’s no obligation on anyone to cut you into the deal. And if you’re going to cry over spilled milk, take up your beef with Pimco and f*ck right off. Alternatively, you can subscribe to your pro rata portion of the DIP and enjoy all of the fees other than the backstop fee.”

The Judge was convinced that the above rationale constituted good business judgment and approved the DIP on an interim basis.

The hearing also foreshadowed another contentious issue in the case: the myTheresa situation. See, the Debtors’ position is the following: “The ‘17 MyTheresa designation as unrestricted subs + the ‘18 distribution of the myTheresa operating companies to non-debtor Neiman Marcus Group Inc. (a/k/a the “asset stripping” transaction) + a ‘19 wholesale amend-and-extend + cost-saving initiatives + comparable same store sales growth for 7 of 10 quarters + “significantly expanded margins” during the holiday period = rocket ship future growth but for the damn pandemic. On the flip side, Marble Ridge Capital LP takes the position that:

…the Debtors’ financial troubles were entirely foreseeable well before recent events. The Company has operated at leverage multiples more than twice its peers since at least 2018 (prior to the fraudulent transfers described herein). And last year’s debt restructuring increased the Company’s already unsustainable annual interest expense by more than $100 million while only reducing the Company’s debt load by $250 million leaving a fraction of adjusted EBITDA for any capital expenditures, principal repayment, taxes or one-time charges. Sadly, the Debtors’ financial distress will come as no surprise to anyone.

This ain’t gonna be pretty. Marble Ridge has already had one suit for fraudulent transfer dismissed with prejudice at the pleading stage. Now there are defamation and other claims AGAINST Marble Ridge outstanding. And subsequent suits in the NY Supreme Court. Have no fear, though, folks. There are independent managers in the mix now to perform an “independent” investigation into these transactions.

The debtors intend to have a plan on file by early June with confirmation in September. Until then, pop your popcorn folks. You can socially distance AND watch these fireworks.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Jones)

  • Capital Structure: See above.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Anup Sathy, Chad Husnick, Matthew Fagen, Austin Klar, Gregory Hesse, Dan Latona, Gavin Campbell, Gary Kavarsky, Mark McKane, Jeffrey Goldfine, Josh Greenblatt, Maya Ben Meir) & Jackson Walker LLP (Matthew Cavenaugh, Jennifer Wertz, Kristhy Peguero, Veronica Polnick)

    • Independent Managers of NMG LTD LLC: Marc Beilinson, Scott Vogel

      • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Brian Lennon, Todd Cosenza, Jennifer Hardy, Joseph Davis, Alexander Cheney)

      • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Dennis Stogsdill)

    • Independent Manager of Mariposa Intermediate Holdings LLC: Anthony Horton

      • Legal: Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

    • Neiman Marcus Inc.

      • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Jeffrey Bjork)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: Berkeley Research Group LLC (Mark Weinstein, Kyle Richter, Marissa Light)

    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC (Tyler Cowan)

    • Claims Agent: Stretto (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Pre-petition ABL Agent: Deutsche Bank AG New York Branch

      • Legal: White & Case LLP (Scott Greissman, Andrew Zatz, Rashida Adams) & Gray Reed & McGraw LLP (Jason Brookner, Paul Moak, Lydia Webb)

    • FILO Agent: TPG Specialty Lending Inc.

      • Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (Adam Harris, Abbey Walsh, G. Scott Leonard) & Jones Walker LLP (Joseph Bain)

    • Pre-petition Term Loan Agent: Credit Suisse AG Cayman Islands Branch

      • Legal: Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP (Paul Zumbro, George Zobitz, Christopher Kelly) & Haynes and Boone LLP (Charles Beckham, Martha Wyrick)

    • Second Lien Note Agent: Ankura Trust Company LLC

    • Third Lien Note Agent: Wilmington Trust NA

    • Unsecured Notes Indenture Trustee: UMB Bank NA

      • Legal: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP (Douglas Mannal, Rachael Ringer)

    • 2028 Debentures Agent: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

    • Ad Hoc Term Loan Lender Group (Davidson Kempner Capital Management LP, Pacific Investment Management Company LLC, Sixth Street Partners LLC)

      • Legal: Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz (Joshua Feltman, Emil Kleinhaus) & Vinson & Elkins LLP (Harry Perrin, Kiran Vakamudi, Paul Heath, Matthew Moran, Katherine Drell Grissel)

      • Financial Advisor: Ducera Partners LLC

    • Ad Hoc Secured Noteholder Committee

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Andrew Rosenberg, Alice Belisle Eaton, Claudia Tobler, Diane Meyers, Neal Donnelly, Patricia Walsh, Jeffrey Recher) & Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins, Eric English, M. Shane Johnson)

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

    • Large Creditor: Chanel Inc.

      • Legal: Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (Justin Bernbrock, Michael Driscoll)

    • Large Creditor: Louis Vuitton USA Inc.

      • Legal: Barack Ferrazzano Kirschbaum & Nagelberg LLP (Nathan Rugg)

    • Large Creditor: Moncler USA Inc.

      • Legal: Morrison Cohen LLP (Joseph Moldovan, David Kozlowski)

    • Marble Ridge Capital LP & Marble Ridge Master Fund LP

      • Legal: Brown Rudnick LLP (Edward Weisfelner, Sigmund Wissner-Gross, Jessica Meyers, Uchechi Egeonuigwe)

    • Mudrick Capital Management LP

      • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Michael Rosenthal, Mitchell Karlan, David Feldman, Keith Martorana, Jonathan Fortney)

    • Sponsor: CPP Investment Board USRE Inc.

      • Legal: Debevoise & Plimpton LLP (Jasmine Ball, Erica Weisgerber) & Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP (Hugh Ray, William Hotze, Jason Sharp)

    • Sponsor: Ares Capital Management

      • Legal: Milbank LLP (Dennis Dunne, Thomas Kreller)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

      • Legal: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Richard Pachulski) & Cole Schotz PC (Daniel Rosenberg)

      • Financial Advisor: M-III Advisory Partners LP (Mohsin Meghji)

      • Valuation Expert: The Michel-Shaked Group (Israel Shaked)

👕 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Chinos Holdings Inc. (J.Crew) 👕

Chinos Holdings Inc. (J.Crew)

May 4, 2020

If you’re looking for a snapshot of the pre-trade war and pre-COVID US economy look no farther than J.Crew’s list of top 30 unsecured creditors attached to its chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. On the one hand there is the LONG list of sourcers, manufacturers and other middlemen who form the crux of J.Crew’s sh*tty product line: this includes, among others, 12 Hong Kong-based, three India-based, three South Korea-based, two Taiwan-based, and two Vietnam-based companies. In total, 87% of their product is sourced in Asia (45% from mainland China and 16% from Vietnam). On the other hand, there are the US-based companies. There’s Deloitte Consulting — owed a vicious $22.7mm — the poster child here for the services-dependent US economy. There’s the United Parcel Services Inc. ($UPS)…okay, whatever. You’ve gotta ship product. We get that. And then there’s Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB, as the debtors’ pre-petition term loan agent, and Eaton Vance Management as a debtholder and litigant. Because nothing says the US-of-f*cking-A like debt and debtholder driven litigation. ‘Merica! F*ck Yeah!!

Chinos Holdings Inc. (aka J.Crew) and seventeen affiliated debtors (the “debtors”) filed for bankruptcy early Monday morning with a prearranged deal that is dramatically different from the deal the debtors (and especially the lenders) thought they had at the tail end of 2019. That’s right: while the debtors have obviously had fundamental issues for years, it was on the brink of a transaction that would have kept it out of court. Call it “The Petsmart Effect.” (PETITION Note: long story but after some savage asset-stripping the Chewy IPO basically dug out Petsmart from underneath its massive debt load; J.Crew’s ‘19 deal intended to do the same by separating out the various businesses from the Chino’s holding company and using Madewell IPO proceeds to fund payments to lenders).

Here is the debtors’ capital structure. It is key to understanding what (i) the 2019 deal was supposed to accomplish and (ii) the ownership of J.Crew will look like going forward:

Screen Shot 2020-05-04 at 3.38.16 PM.png

Late last year, the debtors and their lenders entered into a Transaction Support Agreement (“TSA”) with certain pre-petition lenders and their equity sponsors, TPG Capital LP and Leonard Green & Partners LP, that would have (a) swapped the $1.33b of term loans for $420mm of new term loans + cash and (b) left general unsecured creditors unimpaired (100% recovery of amounts owed). As noted above, the cash needed to make (a) and (b) happen would have come from a much-ballyhooed IPO of Madewell Inc.

Then COVID-19 happened.

Suffice it to say, IPO’ing a brick-and-mortar based retailer — even if there were any kind of IPO window — is a tall order when there’s, like, a pandemic shutting down all brick-and-mortar business. Indeed, the debtors indicate that they expect a $900mm revenue decline due to COVID. That’s the equivalent of taking Madewell — which earned $602m of revenue in ‘19 after $614mm in ‘18 — and blowing it to smithereens. Only then to go back and blow up the remnants a second time for good measure.* Source of funds exit stage left!

The post-COVID deal is obviously much different. The term lenders aren’t getting a paydown from Madewell proceeds any longer; rather, they are effectively getting Madewell itself by converting their term loan claims and secured note claims into approximately 82% of the reorganized equity. Some other highlights:

  • Those term loan holders who are members of the Ad Hoc Committee will backstop a $400mm DIP credit facility (50% minimum commitment) that will convert into $400mm of new term loans post-effective date. The entire plan is premised upon a $1.75b enterprise value which is…uh…interesting. Is it modest considering it represents a $1b haircut off the original take-private enterprise value nine years ago? Or is it ambitious considering the company’s obvious struggles, its limited brand equity, the recession, brick-and-mortar’s continued decline, Madewell’s deceleration, and so forth and so on? Time will tell.

  • Syndication of the DIP will be available to holders of term loans and IPCo Notes (more on these below), provided, however, that they are accredited institutional investors.

  • The extra juice for putting in for a DIP allocation is that, again, they convert to new term loans and, for their trouble, lenders of the new term loans will get 15% additional reorganized equity plus warrants. So an institution that’s in it to win it and has a full-on crush for Madewell (and the ghost of JCrew-past) will get a substantial chunk of the post-reorg equity (subject to dilution).

Query whether, if asked a mere six months ago, they were interested in owning this enterprise, the term lenders would’ve said ‘yes.’ Call us crazy but we suspect not. 😎

General unsecured creditors’ new deal ain’t so hot in comparison either. They went from being unimpaired to getting a $50mm pool with a 50% cap on claims. That is to say, maybe…maybe…they’ll get 50 cents on the dollar.

That is, unless they’re one of the debtors’ 140 landlords owed, in the aggregate, approximately $23mm in monthly lease obligations.** The debtors propose to treat them differently from other unsecured creditors and give them a “death trap” option: if they accept the TSA’s terms and get access to a $3mm pool or reject and get only $1mm with a 50% cap on claims. We can’t imagine this will sit well. We imagine that the debtors choice of venue selection has something to do with this proposed course of action. 🤔

We’re not going to get into the asset stripping transaction at the heart of the IPCo Note issuance. This has been widely-covered (and litigated) but we suspect it may get a new breath of life here (only to be squashed again, more likely than not). In anticipation thereof, the debtors have appointed special committees to investigate the validity of any claims related to the transaction. They may want to take up any dividends to their sponsors while they’re at it.

The debtors hope to have this deal wrapped up in a bow within 130 days. We cannot even imagine what the retail landscape will look like that far from now but, suffice it to say, the ratings agencies aren’t exactly painting a calming picture.

