New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Jason Industries Inc. ($JASN)

Jason Industries Inc.

June 24, 2020

Wisconsin-based Jason Industries Inc. ($JASN) and seven affiliates (the “debtors”) filed a long-anticipated (prepackaged) chapter 11 bankruptcy case in the Southern District of New York on Wednesday — the latest in a line of manufacturers (e.g., Pyxus International Inc., Libbey Glass Inc., Exide Holdings Inc., Pace Industries LLC) to wind its way into bankruptcy court.

The company is an amalgam of decades of growth by acquisition: it launched its components and seating businesses with acquisitions in ‘93 and ‘95, respectively. Everything appeared to be hunky-dory heading into the Great Financial Crisis when things took a turn for the worse.

And so this isn’t the company’s first rodeo in distress. Back in ‘08-’09, the company engaged in a recapitalization transaction supported by Falcon Investment Advisors LLC and Hamilton Lane Advisors; it persevered through the downturn and ultimately sold to a special-purpose-acquisition-company (Quinpairo Acquisition Corp.) in 2014 for $538.6mm. The acquisition was financed through a combination of (i) the $172.5mm raised by the SPAC in its ‘13 IPO, (ii) rollover equity from the aforementioned sponsors (and management), and (iii) $420mm of first and second lien debt. Stick a pin in that last number: it comes back to haunt the debtors. 👻

In the years since, the company streamlined its operations — selling off assets (i.e., its fiber solutions business and a metal components business) and consolidating around two primary business segments. Through their industrial segment, the debtors manufacture a bunch of stuff used for industrial and infrastructure applications; and through their engineered components segment, the debtors manufacture (a) motorcycle seats, (b) operator seats for construction, agriculture, law and turf care and other industrial equipment markets, and (c) seating for the power sports market. Said another way, the company is heavily indexed to the automotive, heavy truck, steel and construction markets. Powered by approximately 700 employees in the US, the company did $338mm in net sales in 2019.

And that is part of the problem. $338mm in net sales represented an 8.2% ($30.1mm) dropoff from 2018. Adjusted EBITDA declined from $36.7mm in ‘18 to $24.8mm in ‘19. Both segments have been underperforming for years. The question is why?

The debtors cite a dramatic dropoff in demand in ‘19. They note:

This reduction was largely caused by reduced end market demand in key industries across the portfolio, specifically, weak economic conditions in Europe and Asia, lower industrial production in North America, and softening end market demand from OEM customers. For example, since as early as the first quarter of 2019, the Company has experienced reduced OEM build and channel inventory destocking. These problems were exacerbated by the operational disruption and demand reduction caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Consequently, the debtors busted out the standard playbook to try and manage liquidity (while parallel-tracking a fruitless pre-petition sale and marketing effort). They (a) intensified focus on growing market segments, (b) reduced capital investment in non-core businesses, (c) cut/furloughed labor and instituted pay reductions for execs and other employees (and eliminated a 401(k) match program), (d) closed plants and manufacturing facilities and deferred rent payments or negotiated reduced rent at leased properties, (e) accelerated the consolidation of plants acquired in a recent acquisition, and (f) invested in automation at their facilities to reduce future operating costs (read: replace expensive human beings) and expand margins. Still, the debtors struggled.

…the pandemic’s impact on orders and revenues, combined with preexisting fixed costs and debt service requirements, have constrained available working capital, reduced profitability and cash flow, and significantly impaired the Company’s ability to adequately finance operations.

Which gets us back to the capital structure:

Given where EBITDA numbers were coming in, this thing’s leverage ratio was through the roof. More to the point, the debtors deferred a March 31 second lien interest payment and had been operating under a series of forbearance agreements ever since. Luckily, the capital structure isn’t all-too-complicated and lends itself well to a prepackaged bankruptcy. And so here we are with a restructuring support agreement and proposed prepackaged plan which will effectively turn the company over to the first lien term lenders and, but for some warrants, wipe out the second lien term lenders. Here’s how the above capital structure breaks down:

Source: PETITION LLC

A couple of notable features here:

• Drop it Likes its Hot. There’s a “first lien put option” baked into the plan pursuant to which any first lien term lender who doesn’t want to own equity or the junior converts can “put” its pro rata share of that equity/converts to a first lien lender, Pelican Loan Advisors III LLC (or lenders as the case may be), which has agreed to backstop this baby. Pelican is managed by Monomoy Capital Partners.

• F*ck You Pay Me. Those first lien lenders who consented to forbearances all of those months are about to get paaaaaaayyyyyyyyydd. They’ll receive a pro rated share of and interest in $10mm worth of open market purchases by the debtors of first lien credit agreement claims held by consenting first lien lenders AND a forbearance fee equal to 4.00% of the principal amount of the first lien credit agreement loans held by the consenting lenders as of a date certain. The open market purchases were, presumably, accomplished prior to the filing with 2% of the fee already paid and the remaining 2% to be paid-in-kind on the earlier of the termination date of the RSA or the plan effective date.

• It’s a Trap! Warrants are technically going to be issued to the first lien term lenders and “gifted” to the second lien lenders. But only if they vote to accept the plan. Given the midpoint total enterprise value of $200mm and resultant deficiency claim, this is a nice absolute priority rule workaround. As reflected in the graphic above, the allowed deficiency claim of $64.9mm is obviously impaired and will get a big fat 🍩.

And so this is what the capital structure will look upon emergence:

The first lien lenders have consented to the use of their cash collateral to fund the cases.*

* ⚡️July 15, 2020 Update: The Second Lien Ad Hoc Committee, however, filed a limited objection to the cash collateral motion on the basis that a final order should (a) limit any credit bid to their collateral (noting that a material amount of assets — including 35% of the equity in foreign subs — are excluded from the first lien lenders’ collateral package, and (b) require a finding that there’s diminution of value of the first lien lenders’ collateral such that they, despite providing no new financing, ought to be granted a superpriority lien on previously unencumbered assets. The Committee also previewed objections it will have to the plan of reorganization. For a purportedly “prepackaged” chapter 11, this one looks like it could be more contentious than most. A final hearing on the cash collateral motion is set for July 22, 2020.⚡️

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• Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Drain)

• Capital Structure: see above.

• Company Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Jonathan Henes, Emily Geier, Laura Krucks, Dan Latona, Jake Gordon, Yates French)

  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP (Rebecca Roof)

  • Investment Banker: Moelis & Company LLC (Zul Jamal)

  • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Large equityholder: Wynnefield Capital Management LLC

  • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Creditors (Credit Suisse Asset Management LLC, Voya CLO Ltd., American Money Management Corp., First Eagle Alternative Credit LLC, Angel Island Capital Services LLC, Monomoy Capital Partners LP, Z Capital Partners LLC)

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Ryan Preston Dahl, Alexander Welch)

    • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

  • First Lien Agent: The Bank of New York Mellon

  • Second Lien Agent: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

    • Legal: Seward & Kissel LLP (John Ashmead, Gregg Bateman)

  • Ad Hoc Group of Second Lien Lenders: Corre Partners Management LLC, Newport Global Advisors

    • Legal: Brown Rudnick LLP (Steve Pohl, Shari Dwoskin, Kenneth Aulet)

    • Financial Advisor: DC Advisory LLC

Update July 17, 2020

⛽️New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Diamond Offshore Drilling Inc. ($DO)⛽️

Diamond Offshore Drilling Inc.

April 26, 2020

Houston-based Diamond Offshore Drilling Inc. and 14 affiliates (the “debtors”), a contract drilling services provider to the oil and gas industry filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of Texas. The company has 15 offshore drilling rigs: 11 semi-submersibles and four ultra-deepwater drillships deployed around the world (primarily in the Gulf of Mexico, Australia, Brazil and UK). Offshore drilling was already challenged due to excess supply of rigs — and has been since 2014. Recent events have made matters much much worse.

