✈️ New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - AeroCentury Corp. ($ACY) ✈️

California-based AeroCentury Corp. ($ACY) and two affiliates (together, the “debtors”) filed chapter 11 bankruptcy cases on Monday March 29, 2021 in the District of Delaware. The debtors are in the business of investing in mid-life regional turboprop and jet aircraft equipment and then turning around and leasing that equipment to foreign and domestic regional air carriers. Their portfolio consists of thirteen aircraft, six of which are held under operating leases, two under financing leases, and five held for sale in whole or as parts. If this general type of business sounds familiar, well, congratulations, you’ve been paying attention: over the last few weeks, we’ve been highlighting the challenges that aircraft finance businesses have faced due to COVID-19 primarily in the context of Nordic Aviation (hereherehere and here).

COVID-19 did no favors for the debtors either. The debtors experienced an 85% decrease in YOY revenue in Q320; they had generated $43.6mm in revenue in FY19. That hurts when thrown against ~$83mm of pre-petition first lien debt due in 2023 (exclusive of debt held on certain non-debtor special purpose entities backing individual aircraft).

Of course, there were problems pre-pandemic. In fact, the debtors have been in a perpetual state of forbearance with their agent bank, MUFG Union Bank NA ($MUFG), and their lenders since October 28, 2019. Not that you could tell from the looks of this chart:

Source: Koyfin

Source: Koyfin

Anywho, pre-COVID, the debtors’ banker, B. Riley Securities Inc. ($RILY), was out to market on a dual track, soliciting bids for a sale of the debtors’ assets on one hand, while also pursuing a capital raise on the other. The bankruptcy will apparently take the first path.

The debtors march into bankruptcy court with a stalking horse agreement in place with Drake Asset Management Jersey Limited, which purchased all of the debt held by the debtors’ lenders in October 2020. Drake will credit bid $83.5mm; it did not negotiate a break-up fee or expense reimbursement so anyone bullish on an airline turnaround is apparently more than welcome to enter the fray with little to no impediments (well, other than than credit bid amount). Given that RILY has been marketing the debtors for what seems like an eternity now, the debtors hope to push the sale process expeditiously, completing the process in approximately 50 days.

Date: March 29, 2021

Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Dorsey)

Capital Structure: $83mm of funded debt

Company Professionals:

  • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Lorenzo Marinuzzi, Erica Richards) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Joseph Barry, Ryan Bartley, Joseph Mulvihill, S. Alexander Faris)

  • Investment Banker: B. Riley Securities Inc. (Adam Rosen)

  • Claims Agent: KCC (Click here for free docket access)

Other Parties in Interest:

  • RCF Agent: MUFG Union Bank NA

⛽️New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Nine Point Energy Holdings Inc.⛽️

Nine Point Energy Holdings Inc.

Colorado-based Nine Point Energy Holdings Inc. (along with three affiliates, the “debtors”) is and independent oil and gas exploration and production company focused on the Williston Basin in North Dakota and Montana. It is the successor to Triangle USA Petroleum Corporation, which filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in June 2016 and confirmed a plan in March 2017. Four years later, it’s back in bankruptcy court. 😬

Followers of E&P bankruptcies have become accustomed to disputes relating to E&P companies and their midstream gathering, transportation and processing providers. Here, Caliber Midstream Partners LP was the debtors’ largest midstream services provider — “was” being the operative word after the debtors terminated the long-term midstream services agreements on the eve of bankruptcy. The story, however, doesn’t end there.

The debtors are willing to enter into a new arrangement with Caliber going forward. It’s unclear how the new arrangement might differ from the existing arrangement because redaction, redaction, redaction. The economic terms of the contract have not been disclosed. 🤔

And so here we are with another potential “running with the land” scenario. If you’re unfamiliar with what this is, you clearly haven’t been paying attention to E&P bankruptcy cases. Just Google it and you’ll pull up probably 8928394829248929 law firm articles on the topic. As this will be a major driver in the case, it probably makes sense to refresh your recollection.

Why are the debtors in bankruptcy? All of the usual reasons, e.g., the big drop in oil prices thanks to COVID-19 and Russia/OPEC. Nothing really new there.