*****

*Curiously, there are some discrepancies here in the numbers. In the first day papers, the debtors indicate that 2018 revenue for Madewell was $529.2mm. With $602mm in ‘19 revenue, one certainly walks away with the picture that Madewell is a source of growth (13.8%) while the J.Crew side of the business continues to decline (-4%). This graph is included in the First Day Declaration:

Source: First Day Declaration

Source: First Day Declaration

The Madewell S-1, however, indicates that 2018 revenue was $614mm.

Screen Shot 2020-05-04 at 3.58.35 PM.png

With $268mm of the ‘18 revenue coming in the first half, this would imply that second half ‘18 revenue was $346mm. With ‘19 revenue coming in at $602mm and $333mm attributable to 1H, this would indicate that the business is declining rather than growing. In the second half, in particular, revenue for fiscal ‘19 was $269mm, a precipitous dropoff from $333mm in ‘18. Even if you take the full year fiscal year ‘18 numbers from the first day declaration (529.2 - 268) you get $261mm of second half growth in ‘18 compared to the $269mm in ‘19. While this would reflect some growth, it doesn’t exactly move the needle. This is cause for concern.

**To make matters worse for landlords, the debtors are also seeking authority to shirk post-petition rent obligations for 60 days while they evaluate whether to shed their leases. We get that the debtors were nearing a deal that COVID threw into flux, but this bit is puzzling: “Beginning in early April 2020, after several weeks of government mandated store closures and uncertainty as to the duration and resulting impact of the pandemic, the Debtors began to evaluate their lease portfolio to, among other things, quantify and realize the potential for lease savings.” Beginning in early April!?!?


  • Jurisdiction: E.D. of Virginia (Judge )

  • Capital Structure: $311mm ABL (Bank of America NA), $1.34b ‘21 term loan (Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB), $347.6 IPCo Notes (U.S. Bank NA)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Ray Schrock, Ryan Preston Dahl, Candace Arthur, Daniel Gwen) & Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP (Tyler Brown, Henry P Long III, Nathan Kramer)

    • JCrew Opco Special Committee: D.J. (Jan) Baker, Chat Leat, Richard Feintuch, Seth Farbman

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co.

    • Real Estate Advisor: Hilco Real Estate LLC

    • Claims Agent: Omni Agent Solutions (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Pre-petition ABL Agent: Bank of America NA

      • Legal: Choate Hall & Stewart LLP (Kevin Simard, G. Mark Edgarton) & McGuireWoods LLP (Douglas Foley, Sarah Boehm)

    • Pre-petition Term Loan & DIP Agent ($400mm): Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

      • Legal: Seward & Kissel LLP

    • Ad Hoc Committee

      • Legal: Milbank LLP (Dennis Dunne, Samuel Khalil, Andrew LeBlanc, Matthew Brod) & Tavenner & Beran PLC (Lynn Tavenner, Paula Beran, David Tabakin)

      • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners Inc.

    • Large common and Series B preferred stock holders: TPG Capital LP (55% and 66.2%) & Leonard Green & Partners LP (20.7% and 24.8%)

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Paul Basta, Jacob Adlerstein, Eugene Park, Irene Blumberg) & Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLP (Christopher Jones, Vernon Inge Jr., Corey Booker)

    • Large Series A preferred stock holders: Anchorage Capital Group LLC (25.6%), GSO Capital Partners LP (26.1%), Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC (15.5%)

⛽️New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Diamond Offshore Drilling Inc. ($DO)⛽️

Diamond Offshore Drilling Inc.

April 26, 2020

Houston-based Diamond Offshore Drilling Inc. and 14 affiliates (the “debtors”), a contract drilling services provider to the oil and gas industry filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of Texas. The company has 15 offshore drilling rigs: 11 semi-submersibles and four ultra-deepwater drillships deployed around the world (primarily in the Gulf of Mexico, Australia, Brazil and UK). Offshore drilling was already challenged due to excess supply of rigs — and has been since 2014. Recent events have made matters much much worse.

Thanks MBS. Thanks Putin. Thanks…uh…debilitating pandemic. The left-right combination of the Saudi/OPEC/Russia oil price war and COVID-19 has the entire oil and gas industry wobbling against the ropes. The pre-existing reality for offshore services companies “worsened precipitously” because of all of this. And so many companies will fall. The question is at what count and at what strength will they be able to get back on their feet. Given that this is a free-fall into bankruptcy with no pre-negotiated deal with lenders, it seems that nobody knows the answer. How could they? More on this below.

Unfortunately, the services segment the debtors play in is particularly at risk. “Almost all” of the debtors’ customers have requested some form of concessions on $1.4b of aggregate contract backlog. One customer, Beach Energy Ltd. ($BEPTF), “recently sought to formally terminate its agreement with the Company” (an action that is now the subject of an adversary proceeding filed in the bankruptcy cases). The debtors have been immersed in negotiations with their contract counter-parties to navigate these extraordinary times. It doesn’t help when business is so concentrated. Hess Corporation ($HES) is 30% of annual revenue; Occidental Petroleum Corporation ($OXY) is 21%; and Petrobras ($PBR) is 20%. BP PLC ($BP) and Royal Dutch Shell ($RDS.A) are other big customers.

With the writing on the wall, the debtors smartly drew down on their revolving credit facility — pulling $436mm out from under Wells Fargo Bank NA ($WFC). WFC must’ve loved that. Times like these really give phrases like “relationship banking” entirely new meaning. The debtors also elected to forgo a $14mm interest payment on its 2039 senior notes. Yep, you read that right: the company previously issued senior notes that weren’t set to mature until 2039. Not exactly Argentina but holy f*ck that expresses some real optimism (and froth) in the markets (and that issuance isn’t even the longest dated maturity but let’s not nitpick here)!

Yeah, so about that capital structure. In total, the debtors have $2.4b in funded debt. In addition to their $442mm of drawing under their revolving credit facility, the debtors have:

  • $500mm of 5.7% ‘39 senior unsecured notes;

  • $250mm of 3.45% ‘23 senior unsecured notes;

  • $750mm of 4.875% ‘43 senior unsecured notes; and

  • $500mm of 7.785% ‘25 senor unsecured notes.

As we’ve said time and time again: exploration and production is a wildly capital intensive business.

So now what? As we said above, there’s no deal here. The debtors note:

The Debtors determined to commence these Chapter 11 Cases to preserve their valuable contract backlog, and preserve their approximately $434.9 million in unrestricted cash on hand while avoiding annual interest expense of approximately $140.1 million under the Revolving Credit Facility and the Senior Notes, and to stabilize operations while proactively restructuring their balance sheet to successfully compete in the changing global energy markets. The Debtors and their Advisors believe cash on hand provides adequate funding at the outset of these cases. The Debtors are well-positioned to successfully emerge from bankruptcy with a highly marketable fleet, a solid backlog of activity, a strong balance sheet and liquidity position, and a differentiated approach and set of capabilities. Despite the volatile and current uncertain market conditions, the Debtors remain confident in the need for their industry, its importance around the world, and the critical services they provide.

We suspect the debtors will hang out in bankruptcy for a bit. After all, placing a value on how “critical” these services are in the current environment is going to be a challenge (though the relatively simple capital structure makes that calculation significantly easier…assuming the value extends beyond WFC). One thing seems certain: Loews Corporation ($L) is gonna have to write-down the entirety of its investment here.

*****

We’d be remiss if we didn’t highlight that, similar to Whiting Petroleum’s execs, the debtors’ executives here got paid nice bonuses just prior to the bankruptcy filing. PETITION Note: We don’t have data to back this up but there appeared to be a much bigger uproar in Whiting’s case about this than here. Which is not to say that people aren’t angry — totally factually incorrect — but angry:

Because equity-based comp doesn’t exactly serve as “incentive” when the equity is worth bupkis, the debtors paid $3.55mm to employees a week before the filing and intend to file a motion to seek bankruptcy court approval of their go-forward employee programs.


  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Jones)

  • Capital Structure: $442mm RCF (inclusive of LOC)(Wells Fargo Bank NA). See above.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Paul Basta, Robert Britton, Christopher Hopkins, Shamara James, Alice Nofzinger, Jacqueline Rubin, Andrew Gordon, Jorge Gonzalez-Corona) & Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins, Eric English, M. Shane Johnson, Genevieve Graham)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Nicholas Grossi)

    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition RCF Agent: Wells Fargo Bank NA

      • Legal: Bracewell LLP

      • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting

    • Indenture Trustee: The Bank of New York Mellon

    • Ad Hoc Group of Senior Noteholders

      • Legal: Milbank LLP

      • Financial Advisor: Evercore Group LLC

    • Major Equityholder: Loews Corporation

      • Legal: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (James Bromley)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors: The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company NA, National Oilwell Varco LP, Deep Sea Mooring, Crane Worldwide Logistics LLC, Kiswire Trading Inc., Parker Hannifin Corporation, SafeKick Americas LLC

      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Philip Dublin, Naomi Moss, Marty Brimmage, Kevin Eide, Patrick Chen, Matthew Breen)

      • Financial Advisor: Berkeley Research Group LLC (Christopher Kearns)

      • Investment Banker: Perella Weinberg Partners LP (Alexander Tracy)

📺 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Frontier Communications Inc. ($FTR) 📺

Triple Frontier.gif

We often highlight how, particularly in the case of oil and gas companies, capital intensive companies end up with a lot of debt and a lot of debt often results in bankruptcy. In the upstream oil and gas space, exploration and production companies need a lot of upfront capital to, among other things, enter into royalty interest agreements with land owners, hire people to map wells, hire people to drill the earth, secure proper equipment, procure the relevant inputs and more. E&P companies literally have to shell out to pull out.

Similarly, telecommunications companies that want to cover a lot of ground require a lot of capital to do so. From 2010 through 2016, Connecticut-based Frontier Communications Inc. ($FTR) closed a series of transactions to expand from a provider of telephone and DSL internet services in mainly rural areas to a large telecommunications provider to both rural and urban markets across 29 states. It took billions of dollars in acquisitions to achieve this. Which, in turn, meant the company took on billions of dollars of debt to finance said acquisitions. $17.5b, to be exact. Due, in large part, to the weight of that heavy debt load, it, and its 28922932892 affiliates (collectively, the “debtors”), are now chapter 11 debtors in the Southern District of New York (White Plains).*

Screen Shot 2020-04-18 at 5.45.23 PM.png

The debtors underwrote the transactions with the expectation that synergistic efficiencies would be borne out and flow to the bottom line. PETITION readers know how we feel about synergies: more often than not, they prove elusive. Well:

Serving the new territories proved more difficult and expensive than the Company anticipated, and integration issues made it more difficult to retain customers. Simultaneously, the Company faced industry headwinds stemming from fierce competition in the telecommunications sector, shifting consumer preferences, and accelerating bandwidth and performance demands, all redefining what infrastructure telecommunications companies need to compete in the industry. These conditions have contributed to the unsustainability of the Company’s outstanding funded debt obligations—which total approximately $17.5 billion as of the Petition Date.

Shocker. Transactions that were meant to be accretive to the overall enterprise ended up — in conjunction with disruptive trends and intense competition — resulting in an astronomical amount of value destruction.

As a result of these macro challenges and integration issues, Frontier has not been able to fully realize the economies of scale expected from the Growth Transactions, as evidenced by a loss of approximately 1.3 million customers, from a high of 5.4 million after the CTF Transaction closed in 2016 to approximately 4.1 million as of January 2020. Frontier’s share price has dropped … reflecting a $8.4 billion decrease in market capitalization.

😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬

Consequently, the debtors have been in a state of liability management ever since the end of 2018. Subsequently, they (i) issued new secured notes to refinance a near(er)-term term loan maturity, (ii) amended and extended their revolving credit facility, and (iii) agreed to sell their northwest operations and related assets for $1.352b (the “Pacific Northwest Transaction”). The Pacific Northwest Transaction has since been hurdling through the regulatory approval process and seems poised to close on April 30, 2020.**

While all of these machinations were positive steps, there were still major issues to deal with. The capital structure remained robust. And “up-tier” exchanges of junior debt into more senior debt to push out near-term maturities were, post-Windstream***, deemed too complex, too short-term, and too likely to end up the subject of fierce (and costly) litigation**** As the debtors’ issued third quarter financials that were … well … not good, they announced a full drawn down of their revolver, instantly arming them with hundreds of millions of dollars of liquidity.