Thanks MBS. Thanks Putin. Thanks…uh…debilitating pandemic. The left-right combination of the Saudi/OPEC/Russia oil price war and COVID-19 has the entire oil and gas industry wobbling against the ropes. The pre-existing reality for offshore services companies “worsened precipitously” because of all of this. And so many companies will fall. The question is at what count and at what strength will they be able to get back on their feet. Given that this is a free-fall into bankruptcy with no pre-negotiated deal with lenders, it seems that nobody knows the answer. How could they? More on this below.

Unfortunately, the services segment the debtors play in is particularly at risk. “Almost all” of the debtors’ customers have requested some form of concessions on $1.4b of aggregate contract backlog. One customer, Beach Energy Ltd. ($BEPTF), “recently sought to formally terminate its agreement with the Company” (an action that is now the subject of an adversary proceeding filed in the bankruptcy cases). The debtors have been immersed in negotiations with their contract counter-parties to navigate these extraordinary times. It doesn’t help when business is so concentrated. Hess Corporation ($HES) is 30% of annual revenue; Occidental Petroleum Corporation ($OXY) is 21%; and Petrobras ($PBR) is 20%. BP PLC ($BP) and Royal Dutch Shell ($RDS.A) are other big customers.

With the writing on the wall, the debtors smartly drew down on their revolving credit facility — pulling $436mm out from under Wells Fargo Bank NA ($WFC). WFC must’ve loved that. Times like these really give phrases like “relationship banking” entirely new meaning. The debtors also elected to forgo a $14mm interest payment on its 2039 senior notes. Yep, you read that right: the company previously issued senior notes that weren’t set to mature until 2039. Not exactly Argentina but holy f*ck that expresses some real optimism (and froth) in the markets (and that issuance isn’t even the longest dated maturity but let’s not nitpick here)!

Yeah, so about that capital structure. In total, the debtors have $2.4b in funded debt. In addition to their $442mm of drawing under their revolving credit facility, the debtors have:

• $500mm of 5.7% ‘39 senior unsecured notes;

• $250mm of 3.45% ‘23 senior unsecured notes;

• $750mm of 4.875% ‘43 senior unsecured notes; and

• $500mm of 7.785% ‘25 senor unsecured notes.

As we’ve said time and time again: exploration and production is a wildly capital intensive business.

So now what? As we said above, there’s no deal here. The debtors note:

The Debtors determined to commence these Chapter 11 Cases to preserve their valuable contract backlog, and preserve their approximately $434.9 million in unrestricted cash on hand while avoiding annual interest expense of approximately $140.1 million under the Revolving Credit Facility and the Senior Notes, and to stabilize operations while proactively restructuring their balance sheet to successfully compete in the changing global energy markets. The Debtors and their Advisors believe cash on hand provides adequate funding at the outset of these cases. The Debtors are well-positioned to successfully emerge from bankruptcy with a highly marketable fleet, a solid backlog of activity, a strong balance sheet and liquidity position, and a differentiated approach and set of capabilities. Despite the volatile and current uncertain market conditions, the Debtors remain confident in the need for their industry, its importance around the world, and the critical services they provide.

We suspect the debtors will hang out in bankruptcy for a bit. After all, placing a value on how “critical” these services are in the current environment is going to be a challenge (though the relatively simple capital structure makes that calculation significantly easier…assuming the value extends beyond WFC). One thing seems certain: Loews Corporation ($L) is gonna have to write-down the entirety of its investment here.

*****

We’d be remiss if we didn’t highlight that, similar to Whiting Petroleum’s execs, the debtors’ executives here got paid nice bonuses just prior to the bankruptcy filing. PETITION Note: We don’t have data to back this up but there appeared to be a much bigger uproar in Whiting’s case about this than here. Which is not to say that people aren’t angry — totally factually incorrect — but angry:

Because equity-based comp doesn’t exactly serve as “incentive” when the equity is worth bupkis, the debtors paid $3.55mm to employees a week before the filing and intend to file a motion to seek bankruptcy court approval of their go-forward employee programs.

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• Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Jones)

• Capital Structure: $442mm RCF (inclusive of LOC)(Wells Fargo Bank NA). See above.

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Paul Basta, Robert Britton, Christopher Hopkins, Shamara James, Alice Nofzinger, Jacqueline Rubin, Andrew Gordon, Jorge Gonzalez-Corona) & Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins, Eric English, M. Shane Johnson, Genevieve Graham)

  • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Nicholas Grossi)

  • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Prepetition RCF Agent: Wells Fargo Bank NA

    • Legal: Bracewell LLP

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting

  • Indenture Trustee: The Bank of New York Mellon

  • Ad Hoc Group of Senior Noteholders

    • Legal: Milbank LLP

    • Financial Advisor: Evercore Group LLC

  • Major Equityholder: Loews Corporation

    • Legal: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (James Bromley)

  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors: The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company NA, National Oilwell Varco LP, Deep Sea Mooring, Crane Worldwide Logistics LLC, Kiswire Trading Inc., Parker Hannifin Corporation, SafeKick Americas LLC

    • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Philip Dublin, Naomi Moss, Marty Brimmage, Kevin Eide, Patrick Chen, Matthew Breen)

    • Financial Advisor: Berkeley Research Group LLC (Christopher Kearns)

    • Investment Banker: Perella Weinberg Partners LP (Alexander Tracy)

📺 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Frontier Communications Inc. ($FTR) 📺

Frontier Communications Inc.

April 14, 2020

We often highlight how, particularly in the case of oil and gas companies, capital intensive companies end up with a lot of debt and a lot of debt often results in bankruptcy. In the upstream oil and gas space, exploration and production companies need a lot of upfront capital to, among other things, enter into royalty interest agreements with land owners, hire people to map wells, hire people to drill the earth, secure proper equipment, procure the relevant inputs and more. E&P companies literally have to shell out to pull out.

Similarly, telecommunications companies that want to cover a lot of ground require a lot of capital to do so. From 2010 through 2016, Connecticut-based Frontier Communications Inc. ($FTR) closed a series of transactions to expand from a provider of telephone and DSL internet services in mainly rural areas to a large telecommunications provider to both rural and urban markets across 29 states. It took billions of dollars in acquisitions to achieve this. Which, in turn, meant the company took on billions of dollars of debt to finance said acquisitions. $17.5b, to be exact. Due, in large part, to the weight of that heavy debt load, it, and its 28922932892 affiliates (collectively, the “debtors”), are now chapter 11 debtors in the Southern District of New York (White Plains).*

The debtors underwrote the transactions with the expectation that synergistic efficiencies would be borne out and flow to the bottom line. PETITION readers know how we feel about synergies: more often than not, they prove elusive. Well:

Serving the new territories proved more difficult and expensive than the Company anticipated, and integration issues made it more difficult to retain customers. Simultaneously, the Company faced industry headwinds stemming from fierce competition in the telecommunications sector, shifting consumer preferences, and accelerating bandwidth and performance demands, all redefining what infrastructure telecommunications companies need to compete in the industry. These conditions have contributed to the unsustainability of the Company’s outstanding funded debt obligations—which total approximately $17.5 billion as of the Petition Date.

Shocker. Transactions that were meant to be accretive to the overall enterprise ended up — in conjunction with disruptive trends and intense competition — resulting in an astronomical amount of value destruction.

As a result of these macro challenges and integration issues, Frontier has not been able to fully realize the economies of scale expected from the Growth Transactions, as evidenced by a loss of approximately 1.3 million customers, from a high of 5.4 million after the CTF Transaction closed in 2016 to approximately 4.1 million as of January 2020. Frontier’s share price has dropped … reflecting a $8.4 billion decrease in market capitalization.

😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬😬

Consequently, the debtors have been in a state of liability management ever since the end of 2018. Subsequently, they (i) issued new secured notes to refinance a near(er)-term term loan maturity, (ii) amended and extended their revolving credit facility, and (iii) agreed to sell their northwest operations and related assets for $1.352b (the “Pacific Northwest Transaction”). The Pacific Northwest Transaction has since been hurdling through the regulatory approval process and seems poised to close on April 30, 2020.**

While all of these machinations were positive steps, there were still major issues to deal with. The capital structure remained robust. And “up-tier” exchanges of junior debt into more senior debt to push out near-term maturities were, post-Windstream***, deemed too complex, too short-term, and too likely to end up the subject of fierce (and costly) litigation**** As the debtors’ issued third quarter financials that were … well … not good, they announced a full drawn down of their revolver, instantly arming them with hundreds of millions of dollars of liquidity.