So what does this filing achieve? For starters, it will give the debtors an opportunity to address the Caliber contracts. Moreover, it will avail the debtors of a DIP facility from their pre-petition lenders in the amount of ~$72mm — $18mm in new money and $54mm on a rollup basis (exclusive of an additional $16.1mm roll-up to account for pre-petition secured swap obligations)(8% interest with 2% commitment fee). Finally, the pre-petition-cum-DIP-lenders have agreed to serve as the stalking horse purchaser of the debtors’ assets with a credit bid floor of $250mm.


Date: March 15, 2021

Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Walrath)

Capital Structure: $256.9mm credit facility, $16.1mm swap obligations

Company Professionals:

  • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Richard Levy, Caroline Reckler, Jonathan Gordon, George Davis, Nacif Taousse, Alistair Fatheazam, Jonathan Weichselbaum, Andrew Sorkin, Heather Waller, Amanda Rose Stanzione, Elizabeth Morris, Sohom Datta) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Michael Nestor, Kara Hammond Coyle, Ashley Jacobs, Jacob Morton)

  • Board of Directors: Patrick Bartels Jr., Dominic Spencer, Frederic Brace, Gary Begeman, Alan Dawes

  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP (John Castellano)

  • Investment Banker: Perella Weinberg Partners LP (John Cesarz)

  • Claims Agent: Stretto (Click here for free docket access)

Other Parties in Interest:

  • Pre-petition & DIP Agent: AB Private Credit Investors LLC

    • Legal: Proskauer Rose LLP (Charles Dale, David Hillman, Michael Mervis, Megan Volin, Paul Possinger, Jordan Sazant) & Landis Rath & Cobb LLP (Adam Landis, Kerri Mumford, Matthew Pierce)

  • Ad Hoc Group of Equityholders: Shenkman Capital Management, JP Morgan Securities LLC, Canyon Capital Advisors LLC, Chambers Energy Capital

    • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Jeffrey Pawlitz, Matthew Dunn, Mark Stancil) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (John Knight, Amanda Steele, David Queroli)

  • Midstream Counterparty: Caliber Measurement Services LLC, Caliber Midstream Fresh Water Partners LLC, and Caliber North Dakota LLC

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Alfredo Perez, Brenda Funk, Tristan Sierra, Edward Soto, Lauren Alexander) & Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Curtis Miller, Taylor Haga, Nader Amer)

📺New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - MobiTV Inc.📺

MobiTV Inc.

On Monday, Emeryville, California-based MobiTV, Inc. and an affiliated debtor filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the District of Delaware. MobiTV is “a creative thinking technology company making TV better.” Which is funny because we’re willing to bet that literally nobody thinks about MobiTV when they think about whether they enjoy their television-watching user experience. Anyway, what that actually means is MobiTV sells a white-label software application to cable providers that allows consumers to stream programming on (i) streaming devices like Roku, Apple TV, Amazon Fire TV, XBox or (ii) a smart TV, without the need for a set-top cable box. Key customers include T-Mobile USA Inc. ($TMUS) and over 120 cable/broadband television providers to deliver content to over 300k end user subscribers. In other words, if you’re streaming HBO via T-Mobile, your experience may very well be powered by MobiTV.

MobiTV has been around since 2000 and had gone through several shifts in its fortunes and business model. In 2020, MobiTV generated $13M in revenue with an operating loss of approximately $34M. That is a long fall from grace for a company that filed for an IPO in 2011 with reported 2010 sales of $67M. At the time, MobiTV was entirely focused on providing licensed TV programming to the personal devices of customers on wireless networks with AT&T Inc. ($T)Sprint, and T-Mobile accounting for almost all of the company’s revenues. MobiTV had raised over $110M from investors like Menlo VenturesRedpoint VenturesAdobe Ventures, and Hearst Ventures.

But despite its rosy trajectory, MobiTV withdrew its IPO filing a few months later citing unfavorable market conditions. In hindsight, there were obviously deeper problems with the business model. Broadcast TV viewing on mobile devices failed to take off in the way the company predicted and MobiTV pivoted away from serving wireless carriers.