The company needed reconstructive surgery. Band-aids alone wouldn’t be enough to dam the tide. In many respects, the company ought to be commended for opting to address the problem in a wholesale way rather than piecemeal kick, kick, and kick the can down the road — achieving nothing but short-term fixes to the enrichment of really nobody other than its bankers (and Aurelius).

And so now the company is at the restructuring support agreement stage. Seventy-five percent of the holders of unsecured notes have agreed to an equitization transaction — constituting an impaired consenting class for a plan of reorganization to be put on file within 30 days. Said another way, the debtors are taking the position that the value breaks within the unsecured debt. That is, that the value is at least $6.6b making the $10.949b of senior unsecured notes the “fulcrum security.” Unsecured noteholders reportedly include Elliott Management Corp., Apollo Global Management LLC, Franklin Resources Inc., and Capital Group Cos. They would end up the owners of the reorganized company.

What else is the RSA about?

  • Secured debt will be repaid in full on the effective date;

  • A proposed DIP (more on this below) would roll into an exit facility;

  • The unsecured noteholders would, in addition to receiving equity, get $750mm of seniority-TBD take-back paper and $150mm of cash (and board seats);

  • General unsecured creditors would ride through and be paid in full; and

  • Holders of secured and unsecured subsidiary debt will be reinstated or paid in full.

The debtors also obtained a fully-committed new money DIP of $460mm from Goldman Sachs Bank USA. This has proven controversial. Though the DIP motion was not up for hearing along with other first day relief late last week, the subject proved contentious. The Ad Hoc First Lien Committee objected to the DIP. Coming in hot, they wrote:

Beneath the thin veneer in which these so-called “pre-arranged” cases are packaged, lies multiple infirmities that, if not properly addressed by the Debtors, will ultimately result in the unraveling of these cases. While the Debtors seek to shroud themselves in a restructuring support agreement (the “RSA”) that enjoys broad unsecured creditor support, the truth is that underlying that support is a fragile house of cards that will not withstand scrutiny as these cases unfold. Turning the bankruptcy code on its head, the Debtors attempt through their RSA to pay unsecured bondholders cash as a proxy for their missed prepetition interest payment, postpetition interest to yet other unsecured creditors of various subsidiaries, and complete repayment to prepetition revolver lenders that are attempting, through the proposed debtor-inpossession financing (the “DIP Loan”), to effectively “roll-up” their prepetition exposure through the DIP Loan, all while the Debtors attempt to deprive their first lien secured creditors of contractual entitlements to default interest and pro rata payments they will otherwise be entitled to if their debt is to be unimpaired, as the RSA purports to require. While those are fights for another day, their significance in these cases must not be overlooked.

Whoa. That’s a lot. What does it boil down to? “F*ck you, pay me.” The first lien lenders are pissed that everyone under the sun is getting taken care of in the RSA except them.

  • You want to deny us our default interest. F+ck you, pay me.

  • You want a DIP despite having hundreds of millions of cash on hand and $1.3b of sale proceeds coming in? F+ck you, pay me.

  • You want a 2-for-1 roll-up where, “as a condition to raising $460 million in debtor-in-possession financing, the Debtors must turn around and repay $850 million to their prepetition revolving lenders, thus decreasing the Debtors’ overall liquidity on a net basis”? F+ck you, pay me.

  • You shirking our pro rata payments we’d otherwise be entitled to if our debt is to be unimpaired? F+ck you, pay me.

  • You want to pay unsecured senior noteholders “incremental payments” of excess cash to compensate them for skipped interest payments without paying us default interest and pro rata payments? F+ck you, pay me.

  • You want to use sale proceeds to pay down unsecureds when that’s ours under the first lien docs? F+ck you, pay me.

  • You want to pay interest on the sub debt without giving us default interest? F+ck you, pay me.

  • You want to do all of this without a proper adequate protection package for us? F+ck you, pay me.

The second lien debtholders chimed in, voicing similar concerns about the propriety of the adequate protection package. For the uninitiated, adequate protection often includes replacement liens on existing collateral, super-priority claims emanating out of those liens, payment of professional fees, and interest. In this case, both the first and second liens assert that default interest — typically several bps higher — ought to be included as adequate protection. The issue, however, was not up for hearing on the first day so all of this is a preview of potential fireworks to come if an agreement isn’t hashed out in coming weeks.

The debtors hope to have a confirmation order within four months with the effective date within twelve months (the delay attributable to certain regulatory approvals). We wish them luck.

______

*Commercial real estate is getting battered all over the place but not 50 Main Street, Suite 1000 in White Plains New York. Apparently Frontier Communications has an office there too. Who knew there was a speciality business in co-working for bankrupt companies? In one place, you’ve got FULLBEAUTY Brands Inc. and Internap Inc. AND Frontier Communications. We previously wrote about this convenient phenomenon here.

**The company seeks an expedited hearing in bankruptcy court seeking approval of it. It is scheduled for this week.

***Here is a Bloomberg video from June 2019 previously posted in PETITION wherein Jason Mudrick of Mudrick Capital Management discusses the effect Windstream had on Frontier and predicted Frontier would be in bankruptcy by the end of the year. He got that wrong. But did it matter to him? He also notes a CDS-based short-position that would pay out if Frontier filed for bankruptcy within 12 months. For CDS purposes, looks like he got that right. By the way, per Moody’s, here was the spread on the CDS around the time that Mudrick acknowledged his CDS position:

Screen Shot 2020-04-19 at 9.33.11 AM.png

Here it was a few months later:

Screen Shot 2020-04-19 at 10.02.17 AM.png

And, for the sake of comparison, here was the spread on the CDS just prior to the bankruptcy filing last week:

Screen Shot 2020-04-19 at 9.35.24 AM.png

Clearly the market was keenly aware (who wasn’t given the missed interest payment?) that a bankruptcy filing was imminent: insurance on FTR got meaningfully more expensive. Other companies with really expensive CDS these days? Neiman Marcus Group (which, Reuters reports, may be filing as soon as this week), J.C. Penney Corporation Inc., and Chesapeake Energy Corporation.

****Notably, Aurelius Capital Management LP pushed for an exchange of its unsecured position into secured notes higher in the capital structure — a proposal that would achieve the triple-frontier-heist-like-whammy of better positioning their debt, protecting the CDS they sold by delaying bankruptcy, and screwing over junior debtholders like Elliott (PETITION Note: we really just wanted to squeeze in a reference to the abominably-bad NFLX movie starring Ben Affleck, an unfortunate shelter-in indulge). On the flip side, funds such as Discovery Capital Management LLC and GoldenTree Asset Management LP pushed the company to file for bankruptcy rather than engage in Aurelius’ proposed exchange.


  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Drain)

  • Capital Structure: $850mm RCF, $1.7b first lien TL (JP Morgan Chase Bank NA), $1.7b first lien notes (Wilmington Trust NA), $1.6b second lien notes (Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB), $10.95mm unsecured senior notes (The Bank of New York Mellon), $100mm sub secured notes (BOKF NA), $750mm sub unsecured notes (U.S. Bank Trust National Association)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Stephen Hessler, Chad Husnick, Benjamin Rhode, Mark McKane, Patrick Venter, Jacob Johnston)

    • Directors: Kevin Beebe, Paul Keglevic, Mohsin Meghji

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Carlin Adrianopoli)

    • Investment Banker: Evercore Group LLC (Roopesh Shah)

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Major equityholders: BlackRock Inc., Vanguard Group Inc., Charles Schwab Investment Management

    • Unsecured Notes Indenture Trustee: Bank of New York Mellon

      • Legal: Reed Smith LLP (Kurt Gwynne, Katelin Morales)

    • Indenture Trustee and Collateral Agent for the 8.500% ‘26 Second Lien Secured Notes

      • Legal: Riker Danzig Scherer Hyland & Perretti LLP (Joseph Schwartz, Curtis Plaza, Tara Schellhorn)

    • Credit Agreement Administrative Agent: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

      • Legal: Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (Sandeep Qusba, Nicholas Baker, Jamie Fell)

    • DIP Agent: Goldman Sachs Bank USA

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Eli Vonnegut, Stephen Piraino, Samuel Wagreich)

    • Ad Hoc First Lien Committee

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Brian Hermann, Gregory Laufer, Kyle Kimpler, Miriam Levi)

      • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners LP

    • Second lien Ad Hoc Group

      • Legal: Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP (Susheel Kirpalani, Benjamin Finestone, Deborah Newman, Daniel Holzman, Lindsay Weber)

    • Ad Hoc Senior Notes Group

      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Philip Dublin, Naomi Moss)

      • Financial Advisor: Ducera Partners LLC

    • Ad Hoc Committee of Frontier Noteholders

      • Legal: Milbank LLP (Dennis Dunne, Samuel Khalil, Michael Price)

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Inc.

    • Ad Hoc Group of Subsidiary Debtholders

      • Legal: Shearman & Sterling LLP (Joel Moss, Jordan Wishnew)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

      • Legal: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP (Amy Caton, Douglas Mannal, Stephen Zide, Megan Wasson)

      • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Richard Newman)

      • Investment Banker: UBS Securities LLC (Elizabeth LaPuma)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - LSC Communications Inc.

LSC Communications Inc.

April 13, 2020

Chicago-based LSC Communications Inc. ($LSC) and 21 affiliated debtors (the “debtors”), a provider of traditional and digital print products, print-related services and office products, filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York. The company is the result of a 2016 spinoff from R.R. Donnelley & Sons and though it subsequently diversified its business into logistics, it still deals with old-school categories like print magazines, catalogs, books, directories, various other print-related services, and office products. In fact, it is one of the largest printers of books in the US. All of which is to say that the debtors were ripe for disruption.

Nothing about this ought to be surprising to people who have been paying attention to the retail and media landscape over the last decade. Nevertheless, it is painful to read:

Although the Company is a market leader in the printing and printing related services industries, the Company’s product and service offerings have been adversely impacted by a number of long-term economic trends. Digital migration has substantially impacted print production volume, in particular with respect to printed magazines as advertising spending continues to move away from print to electronic media. Catalogs have experienced volume reductions as retailers and direct marketers allocate more of their spending to online advertising and marketing campaigns and some traditional retailers and director marketers go out of business in the face of increased competition from online retailers. The Company saw an unprecedented drop in demand for magazines and catalogs in 2019, with the faster pace of decline in demand primarily due to the accelerating movement from printed platforms to digital platforms.

Thanks Facebook Inc. ($FB). Clearly all of the Restoration Hardware Inc. ($RH) catalogues in the world couldn’t offset the shift of advertising away from print media and soften this blow.

And then there’s this:

Demand for printed educational textbooks within the college market has been adversely impacted by electronic substitution and other trends such as textbook rental programs and free open source e-textbooks. The K-12 educational sector has seen an increased focus on e-textbooks and e-learning programs, but there has been inconsistent adoption of these new technologies across school systems. Consumer demand for e-books in trade and mass market has impacted overall print book volume, although e-book adoption rates have stabilized and industry-wide print book volume has been growing in recent years.

Apropos to the brief discussion above about Mary Meeker’s presentation, we’ve got news for these guys: these trends away from printed textbooks are going to gather steam post-COVID. And while we’re happy to see an uptick in physical book production, it’s unclear whether that is a short-term trend or a longer-term rebound. Someone is going to have to get comfortable betting on the latter. More on this in a moment.