$FTR with the clean sweep - Revs, margins, ebitda, FCF, churn, subs, ARPC all worse sequentially. https://t.co/vn49m5PDPP

— JV (@AyyouEm) November 5, 2019

The company needed reconstructive surgery. Band-aids alone wouldn’t be enough to dam the tide. In many respects, the company ought to be commended for opting to address the problem in a wholesale way rather than piecemeal kick, kick, and kick the can down the road — achieving nothing but short-term fixes to the enrichment of really nobody other than its bankers (and Aurelius).

And so now the company is at the restructuring support agreement stage. Seventy-five percent of the holders of unsecured notes have agreed to an equitization transaction — constituting an impaired consenting class for a plan of reorganization to be put on file within 30 days. Said another way, the debtors are taking the position that the value breaks within the unsecured debt. That is, that the value is at least $6.6b making the $10.949b of senior unsecured notes the “fulcrum security.” Unsecured noteholders reportedly include Elliott Management Corp., Apollo Global Management LLC, Franklin Resources Inc., and Capital Group Cos. They would end up the owners of the reorganized company.

What else is the RSA about?

• Secured debt will be repaid in full on the effective date;

• A proposed DIP (more on this below) would roll into an exit facility;

• The unsecured noteholders would, in addition to receiving equity, get $750mm of seniority-TBD take-back paper and $150mm of cash (and board seats);

• General unsecured creditors would ride through and be paid in full; and

• Holders of secured and unsecured subsidiary debt will be reinstated or paid in full.

The debtors also obtained a fully-committed new money DIP of $460mm from Goldman Sachs Bank USA. This has proven controversial. Though the DIP motion was not up for hearing along with other first day relief late last week, the subject proved contentious. The Ad Hoc First Lien Committee objected to the DIP. Coming in hot, they wrote:

Beneath the thin veneer in which these so-called “pre-arranged” cases are packaged, lies multiple infirmities that, if not properly addressed by the Debtors, will ultimately result in the unraveling of these cases. While the Debtors seek to shroud themselves in a restructuring support agreement (the “RSA”) that enjoys broad unsecured creditor support, the truth is that underlying that support is a fragile house of cards that will not withstand scrutiny as these cases unfold. Turning the bankruptcy code on its head, the Debtors attempt through their RSA to pay unsecured bondholders cash as a proxy for their missed prepetition interest payment, postpetition interest to yet other unsecured creditors of various subsidiaries, and complete repayment to prepetition revolver lenders that are attempting, through the proposed debtor-inpossession financing (the “DIP Loan”), to effectively “roll-up” their prepetition exposure through the DIP Loan, all while the Debtors attempt to deprive their first lien secured creditors of contractual entitlements to default interest and pro rata payments they will otherwise be entitled to if their debt is to be unimpaired, as the RSA purports to require. While those are fights for another day, their significance in these cases must not be overlooked.

Whoa. That’s a lot. What does it boil down to? “F*ck you, pay me.” The first lien lenders are pissed that everyone under the sun is getting taken care of in the RSA except them.

• You want to deny us our default interest. F+ck you, pay me.

• You want a DIP despite having hundreds of millions of cash on hand and $1.3b of sale proceeds coming in? F+ck you, pay me.

• You want a 2-for-1 roll-up where, “as a condition to raising $460 million in debtor-in-possession financing, the Debtors must turn around and repay $850 million to their prepetition revolving lenders, thus decreasing the Debtors’ overall liquidity on a net basis”? F+ck you, pay me.

• You shirking our pro rata payments we’d otherwise be entitled to if our debt is to be unimpaired? F+ck you, pay me.

• You want to pay unsecured senior noteholders “incremental payments” of excess cash to compensate them for skipped interest payments without paying us default interest and pro rata payments? F+ck you, pay me.

• You want to use sale proceeds to pay down unsecureds when that’s ours under the first lien docs? F+ck you, pay me.

• You want to pay interest on the sub debt without giving us default interest? F+ck you, pay me.

• You want to do all of this without a proper adequate protection package for us? F+ck you, pay me.

The second lien debtholders chimed in, voicing similar concerns about the propriety of the adequate protection package. For the uninitiated, adequate protection often includes replacement liens on existing collateral, super-priority claims emanating out of those liens, payment of professional fees, and interest. In this case, both the first and second liens assert that default interest — typically several bps higher — ought to be included as adequate protection. The issue, however, was not up for hearing on the first day so all of this is a preview of potential fireworks to come if an agreement isn’t hashed out in coming weeks.

The debtors hope to have a confirmation order within four months with the effective date within twelve months (the delay attributable to certain regulatory approvals). We wish them luck.

______

*Commercial real estate is getting battered all over the place but not 50 Main Street, Suite 1000 in White Plains New York. Apparently Frontier Communications has an office there too. Who knew there was a speciality business in co-working for bankrupt companies? In one place, you’ve got FULLBEAUTY Brands Inc. and Internap Inc. AND Frontier Communications. We previously wrote about this convenient phenomenon here.

**The company seeks an expedited hearing in bankruptcy court seeking approval of it. It is scheduled for this week.

***Here is a Bloomberg video from June 2019 previously posted in PETITION wherein Jason Mudrick of Mudrick Capital Management discusses the effect Windstream had on Frontier and predicted Frontier would be in bankruptcy by the end of the year. He got that wrong. But did it matter to him? He also notes a CDS-based short-position that would pay out if Frontier filed for bankruptcy within 12 months. For CDS purposes, looks like he got that right. By the way, per Moody’s, here was the spread on the CDS around the time that Mudrick acknowledged his CDS position:

Here it was a few months later:

And, for the sake of comparison, here was the spread on the CDS just prior to the bankruptcy filing last week:

Clearly the market was keenly aware (who wasn’t given the missed interest payment?) that a bankruptcy filing was imminent: insurance on FTR got meaningfully more expensive. Other companies with really expensive CDS these days? Neiman Marcus Group (which, Reuters reports, may be filing as soon as this week), J.C. Penney Corporation Inc., and Chesapeake Energy Corporation.

****Notably, Aurelius Capital Management LP pushed for an exchange of its unsecured position into secured notes higher in the capital structure — a proposal that would achieve the triple-frontier-heist-like-whammy of better positioning their debt, protecting the CDS they sold by delaying bankruptcy, and screwing over junior debtholders like Elliott (PETITION Note: we really just wanted to squeeze in a reference to the abominably-bad NFLX movie starring Ben Affleck, an unfortunate shelter-in indulge). On the flip side, funds such as Discovery Capital Management LLC and GoldenTree Asset Management LP pushed the company to file for bankruptcy rather than engage in Aurelius’ proposed exchange.

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• Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Drain)

• Capital Structure: $850mm RCF, $1.7b first lien TL (JP Morgan Chase Bank NA), $1.7b first lien notes (Wilmington Trust NA), $1.6b second lien notes (Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB), $10.95mm unsecured senior notes (The Bank of New York Mellon), $100mm sub secured notes (BOKF NA), $750mm sub unsecured notes (U.S. Bank Trust National Association)

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Stephen Hessler, Chad Husnick, Benjamin Rhode, Mark McKane, Patrick Venter, Jacob Johnston)

  • Directors: Kevin Beebe, Paul Keglevic, Mohsin Meghji

  • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Carlin Adrianopoli)

  • Investment Banker: Evercore Group LLC (Roopesh Shah)

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Major equityholders: BlackRock Inc., Vanguard Group Inc., Charles Schwab Investment Management

  • Unsecured Notes Indenture Trustee: Bank of New York Mellon

    • Legal: Reed Smith LLP (Kurt Gwynne, Katelin Morales)

  • Indenture Trustee and Collateral Agent for the 8.500% ‘26 Second Lien Secured Notes

    • Legal: Riker Danzig Scherer Hyland & Perretti LLP (Joseph Schwartz, Curtis Plaza, Tara Schellhorn)

  • Credit Agreement Administrative Agent: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

    • Legal: Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (Sandeep Qusba, Nicholas Baker, Jamie Fell)

  • DIP Agent: Goldman Sachs Bank USA

    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Eli Vonnegut, Stephen Piraino, Samuel Wagreich)

  • Ad Hoc First Lien Committee

    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Brian Hermann, Gregory Laufer, Kyle Kimpler, Miriam Levi)

    • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners LP

  • Second lien Ad Hoc Group

    • Legal: Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP (Susheel Kirpalani, Benjamin Finestone, Deborah Newman, Daniel Holzman, Lindsay Weber)

  • Ad Hoc Senior Notes Group

    • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Philip Dublin, Naomi Moss)

    • Financial Advisor: Ducera Partners LLC

  • Ad Hoc Committee of Frontier Noteholders

    • Legal: Milbank LLP (Dennis Dunne, Samuel Khalil, Michael Price)

    • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Inc.