Its new target customer was midsize cable providers. Set-top boxes have long been at the center of consumers interactions with cable providers. But these boxes have plenty of drawbacks:

Pay-TV providers (and their consumers) are looking for a way beyond set-top boxes, which can be expensive for consumers to buy, costly to maintain for the pay-TV providers and often limited in their functionality. Their clunkiness, in fact, has made them ripe for disruption, and many now opt for lighter options like Fire TV or Apple TV to bypass those services altogether. In other words, pay-TV providers need to find other routes to providing services to customers that can compete better with the newer generation of video services. (emphasis added)

MobiTV saw the shift towards streaming devices and smart TVs and aimed to position itself as a “television as a service provider” to midsized cable providers like C SpireDirectLink, and Citizens Fiber. These companies lack the R&D budgets of the likes of Comcast Corporation ($CMCSA) to invest in user interface and software applications in their set-top boxes. In 2017, MobiTV raised $21M from Oak Investment Partners and Ally Bank ($ALLY) (at a reported ~$400M valuation!) to develop its MobiTV ConnectTM Platform, “a product for pay TV and on-demand TV providers to stream broadcast TV and offer other services, like catch-up and recording, without the need of a set-top box.

The idea was to capture some of the “customer ownership” that was slipping from cable set-top boxes to streaming devices and services. In 2019, MobiTV raised $50M more from Oak Investment Partners and Ally Bank as well as Cedar Grove Partners to fund further growth. At the time, MobiTV had about 90 cable providers signed up as customers.

Middlemen can make good money and at first glance it seemed like MobiTV might have been able to carve out a position for itself. MobiTV offered cable providers a small way to stem the tide of cord cutting and the proliferation of streaming services like HBO MaxNetflix Inc ($NFLX)Hulu, and the rest. As TechCrunch laid out, “The pitch that MobiTV makes to pay TV providers goes something like this:”

…set-top-box-free pay TV services gives operators a wider array of channels and potentially more flexibility in how they are provisioned. At the same time, a solution like MobiTV’s potentially lowers the total cost of ownership for providers by removing the need for the set-top boxes.

That’s not to say that some of its customers are not using both, though: they can provide a certain set of channels directly through boxes, and the MobiTV service gives them the option of having another set that are offered on top of that.

By 2020, MobiTV’s customer base had grown to about 120 midsize cable TV operators as well as legacy T-Mobile customers. Revenue was growing and its subscribers and customers bases were both increasing. So what the hell happened here? 🤔

An agnostic software solution for cable providers to capture some of the shift towards streaming? Coupled with more people stuck at home from a pandemic? If this product were ever going to work, one would think it would have been during the last year. From the First Day Declaration:

That’s the entirety of section D. Maybe we are dense but it would be interesting to know what exactly about the COVID-19 pandemic and related stay-at-home orders materially impaired the Company’s growth opportunities. Seems like that should have been good for business, no?

But we can speculate.

As every content provider has rolled out their own streaming service over the last twelve months, MobiTV was probably in the worst position in the entire television streaming value chain. On the supply side, content providers are focused on promoting their own streaming services and have little reason to give any sort of pricing concessions to a niche service provider like MobiTV. This surely kept MobiTV’s licensing costs at an elevated level.

On the demand side, consumers likely were not calling in to their cable providers demanding MobiTV considering they could get the same content with a $30 Roku, their streaming subscriptions, and their broadband bill. Cable providers apparently were willing to pay for the service, but not enough to keep the company from losing money.

After 20 years of trying to figure out what its business model was, MobiTV finally threw in the towel and management took COVID cover.

The “tell” that the business issues were more elemental than COVID? The fact that the company has been operating under a series of 17 amendments and forbearance agreements.

At the time of its Ch. 11 filing, MobiTV had ~$25M of debt obligations, owed entirely to its sole pre-petition secured lender, Ally Bank.

In 2017 Ally Bank provided MobiTV a $10M term loan as well as a $5M revolving credit facility which was fully drawn. The original maturity of these loans was February 3, 2019, but following the aforementioned amendments and forbearance agreements, the maturity date was pushed back to January 2021. To fund the business in the interim, Oak Investment Partners threw good money after bad, underwriting three Subordinated Convertible Promissory Notes on August 6, 2020 ($4mm); December 14, 2020 ($1mm); and December 30, 2020 ($0.3mm). As a condition to one of Ally Bank’s credit amendments, MobiTV engaged FTI Capital Advisors LLC to evaluate strategic alternatives. A subsequent marketing effort came up empty: the “alternatives” were non-existent.