As if the secular trends weren’t bad enough, the debtors’ attempt to consolidate with Quad/Graphics Inc. ($QUAD) (synergies!) in late 2018 met with resistance. The DOJ filed a civil antitrust lawsuit seeking to block the proposed merger and ultimately the parties agreed to terminate the merger. While LSC received a reverse termination fee that exceeded the amount of transaction costs, the proposed merger (i) hindered the debtors’ ability to make much-needed operational fixes (i.e., plant consolidation and footprint optimization), (ii) affected new business development efforts and strained existing customer relationships, and (iii) created uncertainty among the employee ranks that, in some respects, sparked attrition.

All of the above led to an internal restructuring. The debtors set their sights on nine plant closures and footprint reductions — primarily in magazines and catalog manufacturing; they also renegotiated a number of unprofitable customer contracts. Bear in mind: all of this was pre-COVID. Matters can only have gotten worse.

What does all of this look like from a financial perspective? The debtors filed their annual report in early March and the numbers don’t lie:

LSC Annual Report 3/2/20

LSC Annual Report 3/2/20

Net sales declined 13% and while there was a corresponding decline in the cost of sales, SG&A remained constant and restructuring costs ballooned.* The magazines/catalogues/logistics segment declined 7.3%. The book segment fell 3.6%. Office products were a rare bright spot up 8.1% (PETITION Note: this is a relatively small portion of the debtors’ business and we’ll see how that plays out going forward given that there may be a huge shift there).

Due to this piss poor operating performance, the debtors tripped their consolidated leverage ratio and minimum interest ratio covenants in their credit agreement. That’s right: you didn’t think this story would be complete without a significantly over-levered balance sheet, did you?

The company has $972mm of total funded indebtedness broken out among a revolver ($249mm + $50.8mm in outstanding letters of credit), a term loan ($221.9mm) and senior secured notes ($450mm at 8.75%). The term loan requires quarterly principal payments of $10.625mm. While the entire capital structure is secured by an “equal first-priority" ranking with respect to the collateral, the revolver has a “first-out” priority and is entitled first to any proceeds from the collateral while the term loan and the senior secured notes enjoy pari passu status. This is where the rubber meets the road: that’s a lot of parties to get to agree on a transaction.

Before it could agree to anything, however, the debtors needed time and therefore entered into a widely reported forbearance in early March. S&P Global Ratings promptly slapped a downgrade on the company saying that it believed a debt restructuring was likely within 90 days. What a genius call!! While all of this was happening, the debtors continued to deteriorate:

During its March discussions with creditors, the Debtors began to see a significant decrease in their available liquidity, driven in part by the long-term industry trends discussed above and made acute by the severe economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Which begs the question: what is the value of this business? Cleary nobody can agree on that: there is no restructuring support agreement here. Instead, there appears to be an arms-locked resignation that a parallel-path is needed to (i) nail down some DIP financing to shore up liquidity ($100mm at L+6.75%) and buy time, (ii) continue to discuss a balance sheet restructuring, AND (iii) simultaneously market test the business via a strategic marketing process. A lot of people will need to wait and see how this plays out, primarily pensioners owed over $50mm and various trade creditors including the bankruptcy-familiar RR Donnelley & Sons Co. ($RRD), Eastman Kodak Company ($KODK) and Verso Paper Holding LLC.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Lane)

  • Capital Structure: $249mm funded RCF (plus $50.8mm LOCs), $221.9mm funded TL (Bank of America NA), $450mm ‘23 8.75% senior secured notes (Wells Fargo Bank NA)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Andrew Dietderich, Brian Glueckstein, Alexa Kranzley, Christian Jensen) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

    • Investment Banker: Evercore Group LLC

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Agent ($100mm): Bank of America NA

      • Legal: Moore & Van Allen PLLC (David Eades, Charles R. Rayburn III, Zachary Smith)

    • Ad Hoc Group of Term Lenders: Bardin Hill Investment Partners LP, Eaton Vance Management, HG Vora Capital Management, LLC, Marathon Asset Management, Shenkman Capital Management, Sound Point Capital Management LP, and Summit Partners Credit Advisors, L.P.

      • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (Michael Messersmith, Sarah Gryll, Lucas Barrett)

    • Ad Hoc Group of Secured Noteholders: Capital Research and Management Company, Manulife Investment Management, Atlas FRM LLC, TD Asset Management Inc.

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Andrew Rosenberg, Alice Eaton, Claudia Tobler)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

      • Legal: Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (Frank Merola, Brett Lawrence, Erez Gilad, Harold Olsen, Gabriel Sasson)

⛽️New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Whiting Petroleum Corporation ($WLL)⛽️

Whiting Petroleum Corporation

April 1, 2020

Denver-based Whiting Petroleum Corporation ($WLL) and four affiliates (the “debtors”), independent oil-focused upstream exploration and production companies focused primarily on the North Dakota and Rocky Mountain regions, filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of Texas. This is a story that requires an understanding of the debtors’ impressively-levered capital structure to understand what’s going on:

  • $1.072b ‘23 RBL Facility (JPMorgan Chase Bank NA)(springing maturity to 12/20 if the ‘21 notes below are not paid in full by 12/20)

  • $189.1mm ‘20 1.25% convertible senior unsecured notes due 2020 (Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A.)

  • $773.6mm ‘21 5.75% senior unsecured notes

  • $408.3mm ‘23 6.25% senior unsecured notes

  • $1b ‘26 6.625% senior unsecured notes

You’ve heard us talk about the capital intensive nature of E&P companies so … yeah … the above $3.443b of debt shouldn’t come as much of a surprise to you. The company is also publicly-traded. The stock performance over the years has been far from stellar:

Screen Shot 2020-04-02 at 10.05.35 AM.png

What’s interesting here is that EVERYONE knows that oil and gas has been a value-destructive sh*t show for years. There’s absolutely ZERO need to belabor the point. Yet. That doesn’t stop the debtors’ CRO from doing precisely that. Here, embedded in the First Day Declaration, is a chart juxtaposing a $100 investment in WLL versus a $100 investment in an S&P 500 index and a Dow Jones U.S. E&P Index:

Screen Shot 2020-04-02 at 10.08.34 AM.png

We should also add that the spike reflected in the above chart in the 2017 timeframe isn’t on account of some stellar improvement of operating performance; rather, it reflects a November 2017 1-to-4 reverse stock split which inflated the reflected price of the shares. Just to be clear.

Notwithstanding the hellacious performance since 2014, the debtors take pains to paint a positive picture that was thrown into disarray by “drastic and unprecedented global events, including a ‘price war’ between OPEC and Russia and the macroeconomic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic….” In fact, the debtors come in HOT in the introduction to the First Day Declaration:

The Debtors ended 2019 standing on solid ground. While the Debtors had more than $1 billion in unsecured bond debt set to mature prior to December 2020, the Debtors had significant financial flexibility to restructure their capital structure. Most importantly, the Debtors began 2020 with a committed revolving credit facility that provided them with committed financing of up to $1.75 billion—more than enough liquidity to service the Debtors’ 2020 maturities and fund anticipated capital expenditure needs throughout the year. For these reasons, the Debtors secured a “clean” audit report as recently as February 27, 2020.

And to be fair, the debt was doing just fine until the middle of February. Indeed, the unsecured notes didn’t hit distressed levels until right after Valentine’s Day. Check out this freefall:

Who needs open amusement parks when you can just follow that price action?

Already focused on “liability management” (take a drink!) given the looming ‘21 notes maturity and the corresponding RBL springing maturity, the debtors’ retained professionals shifted over to restructuring talks with an ad hoc committee of noteholders. The debtors also drew down $650mm on their revolver to ensure adequate go-forward liquidity (and, cough, avoid the need for a relatively more expensive DIP credit facility). After what sounds like serious deliberation (and opposition from the ad hoc committee), the debtors also opted to forgo the $190mm maturity payment on the convertible notes due April 1.

The debtors filed the case with the framework of a restructuring support agreement (aka a term sheet). That framework would equitize the converts and the unsecured notes, giving them 97% of the equity (for now … debt is also still under consideration). Unsecured claims will be paid in full. Existing equity would receive 3% of post-reorg equity and warrants. Post-reorg management will get 8% of the post-reorg equity. In total, this would amount to the evisceration of over $2b worth of debt. 😬

Speaking of management, a lot of people were up in arms over this bit in the debtors’ Form 8-K filed to announce the bankruptcy filing and term sheet:

Screen Shot 2020-04-02 at 11.58.10 AM.png

That’s right. A nice immediately-payable bonus to management.

We’d love to hear how this ISN’T a subversion of code provisions regarding KEIPS/KERPS. Seriously, write us: petition@petition11.com. Ensure stability huh? Tell us: WHERE THE F*CK ARE THESE GUYS GOING TO GO IN THIS ENVIRONMENT? But at least they’re passing up their (WILDLY WORTHLESS) equity awards and bonus payments. FFS.

Ok, fine. Maybe there were contractual provisions that needed to be taken into account. And maybe the alternative — sh*tcanning management and rejecting the employment contracts — doesn’t fit the construct of leaving an umimpaired class of unsecured creditors. Equity is wildly out-of-the-money and getting a tip here anyway. This, therefore, is just a transfer of value from the noteholders to the management. We have to assume that the noteholders, then, were aware of this before it happened. If not, they should be pissed. And the Directors — who make between $180,000 and $305,000 a year — ought to be questioned by said noteholders about potential breaches of duties.


  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of TX (Judge Jones)

  • Capital Structure:

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Stephen Hessler, Brian Schartz, Gregory Pesce, Anna Rotman) & Jackson Walker LLP (Matthew Cavenaugh, Jennifer Wertz, Veronica Polnick)

    • CRO: Stein Advisors LLC (Jeffrey Stein)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Julie Hertzberg)

    • Investment Banker: Moelis & Company

    • Claims Agent: Stretto (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • RBL Agent: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

    • Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Andrew Rosenberg, Alice Beslisle Eaton, Michael Turkel, Omid Rahnama) & Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins, Eric English, Genevieve Graham)

      • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners LP

    • Creditor: Caliber North Dakota LLC

      • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Alfredo Perez, Brenda Funk)

🌑New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Foresight Energy Inc.🌑

Foresight Energy Inc.

March 10, 2020

Are there any coal companies left out there that HAVEN’T filed for bankruptcy at this point?

As expected by everyone, thermal coal producer Foresight Energy LP and numerous affiliates (the “debtors”) filed a “prearranged” bankruptcy on Tuesday in the District of Missouri.

Observers have long recognized that this chapter 11 filing was a fait accompli. The debtors are inextricably linked to Murray Energy, which filed late last year. The difference here, though, is that Foresight’s capital structure is FAR less complex and, because of that among other reasons, the debtors had the luxury of a bit more time to sit back and wait and see how the Murray bankruptcy played out. The debtors also had the luxury of taking their time — which is not to say that things haven’t been a sprint over the last several months — to come to terms on a deal with their lenders to emerge from bankruptcy with a significantly de-levered balance sheet. Indeed, that is the literal plan here.