  • Ad Hoc Group of Subsidiary Debtholders

    • Legal: Shearman & Sterling LLP (Joel Moss, Jordan Wishnew)

  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

    • Legal: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP (Amy Caton, Douglas Mannal, Stephen Zide, Megan Wasson)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Richard Newman)

    • Investment Banker: UBS Securities LLC (Elizabeth LaPuma)

New Chapter 11 Filing - GCX Limited

GCX Limited

September 15, 2019

GCX Limited and 15 affiliated debtors filed a prepackaged bankruptcy this week in pursuit of a dual-track restructuring that will, either through a debt-for-equity swap or a sale, extinguish over $150mm of debt. In the swap scenario, the company will hand the keys over to senior secured noteholders; in the sale scenario, the noteholders will gladly take their cash payout and get the f*ck out of dodge. Either way, the company will be under new ownership with a significantly deleveraged capital structure. Certain consenting senior secured noteholders will provide $54.5mm in DIP financing.

The debtors are a global data communications provider; they operate one of the world’s largest fiber networks (PETITION Note: we’re old enough to remember when fiber was the future!). They provide undersea and terrestrial cables and landing stations and provide managed network services all across the globe. In English, this means they help power, among other things, major telecomms companies and streaming media.

Unfortunately, the debtors have declining revenues. Among other reasons for that sad state of affairs, the debtors cite (i) newly developed and planned cable systems along the debtors’ existing and planned network routes, (ii) financial distress at the parent level, (iii) ongoing disputes with banks that have applied setoff rights against the debtors’ cash, and (iv) high fixed costs and less certain recurring revenue due to clients newfound refusal to enter into long-term arrangements. For all of these reasons, the debtors have been unable to refinance their senior secured notes and the notes matured on July 31. Obviously — considering this thing is now in bankruptcy court — the debtors’ issues prevented them from paying off the debt as it became due. Instead, the debtors have operated under a forbearance agreement since July, during which time it formulated its go-forward plan and solicited the support, via a restructuring support agreement, of a meaningful amount of senior unsecured noteholders. The forbearance expired on the filing date.

Now the bankers, Lazard & Co., will have their work cut out for them. The debtors hope to run an expedited sales process (though, in the bankers’ favor is the fact that the pool of interested parties for assets like these is likely limited) and conduct an auction within 42 days of the filing. Absent that, the debtors will proceed with the debt-for-equity swap with an eye towards confirmation within 75 days and going effective before the end of the year (subject to requisite regulatory approvals, i.e., FCC and CFIUS).

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Sontchi)

• Capital Structure: $365.8mm 7% ‘19 senior secured notes (The Bank of New York Mellon)

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Paul Hastings LLP (Chris Dickerson, Brendan Gage, Robert Dixon Jr., Todd Schwartz) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (M. Blake Cleary, Jaime Luton Chapman)

  • Board of Directors: Rodney Riley, Donald Mallon, Alan Carr

  • Financial Advisor/CRO: FTI Consulting Inc. (Michael Katzenstein, Don Harer)

  • Investment Banker: Lazard & Co. (Ken Ziman)

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Wilmington Trust NA

    • Legal: Duane Morris LLP (Christopher Winter, Jarret Hitchings)

  • Ad Hoc Group of Senior Secured Noteholders

    • Legal: White & Case LLP (Brian Pfeiffer, William Guerrieri, Varoon Sachdev) & Farnan LLP (Brian Farnan, Michael Farnan)

New Chapter 11 Filing - Hexion Holdings LLC

Hexion Holdings LLC

April 1, 2019

What we appreciate that and, we hope thanks to PETITION, others will eventually come to appreciate, is that there is a lot to learn from the special corporate law, investment banking, advisory, and investing niche labeled “restructuring” and “distressed investing.” Here, Ohio-based Hexion Holdings LLC is a company that probably touches our lives in ways that most people have no knowledge of: it produces resins that “are key ingredients in a wide variety of industrial and consumer goods, where they are often employed as adhesives, as coatings and sealants, and as intermediates for other chemical applications.” These adhesives are used in wind turbines and particle board; their coatings prevent corrosion on bridges and buildings. You can imagine a scenario where, if Washington D.C. can ever get its act together and get an infrastructure bill done, Hexion will have a significant influx of revenue.

Not that revenue is an issue now. It generated $3.8b in 2018, churning out $440mm of EBITDA. And operational performance is on the upswing, having improved 21% YOY. So what’s the problem? In short, the balance sheet is a hot mess.* Per the company:

“…the Debtors face financial difficulties. Prior to the anticipated restructuring, the Debtors are over nine times levered relative to their 2018 adjusted EBITDA and face annual debt service in excess of $300 million. In addition, over $2 billion of the Debtors’ prepetition funded debt obligations mature in 2020. The resulting liquidity and refinancing pressures have created an unsustainable drag on the Debtors and, by extension, their Non-Debtor Affiliates, requiring a comprehensive solution.”

This is what that capital structure looks like:

(PETITION Note: if you’re wondering what the eff is a 1.5 lien note, well, welcome to the party pal. These notes are a construct of a frothy high-yield market and constructive readings of credit docs. They were issued in 2017 to discharge maturing notes. The holders thereof enjoy higher priority on collateral than the second lien notes and other junior creditors below, but slot in beneath the first lien notes).

Anyway, to remedy this issue, the company has entered into a support agreement “that enjoys the support of creditors holding a majority of the debt to be restructured, including majorities within every tier of the capital structure.” The agreement would reduce total funded debt by $2b by: (a) giving the first lien noteholders $1.45b in cash (less adequate protection payments reflecting interest on their loans), and 72.5% of new common stock and rights to participate in the rights offering at a significant discount to a total enterprise value of $3.1b; and (b) the 1.5 lien noteholders, the second lien noteholders and the unsecured noteholders 27.5% of the new common stock and rights to participate in the rights offering. The case will be funded by a $700mm DIP credit facility.

*Interestingly, Hexion is a derivative victim of the oil and gas downturn. In 2014, the company was selling resin coated sand to oil and gas businesses to the tune of 8% of sales and 28% of segment EBITDA. By 2016, segment EBITDA dropped by approximately $150mm, a sizable loss that couldn’t be offset by other business units.

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Gross)

• Capital Structure: See above.