Consequently, on January 29, 2021, MobiTV and Ally Bank entered into another amendment and forbearance. T-Mobile — the customer most reliant upon the MobiTV’s services — provided $2.5mm in bridge financing lest they upset thousands of customers right around Super Bowl time. On February 12, 2021, T-Mobile agreed to provide an additional ~$2.3mm and Ally Bank agreed to forbear until February 26, 2021.

Following negotiations with Ally Bank and T-Mobile, the interested parties concluded that a sale process should be implemented through the filing of chapter 11. An affiliate of T-Mobile, TVN Ventures, LLC, has committed to a $15mm DIP credit facility (12%), junior to the pre-existing pre-petition Ally Bank position. As of this writing, management is still seeking a stalking horse bidder to backstop the sale process.

At $13mm of revenue with an operating loss that high, there’s a very good chance that T-Mobile knows it’s buying this thing with that DIP commitment.


Date: March 1, 2021

Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Silverstein)

Capital Structure: $25mm funded debt

Company Professionals:

  • Legal: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Debra Grassgreen, Mary Caloway, Maxim Litvak, Nina Hong, Jason Rosell)

  • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Chris LeWand, Catherine Moran, Chris Post, Chris Tennenbaum, Doug Edelman)

  • Claims Agent: Stretto (Click here for free docket access)

Other Parties in Interest:

  • DIP Lender: T-Mobile USA Inc. and TVN Ventures LLC

    • Legal: Alston & Bird LLP (William Sugden, Jacob Johnson) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Edmon Morton, Kenneth Enos)

  • Silicon Valley Bank

    • Legal: Morrison Foerster LLP (Alexander Rheaume, Benjamin Butterfield) & Ashby & Geddes LLP (Gregory Taylor, Katharina Earle)

  • Ally Bank

    • Legal: McGuireWoods LLP (Kenneth Noble, Kristin Wigness, Ha Young Chung) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (John Knight, David Queroli)

  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors:

    • Legal: Fox Rothschild LLP (Seth Niederman, Michael Sweet, Gordon Gouveia)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - RGN-Group Holdings LLC (d/b/a Regus)

RGN-Group Holdings LLC

We have yet to really see it run through the system but there’s no doubt in our minds that there is a commercial real estate and commercial mortgage-backed security massacre on the horizon. The hospitality sector, in particular, ought to be on the receiving end of a pretty harsh shellacking. More on this in a future edition of PETITION.

For now, the most high profile CRE activity we’ve seen thus far is the trickle of Regus locations that have filed for bankruptcy. Regus is an on-demand and co-working company with 1000 locations across the United States and Canada. Set up as special purpose entities with individual leases, the structure is such that IWG Plc f/k/a Regus Corporation (OTCMKTS: $IWGFF) serves as both ultimate parent and lender but isn’t a guarantor or obligor under any of the downstream leases.* This non-recourse structure allows for individual Regus locations to plop into bankruptcy — all with an eye towards working out lease concessions or turning over — without taking down the entirety of the enterprise.**

The first outpost, RGN-Columbus IV LLC, filed for bankruptcy in Delaware back on July 30. Since then, sixteen additional Regus affiliates have filed with the most recent ones descending upon Delaware last week: RGN-Philadelphia IX LLC, RGN-Chevy Chase I LLC, RGN-Los Angeles XXV LLC, RGN-San Jose IX LLC, RGN-New York XXXIX and RGN-Denver XVI LLC. All of the cases filed under Subchapter V of chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code (though, thanks to the addition of more locations, the case has been re-designated under Chapter 11).***

The description of the overall business model is precious:

IWG’s business model begins with entry into long-term non-residential real property leases (each, a “Lease”) with property owners (each, a “Landlord”) that provide the Company unoccupied office space (the “Centers”). Based on significant market research on potential client needs in local markets and the unique requirements of their existing clients, IWG engineers each of the Centers to meet the architectural style, service, space, and amenity needs of those individuals, companies, and organizations who will contract for use of subportions of the Centers. IWG markets its Centers under an umbrella of different brand names, each tailored to appeal to different types of clients and those clients’ specialized needs. These clients (the “Occupants”) enter into short-term licenses (each, an “Occupancy Agreement”) to use portions of the Centers, which are customizable as to duration, configuration, services, and amenities. When operating successfully, a Center’s Occupants’ license payments (“Occupancy Fees”) will exceed the combined cost of the underlying long-term lease, management cost, and operating expenses of the Center. (emphasis added)

It’s the “when operating successfully” part that always bewildered watchers of the co-working business model generally. After all, it was easy to see the mass expansion of co-working spaces amidst the longest bull run in market history. Indeed, Regus apparently had “Good first half performance overall given COVID-19 impact in Q2.” The question was: what happens in a downturn? The answer? You start to see the model when it operates unsuccessfully. In this scenario, occupancy rates dip lower than expected. Prior geographic expansion begins to look irresponsible. Pricing declines to attract new sales and renewals. And current occupants begin to stretch their payables.**** In total, it ain’t pretty. By way of example, take a look at some of the numbers:*****

Source: PETITION, Chapter 11 Petitions

Source: PETITION, Chapter 11 Petitions

But while the operating performance of those select locations may be ugly AF, the structure bakes in this possibility and isolates the cancer. Aside from the landlords, the locations have virtually no creditors.

  • Each debtor location is an obligor pursuant to a senior secured loan agreement with Regus making for an intercompany obligation. There’s no other funded debt.

  • The debtors are otherwise subject to a management agreement with non-debtor Regus Management Group LLC (“RMG”) pursuant to which each debtor is obligated to reimburse RMG for gross expenses incurred directly by RMG in performing management services plug a 5.5% vig on gross revenues.

  • The debtors are also subject to an equipment lease agreement with debtor RGN-Group Holdings LLC. Under this agreement the debtors are obligated for the original cost of fixtures, furniture and equipment plus a margin fee.

  • As if those agreements didn’t siphon off enough revenue, the debtors are also subject to franchise agreements pursuant to which the debtors have the right to operate an IWG business format in their respective locations and use certain business support services, advice and IT in exchange for a monthly 12% vig on gross revenue.

Given most of the debtors’ obligations are intercompany in nature, what did Regus do? It tried to stick it to its landlords. Duh.

Like so many other companies navigating these troubled times, the Company instituted a variety of comprehensive actions to reduce costs and improve cash flow and liquidity, including the deferral of rent payments and engagement with Landlords to negotiate forbearances, temporary accommodations, and, where possible, permanent modifications to the various Leases to bring them in line with the COVID-19-adjusted market realities so as to permit the Company to continue operating Centers at those respective locations despite the uncertainty when the pandemic will subside and when (and indeed, whether) the U.S. will return to something resembling the pre-pandemic “business as usual.”

Certain landlords, of course, played ball. That helped lessen Regus’ funding burden in the US. But, of course, others didn’t. Indeed, various landlords sent default/eviction notices. Hence the aforementioned bankruptcy filings:

…the Debtors commenced their Chapter 11 Cases to prevent the forfeiture of the Lease Holder Debtors’ Leases, and to preserve all Debtors’ ability to operate their respective businesses—thereby, importantly, protecting the Occupants of the Lease Holder Debtors’ Centers from any disruption to their businesses. I expect that the “breathing spell” from Landlords’ collection efforts that will be afforded by the chapter 11 process will allow the Debtors, and the Company more broadly, to more fully explore the possibility of restructuring their various contractual obligations in order to put the Company’s North American portfolio on a surer footing going forward, so as to allow the Debtors to emerge from this process stronger and more viable than when they went in. If these restructuring efforts prove unsuccessful, the Lease Holder Debtors intend to utilize the procedures available to them under the Bankruptcy Code to (i) orderly wind down the operation of the applicable Centers (including, to the extent necessary, the removal of the FF&E from the leased premises, and to the extent possible, transition of the Occupants to other locations), (ii) liquidate the amounts due to the Landlords under their respective Leases and guarantees, as well as amounts due to the Debtors’ affiliates under their respective agreements, and (iii) to make distributions to creditors in accordance with their respective priorities under the Bankruptcy Code and applicable law.