The debtors have entered into restructuring support agreements with significant and meaningful percentages of holders of first lien loans and second lien notes. Moreover, the debtors have agreements with several key contract counterparties. The end result? The debtors will eliminate over $1b of debt, shed some burdensome royalty and contractual obligations, and get a new money infusion so that it can — against the odds in this hyper-negative-to-coal environment — be better positioned to survive. The reorganized entity, assuming the deal holds, will have $225mm of senior secured debt on it (which will roll in the proposed $175mm DIP facility).*

*The proposed DIP facility includes a new money multi-draw term loan facility of $100mm and a $75mm roll-up of pre-petition first lien debt into a DIP term loan.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of MO (Judge Surratt-States)

  • Capital Structure: $157mm RCF, $743.3mm first lien term loan, $425mm 11.5% ‘23 second lien notes

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Paul Basta, Alice Belisle Eaton, Alexander Woolverton) & Armstrong Teasdale LLP (Richard Engel Jr., John Willard, Kathryn Redmond)

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Alan Boyko)

    • Investment Banker: Jefferies Group LLC

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Ad Hoc First Lien Group

      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Brad Kahn, Ira Dizengoff, Zachary Dain Lanier, James Savin) & Thompson Coburn LLP (Mark Bossi)

    • Second Lien Notes Trustee: Wilmington Trust NA

    • Davidson Kempner Capital Management LP

      • Legal: Milbank LLP (Dennis Dunne, Parker Milender)

    • DIP Agent ($175mm): Cortland Capital Market Services LLC

⛽️New Chapter 11 Filing - Pioneer Energy Services Corp. ($PESX)⛽️

Pioneer Energy Services Corp.

March 1, 2019

San Antonio-based oilfield services provider Pioneer Energy Services Corp. and several affiliates (the “debtors”) filed “straddle” prepackaged chapter 11 bankruptcy cases on Sunday in what amounts to a true balance sheet restructuring. Will this kickoff a new slate of oil and gas related bankruptcy filings? 🤔

The debtors provide well servicing, wireline and coiled tubing services to producers in Texas and the Mid-Continent and Rocky Mountain regions; they also provide contract land drilling services to operators in Texas, Appalachia, and the Rocky Mountain region. International operations in Colombia are not part of the bankruptcy cases. Due to the…shall we say…unpleasant…atmosphere for oil and gas these last few years — which, clearly undermined demand for their services and, obviously, revenue generation — the debtors determined that they couldn’t continue to service their existing capital structure. Alas, bankruptcy.

Hold on: not so fast. We previously wrote in “⛽️Storm Clouds Forming Over Oil & Gas⛽️,” the following:

And so it’s no wonder that, despite a relative dearth of oil and gas bankruptcy filings in 2020 thus far, most people think that (a) the E&P and OFS companies that avoided a bankruptcy in the 2015 downturn are unlikely to avoid it again and (b) many of the E&P and OFS companies that didn’t avoid a bankruptcy in the 2015 downturn are unlikely to avoid the dreaded Scarlet 22….

Sure, Pioneer hasn’t filed for bankruptcy before. But it has been in a constant state of restructuring ever since 2015. Per the debtors:

…in 2015 and 2016, Pioneer reduced its total headcount by over 50%, reduced wage rates for its operations personnel, reduced incentive compensation and eliminated certain employment benefits. In 2016, the Company closed ten field offices to reduce overhead and associated lease payments. At the same time, the Company lowered its capital expenditures by 77% to primarily routine expenditures that were necessary to maintain its equipment and deferred discretionary upgrades and additions (except those that it had previously committed to make during the 2014 market slowdown).

And:

Since the beginning of 2015 through the end of 2018, the Company has liquidated nonstrategic or non-core assets. Specifically, Pioneer has sold thirty-nine (39) non-AC domestic drill rigs, thirty-three (33) older wireline units, seven (7) smaller diameter coiled tubing units and various other drilling and coiled tubing equipment for aggregate net proceeds of over $75 million. As of September 30, 2019, the Company reported another $6.2 million in assets remaining held for sale, including the fair value of buildings and yards for one domestic drilling yard and two closed wireline locations, one domestic SCR drilling rig, two coiled tubing units and spare support equipment.

Annd:

In the first quarter of 2019, the Company continued its cost-reduction initiatives and operational adjustments by expanding the roles and related responsibilities of several of its executive leaders to further leverage their existing talents to the entire organization.

In other words, these guys have been gasping for air for five years.

Relatively speaking, the debtors capital structure isn’t even that intense:

  1. $175mm Term Loan (Wilmington Trust NA)

  2. $300mm 6.125% ‘22 senior unsecured notes (Wells Fargo Bank NA)

Yet with oil and gas getting smoked the way it has, it was still too much. So what now?

The prepackaged plan would give the term lenders cash (from a rights offering) and $78.125mm in new secured bonds (PETITION Note: we’re betting there are a bunch of CLOs here). The unsecured noteholders will get either all of the equity or 94.25% of the equity depending upon what the interest holders do; they’ll also get rights to participate in the rights offering. If the interest holders vote to accept the plan, they’ll get 5.75% of the equity and rights to participate in the rights offering; if they reject the plan, they’ll get bupkis and the noteholders will get 100% of the equity (subject to dilution). General unsecured claimants will get paid in full. Management will put in money as part of the rights offering and an ad hoc group of the unsecured noteholders (Ascribe Capital, DW Partners LP, Intermarket Corporation, New York Life Investments, Strategic Income Management LLC, and Whitebox Advisors LLC) agreed to backstop substantially all of the rights offering (and will receive an 8% premium for their commitment). The cases will be supported by a $75mm DIP. This thing is pretty buttoned up. Confirmation is expected within 45 days.

The end result? The debtors will emerge with $153mm of debt on balance sheet (the $78.125mm in new secured bonds and a $75mm exit ABL). Time will tell whether or not this remains too much.*

*The risk factors here are particularly interesting because all of them are very real. If the oil patch does suffer, as expected, the debtors’ concentration of business among their top three clients (66% of revenue) could be especially troubling — depending on who those clients are.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Jones)

  • Capital Structure: see above.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Brian Hermann, Elizabeth McColm, Brian Bolin, William Clareman, Eugene Park, Grace Hotz, Sarah Harnett) & Norton Rose Fulbrights US LLP (William Greendyke, Jason Boland, Robert Bruner, Julie Goodrich Harrison)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC

    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Lender ($75mm): PNC Bank NA

      • Legal: Blank Rome LLP (James Grogan, Broocks Wilson)

    • Prepetition Term Loan Agent: Wilmington Trust NA

      • Legal: Covington & Burling LLP

    • Ad Hoc Group of Prepetition Term Loan Lenders

      • Legal: Vinson & Elkins LLP (David Meyer, Paul Heath, Harry Perrin, Steven Zundell, Zachary Paiva)

    • Ad Hoc Group of Unsecured Noteholders: Ascribe Capital, DW Partners LP, Intermarket Corporation, New York Life Investments, Strategic Income Management LLC, Whitebox Advisors LLC)

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, Natasha Tsiouris, Erik Jerrard, Xu Pang) & Haynes and Boone LLP (Charles Beckham)

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey

🐟New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy & CCAA Filing - Bumble Bee Parent Inc.🐟

Bumble Bee Parent Inc.

November 21, 2019

Tuna fish went from playing a role in the founding of one of the world’s largest private equity firms (Blackstone) to, in the case of Bumble Bee Parent Inc. and its affiliated debtors, another private-equity-backed (Lion Capital LLP) bankruptcy. Bumble Bee is the company behind “shelf-stable seafood” brands Bumble Bee, Brunswick, Sweet Sue, Snow’s Beach Cliff and Wild Selections (as well as a Canadian brand). It has been on a wild ride since 2017.

The bankruptcy narrative is that a plea agreement with the United States Department of Justice related to criminal charges of alleged price-fixing led to burdensome financial obligations by way of (a) a $25mm criminal fine) and (b) defense costs associated with an onslaught of subsequent civil lawsuits from direct and indirect purchasers of products claiming damages arising out of the alleged price-fixing. This overhang ultimately led to the debtors arriving at, but not quite tripping, an event of default with their term lenders in Q4 ‘18. The debtors have been operating under a series of short-term limited waivers ever since as they sought to explore strategic alternatives.

They have one. The debtors have a stalking horse purchase agreement with affiliates of FCF Co. Ltd.for the sale of substantially all of the Company’s assets at a total implied enterprise value of up to $930.6 million, comprised of $275 million of cash, assumption of the remaining $17 million of the DOJ Fine, and the roll-over of up to $638.6 million in outstanding term loan indebtedness.” This sale will preserve the business as a going concern, preserve jobs, and provide an ongoing business partner to vendors and customers who consider the debtors to be partners.

Debtor first day bankruptcy papers are typically replete with spin and these papers are no different. In fact, necessarily so, they read like an offering memorandum. The papers discuss how the debtors provide “nutricious foods” that are “well-positioned to address a number of important consumer preferences and food trends, including shifts toward protein-rich, low-fat/low-calorie, and high Omega-3 fatty acid diets and trends towards eating multiple small or ‘snack-sized’ portions per day rather than the traditional three-square meals per day, and an overall increase in ‘snacking.’” They have the #1 or #2 market share in the shelf-stable seafood category and 41% of the US share of sales of canned albacore tuna. They also hold “approximately 13% of the U.S. share of sales of canned “light meat” tuna, approximately 12% of the share of sales in tuna pouches, approximately 71% of the U.S. share of sales in ready-to-eat tuna meals, approximately 40% of the U.S. share of sales in sardines, and approximately 16% of the U.S. share of sales in salmon.” It helps that they’re sold at virtually every major bigbox retailer, wholesale club, and grocery store. In 2018, the company had net sales of approximately $933m and adjusted EBITDA of $112.3m and the debtors’ U.S.-based operations contributed $722.2m of net sales and adjusted EBITDA of $86.3m. This is big business.

Putting aside its recent brush with the law, it also faces big market challenges. Questions persist about the safety and viability of shelf-stable seafood, particularly tuna. Indeed, there are headwinds. One sign of this may be that the Company’s overall Adjusted EBITDA has declined by approximately 20% from 2015 to 2018. We assume that, here, the EBITDA is adjusted to ex-out litigation costs.

And then there is this bonkers Wall Street Journal piece noting that consumption of canned tuna has fallen steadily compared with fresh and frozen fish. “Per capita consumption of canned tuna has dropped 42% in the three decades through 2016, according to the latest data available from the U.S. Department of Agriculture. And the downturn has continued, with sales of the fish slumping 4% by volume from 2013 to October 2018, data from market-research firm IRI show.


This bit is off the charts: “In a country focused on convenience, canned tuna isn’t cutting it with consumers. Many can’t be bothered to open and drain the cans, or fetch utensils and dishes to eat the tuna. “A lot of millennials don’t even own can openers,” said Andy Mecs, vice president of marketing and innovation for Pittsburgh-based StarKist, a subsidiary of South Korea’s Dongwon Group.” To address this trend, the debtors have made forays into the fresh fish category. Otherwise, these challenges will play out another day. With a different owner.

A few more bankruptcy-specific points:

  1. The debtors prevailed over a fee objection by the United States Trustee relating to interim access to $40mm of a proposed $80mm DIP term loan facility and immediate access to a $200mm DIP ABL. It seems that Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP, as counsel to DIP term lender Brookfield Principal Credit LLC had to give the UST a lesson in reverse-Seinfeld Logic. With lending, it is about “taking the reservation” rather than holding or using the reservation: once a debtor obtains a commitment to funds, those funds are committed and technically cannot be allocated elsewhere. The lenders argue, therefore, that fees are warranted upfront.

  2. Critical vendor motions can sometimes be controversial because, naturally, everyone wants to jump the line with critical vendor designation. To get it, however, pursuant to standards set many many years ago, there’s a multi-prong test that must be satisfied. In a nutshell, the critical vendor payments are needed to prevent disruption of a debtors’ business, among other things. Here, the buyer, FCF Co Ltd., seeks critical vendor status to the tune of $51mm (out of a $77mm critical vendor ask). Some other creditors were like “Mmmmmm???” and insisted that the Judge postpone any interim payments until an official committee of unsecured creditors could be appointed. Despite protests from FCF’s counsel, Weil for the DIP lender, and the debtors, Judge Silverstein declined to rule on the motion at the hearing, highlighting the unusual nature of a prospective buyer seeking status. If they want the business, will they really walk away?

Despite these first day fireworks, this should be a relatively smooth one.