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (George Davis, Andrew Parlan, Hugh Murtagh, Caroline Reckler, Jason Gott, Lisa Lansio, Blake Denton, Andrew Sorkin, Christopher Harris) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (Mark Collins, Michael Merchant, Amanda Steele, Brendan Schlauch)

  • Managers: Samuel Feinstein, William Joyce, Robert Kaslow-Ramos, George F. Knight III, Geoffrey Manna, Craig Rogerson, Marvin Schlanger, Lee Stewart

  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

  • Investment Banker: Moelis & Company LLC (Zul Jamal)

  • Claims Agent: Omni Management Group (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Noteholders (Angelo Gordon & Co. LP, Aristeia Capital LLC, Barclays Bank PLC, Beach Point Capital Management LP, Capital Research and Management Company, Citadel Advisors LLC, Contrarian Capital Management LLC, Credit Suisse Securities USA LLC, Davidson Kempner Capital Management LP, DoubleLine Capital LP, Eaton Vance Management, Federated Investment Counseling, GoldenTree Asset Management LP, Graham Capital Management LP, GSO Capital Partners LP, Heyman Enterprise LLC, Hotchkis and Wiley Capital Management LLC, OSK VII LLC, Pacific Investment Management Company LLC, Silver Rock Financial LP, Sound Point Capital Management LP, Tor Asia Credit Master Fund LP, UBS Securities LLC, Whitebox Advisors LLC)

    • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Philip Dublin, Daniel Fisher, Naomi Moss, Abid Qureshi)

    • Financial Advisor: Evercore Group LLC

  • Ad Hoc Group of Crossover Noteholders (Aegon USA Investment Management LLC, Aurelius Capital Master Ltd., Avenue Capital Management II LP, Avenue Europe International Management, Benefit Street Partners LLC, Cyrus Capital Partners LP, KLS Diversified Asset Management LLC, Loomis Sayles & Company LP, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, New Generation Advisors LLC, P. Schoenfeld Asset Management LP)

    • Legal: Milbank LLP (Samuel Khalil, Matthew Brod)

    • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

  • Ad Hoc Group of 1.5 Lien Noteholders

    • Legal: Jones Day (Sidney Levinson, Jeremy Evans)

  • Pre-petition RCF Agent & Post-petition DIP Agent ($350mm): JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

    • Legal: Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP

  • Trustee under the First Lien Notes: U.S. Bank NA

    • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (James Carr, Kristin Elliott) & (local) Dorsey & Whitney LLP (Eric Lopez Schnabel, Alessandra Glorioso)

  • Trustee of 1.5 Lien Notes: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

    • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP

  • Trustee of Borden Indentures: The Bank of New York Mellon

  • Sponsor: Apollo

  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation; Agrium US, Inc.; The Bank of New York Mellon; Mitsubishi Gas Chemical America; PVS Chloralkali, Inc.; Southern Chemical Corporation; Wilmington Trust; Wilmington Savings Fund Society; and Blue Cube Operations LLC

    • Legal: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP (Kenneth Eckstein, Douglas Mannal, Rachael Ringer) & (local) Bayard PA (Scott Cousins, Erin Fay, Gregory Flasser)

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Samuel Star)

Updated:

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Parker Drilling Inc.

Parker Drilling Inc.

12/12/18

Back in October, in “Still Work to Do in Oil Country (Short Oil Field Services Companies),” we wrote the following:

Restructuring professionals attempting to extricate themselves from oil and gas work may have to wait a little bit longer. With companies like Houston-based Parker Drilling Corporation ($PKD) continuing to tread water, there may continue to be action in the space in the very near future. 

We added:

The signs of a near-term (read: Q4 ‘18) bankruptcy filing for Parker Drilling continue to shine through. Back in July, the company implemented a reserve stock split and adopted a short-term shareholder rights plan. While neither initiative, on its own, is dispositive of a chapter 11 filing, they are indicia. The former increases the market price per share of the common stock, ensuring compliance with NYSE listing requirements. Given a delisting notice received back in the spring, some level of stock split was basically a fait accompli. The latter is intended to “protect the best interests of the Company and its stakeholders”and is meant to preserve certain tax attributes that, if lost, would be tremendous value leakage to the estate…uh, company. The company noted:

“The Company believes these Tax Benefits are valuable assets that could offset potential future income taxes for federal income tax purposes. As of December 31, 2017, the Company had approximately $456 million of federal NOLs and $47 million of foreign tax credits.”

Of course, net operating losses only emanate out of a business that is (or was during a given fiscal year) unprofitable for tax purposes. So, there’s that. Which, putting the aforementioned shenanigans aside, is seemingly the bigger problem here.

For its second quarter ended June 30, 2018, PKD reported a net loss of $23.8mm on $118.6mm of revenue, a loss of $2.56/share. Adjusted EBITDA was $18.7mm. While those numbers aren’t so good, to say the least, they actually include a Q-over-Q increase of 8.1% in revenue (thanks to an increase in gross margin). Of course G&A expenses increased by $2.1mm because…wait for it…there were “professional fees fees related to ongoing capital structure analysis during the quarter.” You bet there were, homies.

We continued:

This capital structure isn’t complex and refinancing options, while theoretical, may be difficult given the company’s continued cash burn.

This is the company’s capital structure:

And so we concluded:

The path forward here given the liquidity needed seems pretty obvious: we expect to see a restructuring support agreement on this bad boy sometime soon with an attempted quick trip through bankruptcy court that de-levers the balance sheet, eliminates interest expense, and positions the company to make the capex necessary to capture the growth projected in the business plan.

So, what’s the latest? Well, as predicted, Houston-backed Parker Drilling Company, an international provider of contract drilling and drilling-related services and rental tools, filed an earnest bankruptcy petition and accompanying papers in the Southern District of Texas. Earnest? Why “earnest”? The company stated:

Adverse macro trends, including and especially the sustained downturn in commodity prices, have reduced demand for oilfield services provided by the Debtors, resulting in idle rigs, and placing downward pressure on the prices the Debtors are able to charge. Moreover, the Debtors are facing near term 2020 maturities of their 2020 Notes and ABL (each as defined in the First Day Declaration), for which the borrowing base has been tightened and which may not be re-financeable in the current environment under the existing capital structure.

Rather than hold out hope for a market recovery, or execute an inferior transaction that would at best provide more onerous financing without addressing their capital structure in a comprehensive manner, the Debtors have negotiated a comprehensive balance sheet reorganization to both reduce leverage and increase liquidity.

“Rather than hold out hope for a market recovery.” Those are poignant words that say a lot about the company’s outlook for oil in the near-term. It also says a lot about the company’s capital structure: clearly, there was no chance this company could grow into its balance sheet and/or refinance its upcoming debt. And, so, as we also predicted, the company’s bankruptcy filing is accompanied by a deal in hand with the major players in the company’s capital structure and equity profile: Brigade Capital Management, Highbridge Capital Management, Varde Partners, Whitebox Advisors. These four institutions collectively hold approximately 77% of the unsecured notes, approximately 62% of the outstanding preferred stock, and approximately 15% of the outstanding common stock. They’ve agreed to equitize the notes in exchange for equity in the reorganized company and to participate in a rights offering that will have the effect of capitalizing the reorganized entity with $95mm of new equity. The net effect of all of this will be a $375mm deleveraging of the company’s balance sheet.

The company has a commitment for a $50 DIP credit facility to fund the cases and a $50mm exit facility (with an upsize option up to $100mm) upon its emergence from chapter 11.

• Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Isgur)

• Capital Structure: $80mm ABL (unfunded - Bank of America NA), $225mm ‘20 notes (The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A.), $360mm ‘22 notes (The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A.)

• Company Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Christopher Marcus, Brian Schartz, Anna Rotman, Matthew Fagen, Jamie Netznik) & (local) Jackson Walker LLP (Patricia Tomasco, Matthew Cavenaugh)

  • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC (Lacie Melasi, John Walsh)

  • Investment Banker: Moelis & Co. (Bassam Latif)

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Consenting Noteholders: Brigade Capital Management, Highbridge Capital Management, Varde Partners, Whitebox Advisors

    • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP

    • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

New Chapter 11 Filing - FirstEnergy Solutions Corp.

FirstEnergy Solutions Corp. 

March 31, 2018

#MAGA!!

FirstEnergy Solutions Corp. ("FES"), the wholly-owned subsidiary of publicly-traded (non-debtor) FirstEnergy Corp. has filed a "freefall" bankruptcy in the Northern District of Ohio. FES is a provider of "unregulated"-yet-regulated energy-related products and services to retail and wholesale customers primarily in Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio and Pennsylvania. It owns and operates (a) fossil generating facilities (read: coal) in Ohio (three) and Philadelphia (one) through its FirstEnergy Generation subsidiary ("FG") and, (b) 3 nuclear generating facilities (two in Ohio and one in Philadelphia)through its FirstEnergy Nuclear Generation LLC ("NG") subsidiary. 