Said another way: this is gonna be a landlord/tenant battle. Regus has offered to provide $17.5mm of DIP financing to give the debtors time to negotiate with their landlords. To the extent those negotiations (continue to) fail, the debtors will no doubt begin to reject leases left and right.

*****

They likely won’t be alone. Per The Wall Street Journal:

The world’s biggest coworking companies are starting to close money-losing locations across the globe, signaling an end to years of expansion in what had been one of real estate’s hottest sectors.

The retreat reflects an effort to slash costs at a time when the coronavirus is reducing demand for office space, and perhaps for years to come. It also shows how bigger coworking firms, in a race to sign as many leases as possible and grab market share, overexpanded and became saddled with debt and expensive leases.

The share of coworking spaces that have closed is still small. In the first half of the year, closures accounted for just 1.5% of the space occupied by flexible-office companies in the 20 biggest U.S. markets, according to CBRE Group Inc.

Knotel, for instance, seems to be making a habit of getting sued for unpaid rent. Query whether we’re at the tip of the iceberg for co-working distress.


*Other debtor entities, however, like RGN-Group Holdings LLC, RGN-National Business Centers LLC and H Work LLC do sometimes act as guarantors. Hence their bankruptcy filings. RGN-Group Holdings LLC isn’t a lease holder; rather, it owns all of the furniture, fixtures, equipment and other personal property and leases it all fo the respective SPE centers across the US pursuant to Equipment Lease Agreements.

**The nuance of this structure was constantly lost in the furor over WeWork back when WeWork was a thing that people actually cared about. Since we’re on the topic of WeWork, we suppose we ought to explain the video above. WeWork’s eccentric founder, Adam Neumann, was on record saying that he thought WeWork would thrive during a downturn due to its flexible structure — a point that has obviously been disproven by what’s transpired over the past few months. That said, and to be fair, he clearly didn’t have “social distancing” in mind when he hypothesized that result.

***We wrote about Subchapter V last month in the context of Desigual’s bankruptcy filing. We said:

Luckily for a lot of businesses, the Small Business Reorganization Act (SBRA and a/k/a Subchapter V) went into effect in February. Coupled with amended provisions in the CARES Act, the SBRA will make it easier for a lot of smaller businesses to restructure because:

It established a higher threshold ($7.5mm vs. $2.7mm) to qualify which means more businesses will be able to leverage the streamlined SBRA process to restructure. Previously, businesses over that cap couldn’t utilize Subchapter V which made any shot at reorganization via bankruptcy far too expensive for smaller businesses. The only alternative was dissolution and liquidation.

Debtors under SBRA can spread a payment plan for creditors over 3-5 years. Debtors get the benefit of the payments spread out over time and creditors can potentially recover more. Aiding this is the fact that admin expenses also get paid over time and debts are not discharged until all plan payments are fulfilled.

A plan must be filed within 90 days. The shorter time frame also contains cost.

A trustee must be appointed and effectively takes the place of a UCC which may only be formed on showing of cause.

Companies are taking advantage of this.

****It probably stands to reason that various client programs the debtors typically depend upon are less likely to generate results under this scenario. The debtors nevertheless filed a motion seeking to continue these programs. They include (a) rebate programs for occupants who spend over a certain annual amount, (b) occupancy agreement promotions such as discounts, reduced rent costs, one or more months of free rent, etc., and (c) occupant referral fees. Suffice it to say, occupants likely aren’t referring in many other occupants during COVID. Consequently, the debtors ultimately withdrew this motion. All of this brings up another criticism of WeWork: what, exactly, is a co-working space’s moat? As justification for these programs, the debtors say:

The Lease Holders operate in a very competitive and dynamic market and with many competitors for the same customers. The loss of one or more Occupants could significantly impact the Debtors’ profitability, and therefore, the Client Programs require timely coordination on the part of the Lease Holders to ensure the maximum generation of customer agreement profits and brand awareness during this restructuring.

Case and point.