One last question it poses is this: will this be just the first of a clump of tuna-related bankruptcies? 🤔

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Silverstein)

  • Capital Structure: see below.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Alan Kornberg, Kelly Cornish, Claudia Tobler, Christopher Hopkins, Rich Ramirez, Aidan Synnot) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, Ryan Bartley, Ashley Jacobs, Elizabeth Justison, Jared Kochenash)

    • Board of Directors: Scott Vogel, Steve Panagos

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

    • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Inc.

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • ABL Agent & DIP Agent: Wells Fargo Capital Finance LLC

      • Legal: Paul Hastings LLP (Andrew Tenzer, Michael Comerford, Peter Burke) & Womble Bond Dickinson US LLP (Matthew Ward, Morgan Patterson)

    • Term Loan Agent & Term Loan DIP Agent: Brookfield Principal Credit LLC

      • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, David Griffiths, Debora Hoehne, Yehudah Buchweitz) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Paul Heath, Zachary Shapiro, Brendan Schlauch)

Screen Shot 2019-11-23 at 10.51.43 AM.png

🥛New Chapter 11 Filing - Southern Foods Group LLC (d/b/a Dean Foods Company)🥛

We’ve published these charts before here but they’re worth revisiting:

Since we’re all about the charts right now, here’s another one — perhaps the ugliest of them all:

Screen Shot 2020-01-11 at 11.28.49 AM.png

Yup, Southern Foods Group LLC (d/b/a Dean Foods Company) has been a slow-moving train wreck for some time now. In fact, we wrote about the disruption it confronts back in March. It’s worth revisiting (we removed the paywall).

Alas, the company and a long list of subsidiaries finally filed for bankruptcy yesterday in the Texas (where things seem to be getting VERRRRRY VERRRRRY busy these days; see below ⬇️).

Once upon a time everyone had milk. Serena and Venus Williams. Dwight Howard. Mark McGuire. Tyra Banks. The Olsen twins. David Beckham. Giselle. The “Got Milk? campaign was pervasive, featuring A-listers encouraging folks to drink milk for strong bones. Things have certainly changed.

Dean Foods’ long history begins in 1925; it manufactures, markets and distributes branded and private label dairy products including milks, ice cream, creamers, etc. It distributes product to schools, QSRs like McDonald’s Inc. ($MCD), small format retailers (i.e., dollar stores and pharmacies), big box retailers like Walmart Inc. ($WMT)(which accounted for 15.3% of net sales in ‘18), and the government. Its products include, among many others, Friendly’sLand O Lakes and Organic Valley. This company is a monster: it has 58 manufacturing facilities in 29 states, 5000 refrigerated trucks and 15,000 employees (40% of whom are covered by collective bargaining agreements). Milk, while on the decline, remains big business.

How big? Per the company:

In 2018, Dean Foods’ reported consolidated net sales of $7.755 billion, gross profit of $1.655 billion, and operating income of $(315.2) million. Through the first 6 months of 2019, Dean Foods’ reported consolidated net sales of $3.931 billion, gross profit of $753.2 million, and operating income of $(96.2) million.

Those are some serious sales. And losses. And the company also has a serious capital structure:

Screen Shot 2020-01-11 at 11.31.29 AM.png

Milk production is a capital intensive business requiring a variety of inputs: raw milk, resin to make plastic bottles (which likely infuse all of us with dangerous chemicals, but whatevs), diesel fuel, and juice concentrates and sweeteners. Hence, high debt. So, to summarize: high costs, low(er) demand, lots of debt? No wonder this thing is in trouble.

What are the stated reasons for the company’s chapter 11 filing?

  • Milk Consumption Declines. “For the past 10 years, demand has fallen approximately 2% year-over-year in North America.” This is consistent with the chart above.

  • Loss of Pricing Power. Because volumes declined, economies of scale also decreased. “Delivered cost per gallon rose approximately 20.7% between 2018 and 2013 as a result of volume deleverage.” That’s vicious. Talk about a mean spiral: as volumes went down, the company couldn’t support the input volumes it had previously and therefore lost pricing power. “Dean Foods suffered a full year 2018 year-over-year decline in fluid milk volume of 5.8% following a 2017 year-over-year decline of 4.2%. Moreover, Dean Foods’ volume declines continue to outpace the overall category; while category volumes declined by approximately 4%8 year-over-year through the end of September, 2019, Dean Foods experience declines of over 11.4%.” Apparently, this impacted Dean Foods disproportionately. Any buyer looking at this has to wonder how these issues can be remedied.

  • Market Share Disruption. New forms of “milk” have taken market share. “Sales of nut and plant beverages grew by 9% in 2018 and had sales of $1.6 billion, according to the Plant Based Foods Association.

  • Retail Consolidation. It doesn’t help when, say, Dollar General merges with Family Dollar. That gives the dollar stores increased leverage on price. And that’s just one example.

  • “The BigBox Effect.” The biggest retailers have become increasingly private label focused and, in turn, vertically integrated. Take Walmart, for example. In 2018, the retailer opened its first U.S. food production facility in Indiana. Want to guess what kind of food? Why would we be mentioning it? This new facility amounted to a 100mm gallon loss of volume to Dean Foods.

  • “The Loss Leader Effect.” We often talk about the venture-backed subsidization of commonplace lifestyle items, e.g., Uber Inc. ($UBER). Retailers have, in recent years, aggressively priced private label milk to drive foot traffic. “As retailers continue to invest in private-label milk to drive foot traffic, private label margin over milk contracted to a historic low of $1.26 in June, before falling even further to $1.24 in September.

  • Freight Costs. They’ve been up over the last few years. This is a different version of
    ”The Amazon Effect” ($AMZN).

All of these are secular issues that a balance sheet solution won’t remedy. Buyer beware. 😬🤔

So, what CAN the bankruptcy achieve? Yes, the obvious: the balance sheet. Also, there is a contingent liability of over $722.4mm that results from the company’s participation in an underfunded multi-employer pension plan. And liquidity: the bankruptcy will avail the company of a $850mm DIP credit facility. It may also allow the company to pursue a sale transaction to its long-time commercial partner and largest single raw milk vendor, Dairy Farmers of America (which is wed $172.9mm). Surely they must be aware of the secular trends and will price any offer accordingly, right? RIGHT? Either way, those ‘23 notes look like they might be about to take a bath.*

*Likewise certain trade creditors. The debtors state that that they have $555.7mm of total outstanding accounts payable and claim $257mm needs to go to critical vendors and another $189.2mm to 503(b)(9) admin claimants. That leaves a small subset of creditors due a bit more than $100mm holding the bag. This also explains the sizable DIP.

Meanwhile, one of the largest unsecured creditors is Acosta Inc., with a contingent, disputed and unliquidated claim arising out of litigation. Acosta is unlikely to recover much on this claim which is a bit ironic considering that an Acosta bankruptcy filing is imminent. Womp womp.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Jones)

  • Capital Structure: see above

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Brian Resnick, Steven Szanzer, Daniel Meyer, Nate Sokol, Alexander Bernstein, Charlotte Savino, Cameron Adamson) & Norton Rose Fulbright LLP (William Greendyke, Jason Boland, Bob Bruner, Julie Goodrich Harrison)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Jeffrey Stegenga, Brian Fox, Tom Behnke, Taylor Atwood)

    • Investment Banker: Evercore Group LLC (Bo Yi)

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Receivables Securitization Agent, RCF Agent & DIP Agent: Rabobank USA

      • Legal: White & Case LLP (Scott Greissman, Philip Abelson, Elizabeth Fuld, Rashida Adams, Andrew Zatz) & Gray Reed & McGraw LLP (Jason Brookner, Lydia Webb, Amber Carson)

    • Unsecured Bond Indenture Trustee: Bank of New York Mellon NA

      • Legal: Emmett Marvin & Martin LLP (Thomas Pitta, Edward Zujkowski, Elizabeth Taraila)

    • Ad Hoc Group of 6.5% ‘23 Unsecured Noteholders: Ascribe III Investments LLC, Broadbill Investment Partners LLC, Ensign Peak Advisors Inc., Kingsferry Capital LLC, Knighthead Capital Management LLC, MILFAM Investments LLC

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Andrew Rosenberg, Robert Britton, Douglas Keeton, Grace Hotz) & Pillsbury Winthrop LLP (Hugh Ray III, William Hotze, Jason Sharp)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors: Central States Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company NA, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Land O’ Lakes Inc., California Dairies Inc., Consolidated Container Company LP, Select Milk Producers Inc.

      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Philip Dublin, Meredith Lahaie, Martin Brimmage, Joanna Newdeck, Julie Thompson, Patrick Chen, Madison Gardiner)

      • Financial Advisor: Berkeley Research Group LLC (Christopher Kearns)

      • Investment Banker: Miller Buckfire & Co. LLC (Richard Klein)

Update 1/11/20

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Triangle Petroleum Corporation

Triangle Petroleum Corporation

May 8, 2019

If it walks like a chapter 22 and quacks like a chapter 22…it…may…notactually…be a chapter 22??

Triangle Petroleum Corporation (“TPC”) filed a prepackaged plan of reorganization with the District of Delaware to consummate a balance sheet restructuring. TPC is an independent energy holding company with a focus on the Williston Basin of North Dakota; its assets include a joint venture interest in Caliber Midstream Holdings LP, a midstream services company, leases of commercial and multi-unit residential buildings in North Dakota, and net operating losses. On the debt side of the balance sheet, the company had a $120mm 5.0% convertible promissory note issued to NGP Triangle Holdings, LLC (“NGP”).

So, what’s up with that convertible note? Wholly-owned direct or indirect subsidiaries of TPC — including Triangle USA Petroleum Corporation — filed for bankruptcy back in June 2016 to address their capital structure and, in the course of confirming a plan of reorganization, wiped out their stock. That stock, naturally, was an asset of TPC and, consequently, the New York Stock Exchange delisted TPC, constituting a “Fundamental Change,” under the note and triggering a requirement that TPC repurchase the convertible note for $154mm. TPC didn’t do so. Upon failing to do so, TPC triggered an event of default. Subsequently, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC (“JPMS”) purchased the note from NGP.

Thereafter, as part of discussions about a forbearance, JPMorgan Chase Bank NA provided the company with a term loan and the company and JPMS amended and restated the convertible note, granting JPMS a second lien in the process. JPMS, however, ultimately concluded that forbearing to nowhere wasn’t exactly a great strategy and so the chapter 11 filing will leave the term loan unimpaired, swap JPMS’ second lien secured note for 100% of TPC’s equity, ride through (what is a de minimis amount of) unsecured claims and wipe out equity, which had been trading over the counter. As of the petition date, the company had $2mm outstanding under the term loan and $167mm outstanding under the newly secured note.

Given that JPMS is the only voting party, this is a pretty easy plan to effectuate. Suffice it to say, JPMS voted yes to the prepackaged plan which means, going forward, it will own the interests in Caliber, Bakken Real Estate and, significantly, the valuable net operating losses.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Walrath)

  • Capital Structure: see above.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Kelley Cornish, Alexander Woolverton) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, Andrew Magaziner, Shane Reil)

    • Board of Directors: Gus Halas, James Shein, Randal Matkaluk

    • Financial Advisor: Development Specialists Inc. (Mark Iammartino)

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Corporate Restructuring LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition Lender: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA & J.P. Morgan Securities LLC

      • Legal: Duane Morris LLP (Lawrence Kotlar, Joel Walker)

New Chapter 11 Filing - Sungard Availability Services Capital Inc.

Sungard Availability Services Capital Inc.