For those of you who aren't power geeks - and we confess that we are not - this filing gives a pretty solid primer on how United States' power production and distribution works. Or doesn't work - depending on your point of view, we suppose. We summarize some high points here but if you're especially nerdy and want to understand the power industry better, read docket number 55. You can find it via the case name link above. 

A big piece of this bankruptcy filing is the debtors' retail electricity business. Retail sellers of electricity are subject to state-applied "Renewable Portfolio Standards" ("RPS") that requires sellers to obtain a certain percentage or amount of its power supply from renewable energy sources. One way to comply is through the purchase of renewable energy credits ("RECs"). Historically, FES has obtained RECs to comply with the RPS via eight power purchase agreements entered into between 2003-2011 with various wind and solar power producers. But apparently things have changed considerably since then. And FES no longer wants the RECs. 

What's changed? Now FES's actual and projected sales are much lower. Per the company in more detail: 

"The main drivers to the collapse in prices include:

• Lower natural gas prices due to continued improvements in natural gas fracking;

• Excess generating capacity due in part to lower than expected load growth;

• Lower cost of construction for renewable technologies, and/or improved performance (e.g., higher capacity factors); and

• Surplus of RECs."

Also, future market prices and outlook for power and RECs are projected materially lower. RPS mandates are less demanding (#MAGA!!). And the supply of RECs is significantly greater. Said another way: energy disruption. From frackers pushing a rapid expansion in nat gas supplies which, in turn, caused plummeting electricity prices and reduced profits. From regulation and the rise of renewables. From energy efficient electronics. 

Per the company, "While the PPAs made sense to FES at the time they were entered into, a dramatic downturn in the energy market and prices of RECs now renders these contracts extremely burdensome and uneconomic to FES." They're also, according to the debtor, unnecessary: FES is phasing out its retail business and, today, expects to sell less than half of the amount of power this year that it sold in 2013. Consequently, FES seeks to reject those PPAs in bankruptcy.

Which is not the only PPA it seeks to reject. The debtor also seeks to shed its multi-party intercompany PPA pursuant to which it and several other power companies purchase power generated via fossil fuel from the Ohio Valley Electric Corporation ("OVEC"). The debtor alleges that this obligation is priced at above-market rates. And because FES sells very little wholesale power emanating out of the OVEC PPA, it stands to lose approximately $268 million from the deal. Yikes. 

The issue, though, is whether the rejection of the nine PPAs will cause disruption to the continued supply of wholesale electricity or impact the reliability of the transmission grid in the regional transmission organization that governs FES and FG. That generally means YOUR electricity - if you live in the Northeast. Naturally, the debtor argues it won't. The federal government may think otherwise. And this is precisely why the company filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment and injunction against the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") to prevent the feds from hindering -- on the basis of the Federal Power Act -- the company's attempts to reject the PPAs under the federal bankruptcy code. FERC regulates the wholesale power market. It is also why the company has filed a request for assistance from Rick Perry, President Trump's Energy Secretary. This is some real dramatic sh*t folks: a conflict between federal statutes with efforts for executive branch intervention. Someone dial up Daniel Day-Lewis and bring him out of retirement: this could be the next "Lincoln." 

So, in a nutshell: the company filed for bankruptcy because it needs to leverage the bankruptcy code's debtor-friendly provisions to shed some burdensome contracts - including the PPAs. It also needs to address its cost structure, its over-levered balance sheet (in terms of interest payments and near-term maturities), and lease payments under certain sale-leaseback arrangements related to one of its power facilities. Said another way, this is a full-stop restructuring: both operational and financial in nature. There is a "Process Support Agreement" with various parties in interest which reflects a good faith commitment to cooperate on first day motions, implementation of employee retention and severance programs, and establishing a protocol for the disposition of company assets. Sounds great but it doesn't really promise any certainty given the various claims and regulatory issues. Buckle your seat belts. 

Some additional things of note:

• "Just when I thought I was out, they pull me back in!" (Long Don Corleone). Ironically in the week that Westinghouse Electric Corp. emerged out of its own bankruptcy proceeding, it may now find itself back in bankruptcy court for purposes of adjudicating its $2.36 million trade claim.
• Coal (#MAGA!!). A first order of business is the debtor is seeking to reject its coal transportation agreements with BNSF Railway Company ((owned by Berkshire Hathaway ($BRK.A)) and Norfolk Southern Railway Company ($NSC). Why? It expects to order 200,000 tons of coal less than the 2.5 million tons of coal minimum requirement delineated in the contract. The debtor claims that rejection of the contract will save it $105.6 million over the next 12 months as it replaces rail with barge transportation. 
• Commodities. The company also seeks to reject certain uranium supply contracts because (i) it already has enough uranium inventory for the rest of 2018 and 2019, (ii) the spot price for uranium has dropped precipitously since entering into the agreements (from $36 and $48 per pound, respectively, to $22 per pound), and (iii) there is "ample supply of uranium available in the market." 
• Professional Retentions: Two law firms represent the Ad Hoc Group of Holders of the 6.85% Pass Through Certificates due 2034 because George Davis departed O'Melveny & Myers LLP for Latham & Watkins LLP. 

• Jurisdiction: N.D. of Ohio (Judge Koschik)
• Capital Structure: $3.8 billion funded debt     

  • FES

    • $700 million secured revolving credit facility, ~$332 million of '21 6.05% unsecured notes; (c) ~$363 million of '39 6.80% unsecured notes; and (d) $150 million revolving credit note with Allegheny Energy Supply Company, LLC under which $102 million is currently outstanding and is due on April 2, 2018. 

  • FG

    • ~$328 million of secured fixed-rate pollution control revenue notes ("PCNs"); ~$677 million of unsecured fixed-rate PCNs

  • NG

    • ~$285 million of secured PCNs; ~$842 million of unsecured PCNs

• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Lisa Beckerman, Brad Kahn, Scott Alberino, Kate Doorley, David Applebaum, Todd Brecher, Sean O'Donnell, Rachel Presa, Brian Carney, Abid Qureshi, Joseph Sorkin, David Zensky) & (local) Brouse McDowell LPA (Marc Merklin, Kate Bradley, Bridget Franklin) & (conflicts) Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP
  • Financial Advisor/CRO: Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC (Charles Moore)
  • Investment Banker: Lazard Ltd. 
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name for docket)
  • Special Nuclear Regulatory Counsel: Hogan Lovells US LLP
  • Industry Consultants: ICF International Inc.
  • Special Litigation Counsel: Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP
  • Tax Consultant: KPMG US LLP
  • Communications Consultant: Sitrick and Company
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Board of Directors of FirstEnergy Corp. 
    • Legal: Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP (Stephen Lerner, Peter Morrison, Julia Furlong)
  • Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB
    • Legal: KIlpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP (Todd Meyers, Michael Langford) & (local) McDonald Hopkins LLC (Michael Kaczka, Scott Opincar, Maria Carr)
  • Indenture Trustee: Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A.
  • Indenture Trustee to PCNs: UMB Bank, National Association
  • Ad Hoc Group of Holders of the 6.85% Pass Through Certificates due 2034
    • Legal: O'Melveny & Myers LLP & Latham & Watkins LLP
    • Financial Advisor: Guggenheim Partners LLC
  • Ad Hoc Group of Holders of PCNs issued by FG and NG
    • Legal: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 
    • Financial Advisor: GLC Advisors & Co.
  • Contract Counterparty: BNSF Railway Company
    • Legal: Whitmer & Eherman LLC (Mary Whitmer, James Ehrman, Robert Stefancin)
  • Non-debtor Parent: FirstEnergy Corp.
    • Legal: Jones Day (Heather Lennox, Thomas Wilson)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy & CCAA - Toys "R" Us Inc.

Toys "R" Us Inc.

• 9/19/17 Recap: So. Much. To. Unpack. Here. We've previously discussed the run-up to this massive chapter 11 bankruptcy filing here and here. Still, suffice it to say that, unlike many of the other retailers that have predictably filed for bankruptcy thus far in 2017, this one was different. This one seemingly came out of nowhere - particularly given the proximity to the holiday shopping season. Before we note what this case is, lets briefly cover what it isn't and clear the noise that is pervasive on the likes of Twitter: this is NOT "RIP" Toys "R" Us. We don't get overly sentimental usually but the papers filed with the bankruptcy court were well-written and touching: this is a store, a brand, that means a lot to a lot of people. And it's not going anywhere (the company will have its challenges to assure people that this is the case). This is a financial restructuring not a liquidation: the company simply hasn't been able to evolve while paying $400mm in annual interest expense on over $5b of private equity infused debt. Plain and simple. Yes, there are other challenges (blah blah blah, Amazon), but with that debt overhang, it appears the company hasn't been able to confront them (PETITION side note: an ill-conceived deal with Amazon 18 years ago is mind-blowing when viewed from the perspective of Amazon's long game). With this filing, the company is signaling that the time for short term band-aids to address its capital structure is over. Now, "[t]he time for change, and reinvestment in operations, has come." Decisive. Management isn't messing around anymore. With a reduction in debt, the company will be unshackled and able to focus on "general upkeep and the condition of...stores, [its] inability to provide expedited shipping options, and [its] lack of a subscription-based delivery service." Indeed, the company intends to use a $3.1b debtor-in-possession credit facility to begin investing in modernization immediately.
• Interesting Facts:
  • Toy Manufacturers: Mattel ($MAT)(approx $136mm), Hasbro ($HAB) (approx $59mm) & Lego (approx $31.5mm) are among the top general unsecured creditors of the company. Mattel and Hasbro's stock traded down quite a bit yesterday on the rampant news of this filing. Query whether any of the $325mm of requested critical vendor money will apply to these companies.
  • The Power of the Media (read: NOT "fake news"): This CNBC piece helped push the company into bankruptcy. Bankruptcy professionals were retained in July (or earlier in the case of Lazard) to pursue capital structure solutions. In August the company engaged with some of its lenders. But then "...a news story published on September 6, 2017, reporting that the Debtors were considering a chapter 11 filing, started a dangerous game of dominos: within a week of its publication, nearly 40 percent of the Company’s domestic and international product vendors refused to ship product without cash on delivery, cash in advance, or, in some cases, payment of all outstanding obligations. Further, many of the credit insurers and factoring parties that support critical Toys “R” Us vendors withdrew support. Given the Company’s historic average of 60-day trade terms, payment of cash on delivery would require the Debtors to immediately obtain a significant amount—over $1.0 billion—of new liquidity." 
  • Revenue. The company generates 40% of its annual revenue during the holiday season.
  • Footprint. The company has approximately 1,697 stores and 257 licensed stores in 38 countries, plus additional e-commerce sites in various countries. The company has been shedding burdensome above-market leases and combining its Babies and Toys shops under one roof; it intends to continue its review of its real estate portfolio. Read: there WILL be store closures.
  • Eff the Competition. Toys has some choice words for its competition embedded in its bankruptcy papers; it accuses Walmart ($WMT) and Target ($TGT)(the "big box retailers") of slashing prices on toys and using toys as a loss leader to get bodies in doors; it further notes that "retailers such as Amazon are not concerned with making a profit at this juncture, rendering their pricing model impossible to compete with..." ($AMZN). Yikes. 
  • Experiential Retail. The company intends to invest in the "shopping experience" which will include (i) interactive spaces with rooms to use for parties, (ii) live product demonstrations put on by trained employees, and (iii) the freedom for employees to remove product from boxes to let kids play with the latest toys. And...wait for it...AUGMENTED REALITY. Boom. Toysrus.ar and Toysrus.ai here we come. 
• Jurisdiction: E.D. of Virginia (Judge Phillips)
• Capital Structure: see below     
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Jamie Sprayragen, Anup Sathy, Edward Sassower, Chad Husnick, Joshua Sussberg, Robert Britton, Emily Geier) & (local) Kutak Rock LLP (Michael A. Condyles, 
    Peter J. Barrett, Jeremy S. Williams) & (Canadian counsel) Goodmans LLP
  • Legal to the Independent Board of Directors: Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP
  • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC (Jeffrey Stegenga, Jonathan Goulding, Tom Behnke, Cari Turner, Jim Grover, Arjun Lal, Doug Lewandowski, Bobby Hoernschemeyer, Scott Safron, Kara Harmon, Nick Cherry, Adam Fialkowski)
  • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co., LLC (David Kurtz)
  • Real Estate Consultant: A&G Realty Partners LLC (Andrew Graiser)
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Communications Consultant: Joele Frank Wilkinson Brimmer Katcher
• Other Parties in Interest:
• ABL/FILO DIP Admin Agent: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA
  • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Marshall Heubner, Brian Resnick, Eli Vonnegut, Veerle Roovers) & (local) Hunton & Williams LLP (Tyler Brown, Henry (Toby) Long III, Justin Paget)
• DIP Admin Agent (Toys DE Inc). NexBank SSB & Ad Hoc Group of B-4 Lenders (Angelo Gordon & Co LP; Franklin Mutual Advisors LLC, HPS Investment Partners LLC, Marathon Asset Management LP, Redwood Capital Management LLC, Roystone Capital Management LP, and Solus Alternative Asset Management LP)
  • Legal: Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz (Joshua Feltman, Emil Kleinhaus, Neil Chatani) & (local) McGuireWoods LLP (Dion Hayes, Sarah Bohm, Douglas Foley)
• Ad Hoc Group of Taj Noteholders.
  • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Brian Hermann, Samuel Lovett, Kellie Cairns) & (local) Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLP (Christopher Jones, Jennifer Wuebker)
• Steering Committee of B-2 and B-3 Lenders (American Money Management, Columbia Threadneedle Investments, Ellington Management Group LLC, First Trust Advisors L.P., MJX Asset Management LLC, Pacific Coast Bankers Bank, Par-Four Investment Management LLC, Sound Point Capital Management, Taconic Capital Advisors LP).
  • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (Michael Messersmith, D. Tyler Nurnberg, Sarah Gryll, Rosa Evergreen)
• 12% ’21 Senior Secured Notes Indenture Trustee: Wilmington Trust, National Association.
  • Legal: Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP (Todd Meyers, David Posner, Gianfranco Finizio) & (local) ThompsonMcMullan PC (David Ruby, William Prince IV)
• Bank of America NA
  • • Legal: Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP (Paul Leake, Shana Elberg, George Howard) & (local) Troutman Sanders LLP (Jonathan Hauser)
  • Private Equity Sponsors: Bain Capital Private Equity LP, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P. ($KKR), and Vornado Realty Trust ($VNO)
• Large Creditor: Mattel Inc.
  • Legal: Jones Day (Richard Wynne, Erin Brady, Aaron Gober-Sims) & (local) Michael Wilson PLC (Michael Wilson)
• Large Creditor: LEGO Systems Inc.
  • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Kelly DiBlasi) & (local) Walcott Rivers Gates (Cullen Speckhart)
• Large Creditor: American Greetings Corporation.
  • Legal: Baker & Hosteler LLP (Benjamin Irwin, Eric Goodman)
• Creditor: River Birch Capital
  • Legal: Andrews Kurth & Kenyon LLP (Paul Silverstein)
• Creditor: Owl Creek Asset Management
  • Legal: Stroock Stroock & Lavan LLP (Samantha Martin)
• TRU Trust 2016-TOYS, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-TOYS acting through Wells Fargo Bank NA
  • Legal: Dechert LLP (Allan Brilliant, Brian Greer, Stephen Wolpert, Humzah Soofi) & (local) Troutman Sanders LLP (Jonathan Hauser)
• Trustee: Tru Taj DIP Notes (Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB)
  • Legal: Porter Hedges LLP (Eric English) & (local) Spotts Fain PC (James Donaldson)
• Committee of Unsecured Creditors (Mattel Inc., Evenflo Company Inc., Simon Property Group, Euler Hermes North America Insurance Co., Veritiv Operating Company, Huffy Corporation, KIMCO Realty, The Bank of New York Mellon, LEGO Systems Inc.)