May 1, 2019

Pennsylvania-based Sungard Availability Services Capital Inc., a provider of “critical production and recovery services to global enterprise companies,” with $977mm of net revenue and $203mm of EBITDA in fiscal 2018 filed a prepackaged chapter 11 plan in the Southern District of New York on Wednesday and, if you blinked, you may have missed its residency in bankruptcy. Indeed, some lost their minds because Kirkland & Ellis LLP was able to shepherd the case in and out of bankruptcy in less than 24 hours — breaking the previous record only recently set in FullBeauty. Yes, people care about these things.*

The upshot of this expeditious bankruptcy case is that (a) the company shed nearly $900mm of debt from its balance sheet (reducing debt down to approximately $400-450mm) and (b) transferred 89% ownership to a variety of debt-for-equity swapping funds such as GSO Capital Partners, Angelo Gordon & Co., and Carlyle Group (who will also receive $300mm in senior secured term loan paper). Major equity holders — Bain Capital Integral Investors LLC, Blackstone Capital Partners IV LP, Blackstone GT Communications Partners LP, KKR Millennium Fund LP, Providence Equity Partners V LP, Silver Lake Partners II LP, TPG Partners IV LP — had their equity wiped out. We had previously highlighted KKR’s investment here in “A Hot-Potato Plan of Reorganization. Short BDC Retail Exposure,” discussing the broader context of BDC lending. This is what the capital structure looks like and will look like:

Source: Disclosure Statement

Source: Disclosure Statement

That balance sheet is the driver behind the bankruptcy filing. Per the company:

This legacy capital structure was created based upon the Company’s historical operating model and performance and is unsustainable under current market conditions. When the capital structure was put in place, the Company benefited from a larger revenue base with substantially higher free cash flow. As business conditions evolved and the Company’s revenue declined, cash flow available to service debt and invest in products and services substantially declined. Consolidated net revenue declined by approximately 18% from approximately $1.2 billion in 2016 to approximately $977 million in 20188 while adjusted EBITDA margins remained within a range of approximately 20% to 22%. Negative net cash flow from 2016 to 2018 was approximately $80 million.

In other words, this is as clear-cut a balance sheet restructuring that you can get. Indeed, general unsecured claims are — as you might expect from a prepackaged plan of reorganization — riding through unimpaired. This consensual restructuring is clearly the right result. Getting it in and out of court so quickly is a bonus.

Yet, lest anyone get too high on their own supply, it’s important to note that, while this is a good result under the circumstances, there is a significant amount of value destruction illustrated by this filing. The term lenders are getting merely an estimated 50-73% recovery while the noteholders are getting 7-14%**. Now, it IS reasonable to expect that the “par guys” blew out of this situation long ago. And it is also reasonable to assume that the current holders of loans and notes got in at a significant discount so “value destruction” really is a matter of timing/pricing. For the avoidance of doubt, however, there’s no question that certain lenders experienced some pain on the path to this filing. Here is the chart representing the company’s notes:

Screen Shot 2019-05-03 at 11.12.24 AM.png

So, while some are surely celebrating, others are surely licking their wounds.

*We don’t really want to be too flip about this. As critics of the bankruptcy process, we’re all for seeing more efficient uses of the bankruptcy court — even if that does mean that fees were run up pre-petition without any oversight whatsoever.

**You always have to take these recovery amounts with a grain of salt. In case the rampant Chapter 22s haven’t already taught you that.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Drain)

  • Capital Structure:

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Jonathan Henes, Emily Geier, Ryan Blaine Bennett, Laura Krucks

    • Board of Directors: Darren Abrahamson, Patrick J. Bartels Jr., Randy Hendricks, John Park, David Treadwell

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: AlixPartners LLP (Eric Koza)

    • Investment Banker: Centerview Partners (Samuel Greene)

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Agent: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

    • Secured Lender Group

      • Jones Day (Scott Greenberg, Michael Cohen, Nicholas Morin)

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

    • Crossover Group

      • Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Philip Dublin, Naomi Moss)

      • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners LP

    • Large Equityholders: Bain Capital Integral Investors LLC, Blackstone Capital Partners IV LP, Blackstone GT Communications Partners LP, KKR Millennium Fund LP, Providence Equity Partners V LP, Silver Lake Partners II LP, TPG Partners IV LP

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Brian Hermann, Jacob Adlerstein)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Windstream Holdings Inc.

Windstream Holdings Inc.

February 25, 2019

See here for our write-up on Winstream Holdings Inc.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Drain)

  • Capital Structure: see below.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Stephen Hessler, Ross Kwasteniet, Marc Kieselstein, Brad Weiland, Cristine Pirro Schwarzman, John Luze, Neda Davanipour)

    • Legal (Board of Directors): Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP (Louis Strubeck Jr., James Copeland, Kristian Gluck)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC

    • Investment Banker: PJT Partners LP

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Lender ($500mm TL, $500mm RCF): Citigroup Global Markets Inc.

    • Prepetition 10.5% and 9% Notes Indenture Trustee: Wilmington Trust NA

      • Legal: Reed Smith LLP (Jason Angelo)

    • Prepetition TL and RCF Agent: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

      • Legal: Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (Sandeep Qusba, Nicholas Baker, Jamie Fell)

    • Ad Hoc Group of Second Lien Noteholders

      • Legal: Milbank LLP

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital

    • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Term Lenders

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Brian Hermann, Andrew Rosenberg, Samuel Lovett, Michael Rudnick)

      • Financial Advisor: Evercore

    • Midwest Noteholders

      • Legal: Shearman & Sterling LLP

    • Uniti Group Inc.

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Marshall Huebner, Eli Vonnegut, James Millerman)

      • Financial Advisor: Rothschild & Co.

    • Large Unsecured Creditor: AT&T Corp.

      • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (Brian Lohan, Ginger Clements, Peta Gordon) & AT&T (James Grudus)

    • Large Unsecured Creditor: Verizon Communications Inc.

      • Legal: Stinson Leonard Street LLP (Darrell Clark, Tracey Ohm)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (AT&T Services Inc., Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Communication Workers of America, AFL-CIO CLC, VeloCloud Networks Inc., Crown Castle Fiber, LEC Services Inc., UMB Bank)

      • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Lorenzo Marinuzzi, Brett Miller, Todd Goren, Jennifer Marines, Erica Richards)

Screen Shot 2019-02-25 at 9.04.55 PM.png

😷New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Trident Holding Company LLC😷

Trident Holding Company LLC

February 10, 2019

It looks like all of those 2018 predictions about healthcare-related distress were off by a year. We’re merely in mid-February and already there has been a full slate of healthcare bankruptcy filings. Here, Trident Holding Company LLC, a Maryland-based provider of bedside diagnostic and other services (i.e., x-ray, ultrasound, cardiac monitoring) filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York. What’s interesting about the filing is that it is particularly light on detail: it includes the standard description of the capital structure and recent efforts to restructure, but there is a dearth of information about the history of the company and its financial performance. There is, however, a restructuring support agreement with the company’s priority first lien lenders.

Here’s a quick look at the company’s capital structure which is a large factor driving the company into bankruptcy:

Source: First Day Declaration

Source: First Day Declaration

As you can see, the company has a considerable amount of debt. The above-reflected “Priority First Lien Facility” is a fairly recent development, having been put in place as recently as April 2018. That facility, provided by Silver Point, includes a $27.1mm prepayment fee triggered upon the filing of the bankruptcy case. That’s certain to be a point of interest to an Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors. It also contributed to an onerous amount of debt service. Per the company:

In the midst of market and competitive challenges, Trident has significant debt service obligations. Over the course of 2018, Trident paid approximately $26,185,667.75 in cash interest on the Secured Credit Facilities. On January 31, 2019, the Company missed an interest payment of $9,187,477.07 on the Secured Credit Facilities, resulting in an Event of Default on February 8, 2019 after the cure period expired.

But, wait. There’s more. The recent uptick in distressed healthcare activity is beginning to aggregate and create a trickle-down bankruptcies-creating-bankruptcies effect:

Moreover, a number of recent customer bankruptcies – including those of Senior Care Centers, LLC, 4 West Holdings, Inc., and Promise Healthcare Group, LLC – have exacerbated the Company’s liquidity shortfall by limiting the collectability of amounts owed from these entities. A number of other customers who have not yet filed bankruptcy cases are generally not paying the Debtors within contractual terms due to their own liquidity problems. As a result of these collection difficulties and challenges with the new billing system in the Sparks Glencoe billing center, the Debtors recorded $27.8 million of extraordinary bad debt expense in 2018 and $12.7 million in 2017.

Ouch. Not to state the obvious, but if the start of 2019 is any indication, this is only going to get worse. The company estimates a net operating cash loss of $9.1mm in the first 30 days of the case.

Given the company’s struggles and burdensome capital structure, the company has been engaging its lenders for well over a year. In the end, however, it couldn’t work out an out-of-court resolution. Instead, the company filed its bankruptcy with a “restructuring support agreement” with Silver Point which, on account of its priority first lien holdings, is positioned well to drive this bus. And by “drive this bus,” we mean jam the junior creditors. Per the RSA, Silver Point will provide a $50mm DIP and drive the company hard towards a business plan and plan of reorganization. Indeed, the business plan is due within 36 days and a disclosure statement is due within a week thereafter. Meanwhile, the RSA as currently contemplated, gives Silver Point $105mm of take-back term loan paper and 100% of the equity of the company (subject to dilution). The first lien holders have a nice blank in the RSA next to their recovery amount and that recovery is predicated upon…wait for it…

…a “death trap.” That is, if they accept the plan they’ll currently get “ [●]%” but if they reject the plan they’ll get a big fat donut. Likewise, the second lien holders. General unsecured claimants would get a pro rata interest in a whopping $100k. Or the equivalent of what Skadden will bill in roughly, call it, 3 days of work??

The business plan, meanwhile, ought to be interesting. By all appearances, the company is in the midst of a massive strategic pivot. In addition to undertaking a barrage of operational fixes “…such as optimized pricing, measures to improve revenue cycle management by increasing collection rates, rationalizing certain services, reducing labor costs, better managing vendor spend, and reducing insurance costs,” the company intends to focus on its core business and exit unprofitable markets. While it retreats in certain respects, it also intends to expand in others: for instance, the company intends to “expand home health services to respond to the shifting of patients from [skilled nursing facilities] into home care.” Per the company:

Toward this end, Trident conducted successful home health care pilot programs in 2018 in two markets to optimize its Care at Home business model with radiology technicians dedicated to servicing home health patients. Trident hopes to expand this business model to an additional seven markets in 2019.

Like we said, a pivot. Which begs the question “why?” In addition to the debt, the company noted several other factors that drove it into bankruptcy. Chief among them? The rise of home health care. More from the company:

Trident has suffered ripple effects from the distress faced by skilled nursing facilities (“SNF”), which are its primary direct customers. SNF occupancy rates have declined to a multi-year low as a result of structural and reimbursement changes not yet offset by demographic trends. These structural changes include, among other things, patient migration to home health care. The decline in SNF occupancy rates has led to reduced demand for Trident’s services. At the same time, Trident has only had limited success reducing costs in response to lower volumes, as volume declines are driven by lower utilization per facility rather than a reduction in the number of facilities served.

This is a trend worth continued watching. Who else — like Trident — will be affected by this?

Large general unsecured creditors of the business include Grosvenor Capital Management, Jones Day (to the tune of $2.3mm…yikes), Konica Minolta Healthcare Americas Inc., McKesson ($MCK)(again!!…rough couple of weeks at McKesson), Quest Diagnostics Inc. ($DGX), Cardinal Health Inc. ($CAH) and others. They must be really jacked up about that pro rata $100k!!