First Day Declaration

First Day Declaration

Updated 10/5/17 11:40 am

New Chapter 11 Filing - CGG Holding (US) Inc.

CGG Holding (US) Inc.

• 6/14/17 Recap: Global geophysical and geoscience company servicing customers primarily in oil and gas E&P is the latest victim of the oil and gas downturn of the past two-or-so years. The company's success is tied heavily to the E&P space and those clients were reluctant to invest in data acquisition projects to identify areas for future production or increased current production; therefore, you can imagine what happened to revenues and what that means when you're looking at a debt-stack as aggressive as this one. Indeed revenues and earnings were cut by 67% from 2012 to 2016. Ad hoc groups of secured lenders and high yield bondholders as well as as certain holders of the converts and certain shareholders of CGG SA, the foreign entity that filed in France and for Chapter 15, have entered into a Lock-up agreement delineating a balance sheet restructuring. The upshot is that the high yield bondholders and converts will own the majority of the equity in the reorganized company. 
• Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Glenn)
• Capital Structure: $810mm secured debt ($300mm French Revolver of CGG SA - Wilmington Trust (London), $165mm US Revolver - Credit Suisse AG, $342mm US TL - Wilmington Trust NA), $1.6b senior unsecured high yield bonds (The Bank of New York Mellon) and $402.7mm convertible notes (issued by CGG SA).     
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Alan Kornberg, Brian Hermann, Lauren Shumejda, Christopher Hopkins) & (Chapter 15 for CGG SA) Linklaters LLP (Margot Schonholz, Robert Trust, Christopher Hunker)
  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP (Becky Roof, Susan Brown, Brad Hunter, John Creighton, Francisco Echevarria,John Somerville, David Shim)
  • Investment Banker: Morgan Stanley & Lazard (Kenneth Ziman)
    • Legal (Lazard): Sidley Austin LLP (Thomas Labuda Jr., Andrew Propps)
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Ad Hoc Secured Lender Committee (Och Ziff, Goldman Sachs International, Makuria Investment Management (UK) LLP, T. Rowe Price)
    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Kon Asimacopolous, Stephen Hessler, Anthony Grossi, Hannah Crawford)
  • Ad Hoc Committee of Holders of High Yield Bonds (Alden Global Capital, Attestor Capital LLP, Boussard & Gavaudan Asset Management LP, Contrarian Capital Management LLC, Aurelius Capital Management LP, Third Point LLC)
    • Legal: Wilkie Farr & Gallager LLP (John Longmire, Weston Eguchi)
  • Indenture Trustee for Senior Noteholders: Bank of New York Mellon
    • Legal: Hogan Lovells US LLP (Christopher Donoho, John Beck)

Updated 7/11/17 6:41 CT

New Chapter 15 Filing - Mood Media Corporation

Mood Media Corporation

• 5/22/17 Recap: Publicly-traded (on the Canadian exchange) provider of sound, sight, and scent solutions for retail, restaurant and hospitality companies has filed for CBCA and Chapter 15 to effectuate a deleveraging transaction. The transaction in brief: noteholders are swapping their 9.25% notes for $500mm new second lien notes and common stock in the reorganized company (subject to upsize via rights offering participation). Equity will get 17 cents on the dollar. The company will also install a $315mm first lien facility. So, it sounds like the company will still have a f*ck-ton of debt on it. But we're just thankful that the company that brags that "We Put People in the Mood to Buy" will still be providing customers of Qdoba, McDonald's & Ikea, to name a few, with the full sensory experience that inspires needless consumerism of unhealthy and/or bad quality food and wares. Those annoying text message offers you might randomly get? Yeah, it's possible that's from Mood Media. Remember muzak? Yeah, that's also Mood Media. Muzak filed for bankruptcy back in February '09 (with Kirkland & Ellis as counsel then too) and emerged a year later with Silver Point Capital Management as the majority owner. Mood Media then bought Muzak for $345mm in March 2011. Pursuant to this transaction, Apollo Global Management LP and GSO Capital Partners will own this sucker.
• Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York
• Capital Structure: $250mm first lien term loan (Credit Suisse AG), $350mm '20 9.25% senior unsecured notes (Bank of New York Mellon), $50mm '23 10% senior unsecured MMGSA notes (Computershare Trust Company NA)(subsidiary level)    
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Edward Sassower, Joshua Sussberg, Adam Paul, Bradley Giordano, Whitney Fogelberg) & (Canadian counsel) Stikeman Elliott LLP (Alexander Rose)
  • Financial Advisor: Allen & Company LLC
  • Investment Banker: Origin Merchant Partners
  • Claims Agent: JND Legal Administration (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • MMGSA noteholders: GSO Capital Partners LP, Apollo Global Management LLC
    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Robert Agar) & (Canadian counsel) Goodmans LLP (Brendan O'Neill)
    • Financial Advisor: Credit Suisse
  • New Lender: HPS Investment Partners LLC
  • The Bank of New York Mellon & BNY Trust Company of Canada
    • Legal: Emmet Marvin & Martin LLP (Edward Zujkowski, Thomas Pitta)

Updated 7/11/17

New Filing - Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico & Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation ("COFINA")

• 5/3/17 Recap: The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico filed a petition for relief under Title III of the the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA"). Much has been written on this situation and so we're going to keep this brief. We're also going to shed the snark. Why? Well, because this is truly a sad story. GNP in Puerto Rico has declined over 14% in the last decade. The unemployment rate is 12.1% as of 10/16. The labor participation rate plummeted to 40%. The population has declined by 10% over the last decade. 46.1% of PR's residents live below the federal poverty level: the national average is 14.7% and Detroit's poverty level at the time of filing for Chapter 9 was 36%. Brutal. All in, the Commonwealth has $74 billion of bond debt and $48 billion of unfunded pension liabilities. A total dumpster fire.
• Jurisdiction: United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico
• Capital Structure:

• Professionals:
  • Counsel to the Oversight Board: Proskauer Rose LLP (Martin Bienenstock, Scott Rutsky, Philip Abelson, Ehud Barak, Maja Zerjal, Timothy Mungovan, Steven Ratner, Paul Possinger) & O'Neill & Borges LLC (Hermann Bauer)
  • Strategic Consultant to the Oversight Board: McKinsey & Co.
  • Municipal Investment Banker to the Oversight Board: Citigroup Global Markets
  • Financial Advisor to the Oversight Board: Ernst & Young LLP
  • Counsel to the Puerto Rico Tax Agency and Financial Advisory Authority: O'Melveny & Myers LLP (John Rapisardi, Suzzanne Uhland, Peter Friedman)
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Ad Hoc Retiree Committee
    • Legal: Bennazar Garcia & Milian CSP (A.J. Bennazar-Zequeira) & Clark Hill PLC (Robert Gordon, Shannon Deeby, Jennifer Green)
  • National Public Finance Guarantee Corporation
    • Legal: Weil (Marcia Goldstein, Kelly DiBlasi, Gabriel Morgan)
  • Ambac Assurance Corporation
    • Legal: Milbank Tweed & McCloy LLP (Dennis Dunne, Andrew Leblanc, Atara Miller)
  • UBS Family of Funds
    • Legal: White & Case LLP (John Cunningham)
  • Oppenheimer Funds
    • Legal: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP (Thomas Mayer, Amy Caton, Douglas Buckley, David Blabey Jr., Phillip Bentley)
  • American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
    • Legal: Saul Ewing LLP (Dipesh Patel, Sharon Levine)
  • The Employees Retirement System of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
    • Legal: DLA Piper LLP (Richard Chesley, Rachel Albanese)
  • Goldman Sachs Asset Management LP
    • Legal: McDermott Will & Emery LLP (James Kapp, Megan Thibert-Ind, William Smith)
  • Trustee: Bank of New York Mellon 
    • Legal: Reed Smith LLP (Luke Sizemore, Eric Schaffer, Kurt Gwynne)

Updated 5/11/17

From the Commonwealth's petition.