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Lane)

  • Capital Structure: see above.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP (Paul Leake, Jason Kestecher, James Mazza Jr., Justin Winerman)

    • Independent Director: Alexander D. Greene

    • Financial Advisor: Ankura Consulting (Russell Perry, Ben Jones)

    • Investment Banker: PJT Partners LP (Mark Buschmann, Josh Abramson, Willie Evarts, Meera Satiani, Elsa Zhang)

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Professionals:

    • Priority First Lien Admin Agent: SPCP Group LLC/Silver Point Finance LLC

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Alan Kornberg, Robert Britton, Lewis Clayton, Aidan Synnott, Christman Rice, Michael Turkel)

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey LP

    • First Lien Agent: Cortland Capital Market Services LLC

      • Legal: White & Case LLP (Thomas Lauria, Erin Rosenberg, Jason Zakia, Harrison Denman, John Ramirez)

    • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Lenders

      • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Patrick Nash)

      • Financial Advisor: Greenhill & Co. Inc.

    • Second Lien Agent: Ares Capital Corporation

    • Ad Hoc Group of Second Lien Lenders

      • Legal: Latham & Watkins (Richard Levy, James Ktsanes)

    • Large Creditor: McKesson Medical-Surgical Inc.

      • Legal: Buchalter P.C. (Jeffrey Garfinkle)

    • Large Creditor: Quest Diagnostics

      • Legal: Morris James LLP (Brett Fallon)

    • Equity Sponsor: Revelstoke Capital Partners

      • Legal: Winston & Strawn LLP (Carey Schreiber, Carrie Hardman)

    • Equity Sponsor: Welltower Inc.

      • Legal: Sidley Austin LLP (Andrew Propps, Bojan Guzina)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

      • Legal: Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP (David Posner, Gianfranco Finizio, Kelly Moynihan)

      • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP (David MacGreevey)



New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - FULLBEAUTY Brands Holdings Corp.

FULLBEAUTY Brands Holdings Corp.

February 3, 2019

We’re going to regurgitate our report about FULLBEAUTY Brands Holdings Corp. from January 6th after the company publicly posted its proposed plan of reorganization and disclosure statement and issued a press release about its proposed restructuring. What follows is what we wrote then:


FULLBEAUTY Brands Inc., an Apax Partners’ disaster…uh, “investment”…will, despite earlier reports of an out-of-court resolution to the contrary, be filing for bankruptcy after all in what appears to be either a late January or an early February filing after the company completes its prepackaged solicitation of creditors. Back in May in “Plus-Size Beauty is a Plus-Size Sh*tfest (Short Apax Partners’ Fashion Sense),” we wrote:

Here’s some free advice to our friends at Apax Partners: hire some millennials. And some women. When you have 23 partners worldwide and only 1 of them is a woman (in Tel Aviv, of all places), it’s no wonder that certain women’s apparel investments are going sideways. Fresh off of the bankruptcies of Answers.com and rue21, another recent leveraged buyout by the private equity firm is looking a bit bloated: NY-based FullBeauty Brands, a plus-size direct-to-consumer e-commerce and catalogue play with a portfolio of six brands (Woman Within, Roamans, Jessica London, Brylane Home, BC Outlet, Swimsuits for All, and Eilos).

Wait. Hold up. Direct-to-consumer? Check. E-commerce? Check. Isn’t that, like, all the rage right now? Yes, unless you’re levered to the hilt and have a relatively scant social media presence. Check and check.

Per a press release on Thursday, the company has an agreement with nearly all of its first-lien-last out lenders, first lien lenders, second lien lenders and equity sponsors on a deleveraging transaction that will shed $900mm of debt from the company’s balance sheet. It also has a commitment for $30mm in new liquidity in the form of a new money term loan with existing lenders. Per Bloomberg:

About 87.5 percent of the common reorganized equity would go to first-lien lenders, 10 percent to second liens, and 2.5 percent to the sponsor, according to people with knowledge of the plan who weren’t authorized to speak publicly.

Which, in English, means that Oaktree Capital Group LLCGoldman Sachs Group Inc., and Voya Financial Inc. will end up owning this retailer. Your plus-sized clothing, powered by hedge funds. Apax and Charlesbank Capital, the other PE sponsor, stand to maintain 2.5% of the equity which, from our vantage point, appears rather generous (PETITION Note: there must be a decent amount of cross-holdings between the first lien and second lien debt for that to be the case). Here is the difference in capital structure:

Screen Shot 2019-02-04 at 7.06.26 PM.png

What’s the story here? Simply put, it’s just another retail with far too much leverage in this retail environment.

Screen Shot 2019-02-04 at 7.06.56 PM.png

Of course, there’s the obligatory product strategy, inventory control, and e-commerce excuses as well. Not to mention…wait for it…Amazon Inc ($AMZN)!

“In addition to these operational hurdles, FullBeauty has also faced competition from online retail giant Amazon, Inc. and retail chains, including Walmart Inc. and Kohl’s Corporation, that have recently entered the plus-size clothing space.”

Kirkland & Ellis LLPPJT Partners ($PJT) and AlixPartners represent the company.


We give bankruptcy professionals grief all of the time for what often appears to be fee extraction in various cases. In our view, there have been some pretty egregious examples of inefficiency in the system and, considering a number of our readers are management teams of distressed companies, we feel it’s imperative that we cure for a blatant information dislocation and help educate the masses. This, though, appears to be an extraordinary case. In the other direction.

The company’s professionals here propose to confirm the company’s plan of reorganization at the first day hearing of the case. As Bloomberg noted on Monday, this would “set a new record for emerging from court protection in under 24 hours.” Bloomberg reports:

The previous record for the fastest Chapter 11 process is held by Blue Bird Body Co., which exited bankruptcy in 2006 in less than two days. Fullbeauty and its advisers aim to beat that mark.

“We structured this deal as if bankruptcy never happened for our trade creditors, vendors and employees to avoid further disruption to the company,” attorney Jon Henes at Kirkland & Ellis, the company’s legal counsel, said in an interview. “In this situation, every day in court is another day of costs without any corresponding benefit.”

In fact, this case would be so quick that, as you read this (on Wednesday), Judge Drain may have already given the plan his blessing. This makes Roust Corporation Inc. (6 days) and Southcross Holdings (13 days) look like child’s play. For that reason — and that reason alone — we’ll forgive the company’s professionals for their blatant victory lap: it’s curious that Bloomberg had a completed interview ready to go at 9:26am on the morning of the company’s bankruptcy filing. Clearly Kirkland & Ellis LLP, PJT Partners LP ($PJT) and Houlihan Lokey Capital ($HL) want to milk this extraordinary result for all it’s worth. We can’t really blame them, truthfully. That is, unless and/or until the company violates the “Two Year Rule” a la Charlotte Russe.

Anyway, why so quick? Well, because they can: the entire capital structure is on board with the proposed plan and trade will ride through unimpaired and paid. All contracts will be assumed. There are no brick-and-mortar stores to deal with: this is a web and catalogue-based business. Like we said, this case is extraordinary. Per the Company:

It is in the best interest of the estates that the Debtors remain in bankruptcy for as short a time-period as possible. If FullBeauty is forced to remain in chapter 11 longer than necessary, it may be required to seek debtor in possession financing, which would cost the Debtors unnecessary bank fees and professional expenses. In addition, although January has been relatively smooth in terms of vendor outreach, FullBeauty expects that trade could contract very quickly if the company remains in chapter 11 longer than necessary—particularly because many vendors are in foreign jurisdictions and they do not understand the nuances of prepackaged cases versus longer prearranged or traditional chapter 11 cases. Every day that FullBeauty remains in chapter 11 results in cash spent that could go to developing the business.

Indeed, for once, it appears that the best interests of the debtor company were, indeed, heeded.*

*Which is not to say that we believe the out-of-court bills will be light.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Drain)

  • Capital Structure: $mm debt     

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Jonathan Henes, Emily Geier, George Klidonas, Rebecca Blake Chaikin, Nicole Greenblatt)

    • Independent Director: Mohsin Meghji

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLC

    • Investment Banker: PJT Partners LP (Jamie Baird)

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Financial Sponsor (69.6%): Apax Partners LLP

      • Legal: Simpson Thatcher & Bartlett LLP (Elisha Graff, Nicholas Baker)

    • Financial Sponsor (26.4%): Charlesbank Capital Partners LLC

      • Legal: Goodwin Proctor LLP (William Weintraub, Joseph Bernardi Jr.)

    • ABL Agent & FILO Agent: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Darren Klein, Aryeh Falk)

    • First Lien Agent & Second Lien Agent: Wilmington Trust NA

      • Legal: Shipman & Goodman LLP (Nathan Plotkin, Eric Goldstein, Marie Pollio)

    • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Term Loan Lenders

      • Legal: Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP (Dennis Dunne, Gerard Uzzi, Nelly Almeida)

      • Financial Advisor: Ducera Partners

    • Ad Hoc Group of Second Lien Term Loan Lenders

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Paul Basta, Elizabeth McColm, Christopher Hopkins)

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc. (Saul Burian)

Updated 2/4/19 at 7:03 CT

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Catalina Marketing Corporation

Catalina Marketing Corporation

12/12/18

On September 16 in “🤖Tech Wants to Axe Lawyers🤖,” we wrote about Crossmark Holdings Inc.Acosta Inc., and Catalina Marketing (a unit of Checkout Holding Corp.) and noted that “[a]ll three are in trouble.” Catalina Marketing was the first domino to fall as it filed for bankruptcy in the District of Delaware.

In connection with our review of the three companies, we previously wrote:

Finally, Catalina Marketing finds itself paying restructuring fees these days too. The St. Petersburg Florida company is owned by Berkshire Partners and Hellman & FriedmanCrescent Capital is also a large equity holder. The company’s capital structure includes approximately:

$29mm April ‘19 L+3.5% Revolving Credit Facility

$1.05b April ‘21 L+3.5% Term Loan (~48.4 bid)

$460mm April ‘22 L+6.75% Second Lien Term Loan (~11.6 bid)

$230mm PIK Toggle unsecured notes

Carry the one, add the two, that’s over $5b of debt across all three companies. Gotta love private equity.

So, yes, yet another private equity-backed company is in bankruptcy court. Here, the company appears to have an agreement with 90% of its first lien lenders (Abry Advanced Securities Fund II and III, Alcentra Limited, Bain Capital Credit LP, Carlyle Investment Management LLC, Invesco Senior Secured Management Inc., and OppenheimerFunds Inc.), and 75% of its second lien lenders, the effect of which is purported to be a $1.6b — yes, $1.6 BILLION — debt reduction. An ad hoc group of first lien lenders has agreed to provide $275mm DIP credit facility (of which $125mm is new money) and committed to provide $40mm in exit financing.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Gross)

  • Capital Structure: see above.

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Gary Holtzer, Ronit Berkovich, Jessica Liou, Kevin Bostel, Alexander Condon, Elizabeth Carens, Michael Godbe, Lisa Lansio, Leonard Yoo, Patrick Steel, David Zubkis, Theodore Tsekerides, Peter Isakoff) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (Mark Collins, Jason Madron)

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Robert Del Genio, Thomas Ackerman)

    • Investment Banker: Centerview Partners

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Lenders and the Ad Hoc First Lien Lenders

      • Legal: Jones Day (Scott Greenberg, Michael J. Cohen, David Torborg, Stacey Corr-Irvine, Jeremy Evans, C. Lee Wilson) and (local) Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP represent the DIP Lenders and the Ad Hoc First Lien Lenders. 

    • Ad Hoc Group of Second Lien Lenders

      • Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Harrison (Brian Hermann, Robert Britton, Daniel Youngblut, Miriam Levi) and (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, Andrew Magaziner)

    • Admin Agent of the First Lien Credit Agrement

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Brian Resnick, David Schiff) and Landis Rath & Cobb LLP (Adam Landis, Kerri Mumford)

    • Admin agent under the Second Lien Credit Agreement

      • Legal: Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr (Andrew Goldman, Benjamin Loveland)

    • Ad Hoc Group of the PIK Toggle notes

      • Legal: Debevoise & Plimpton LLP