*****These numbers are YTD for the period ended June 30, 2020.


For more commentary and analysis about distressed investing, restructuring and/or bankruptcy, please visit us here.


Dates:

RGN-Columbus IV LLC (July 30, 2020)

RGN-Chapel Hill II LLC (August 2, 2020)

RGN-Chicago XVI LLC (August 3, 2020)

RGN-Fort Lauderdale III LLC (August 8, 2020)

RGN-Group Holdings LLC (August 17, 2020)

H Work, LLC (August 17, 2020)

RGN-National Business Centers LLC (August 17, 2020)

RGN-Lehi LLC (August 27, 2020)

RGN-Lehi II LLC (August 27, 2020)

RGN Atlanta XXXV LLC (August 29, 2020)

RGN-Arlington VI LLC (August 30, 2020)

RGN-Chevy Chase I LLC (September 2, 2020)

RGN-Philadelphia IX LLC (September 2, 2020)

RGN-Denver XVI LLC (September 3, 2020)

RGN-New York XXXIX (September 3, 2020)

RGN-Los Angeles XXV LLC (September 3, 2020)

RGN-San Jose IX LLC (September 4, 2020)

Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Shannon)

Capital Structure: N/A

Company Professionals:

  • Legal: Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP (James Conlan, Mike Gustafson, Patrick Jackson, Ian Bambrick, Jay Jaffe)

  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP (Stephen Spitzer)

  • Restructuring Advisor/Chief Restructuring Officer: Duff & Phelps LLC (James Feltman)

  • Claims Agent: Epiq Corporate Restructuring LLC (Click here for free docket access)

  • Subschapter V Trustee: Gibbons PC (Natasha Songonuga)

Other Parties in Interest:

  • Regus Corporation, Regus Management Group, LLC and Franchise International GmbH

    • Legal: Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Robert Brady, James Hughes Jr., Joseph Barry, Justin Duda, Ryan Hart)

  • Starwood Capital Group

    • White & Case LLP (Harrison Denman, John Ramirez) & Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP (Christopher Samis, Aaron Stulman)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Golden Eagle Entertainment $ENT

Golden Eagle Entertainment

July 22, 2020

Suffice it to say, high correlation to the airline and cruiseline industries is a credit negative these days. A few months ago Speedcast — a provider of information technology services and (largely satellite-dependent) communications solutions (i.e., cybersecurity, content solutions, data and voice apps, IoT, network systems) to customers in the cruise, energy, government and commercial maritime businesses — discovered this the hard way and free fell into bankruptcy court. There’s still no resolution of that case. Similarly, Global Eagle Entertainment Inc. ($ENT), a business that generates revenue by (i) licensing and managing media and entertainment content and providing related services to customers in the airline, maritime and other “away-from-home” nontheatrical markets, and (ii) providing satellite-based Internet access and other connectivity solutions to airlines, cruise ships and other markets, couldn’t avoid trouble once COVID-19 shutdown its core end users. No monthly recurring revenue model can save a company when its clients are effectively closed for business AND there’s $855.6mm of funded debt to service. Not to state the obvious.

Things may get worse before they get better. The company’s largest customer is Southwest Airlines Co. ($LUV) (21% of overall revenue) and it has a pretty bearish take on …

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  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Dorsey)

  • Capital Structure: $85mm RCF, $503.3mm TL, $188.7mm second lien notes, $82.5mm unsecured convertible notes.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (George Davis, Madeleine Parish, Ted Dillman, Helena Tseregounis, Nicholas Messana, Eric Leon) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Michael Nestor, Kara Hammond, Betsy Feldman)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC

    • Investment Banker: Greenhill & Co. Inc.

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition First Lien Admin Agent & DIP Agent: Citibank NA

      • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (David Griffiths, Bryan Podzius)

    • Ad Hoc DIP & First Lien Lender Group: Apollo Global Management, L.P., Eaton Vance Management, Arbour Lane Capital Management, Sound Point Capital Management, Carlyle Investment Management LLC, Mudrick Capital Management, BlackRock Financial Management, Inc.

      • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Scott Greenberg, Michael Cohen, Jason Goldstein) & Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Laura Davis Jones, TImothy Cairns)

    • Second Lien Agent: Cortland Capital Market Services LLC

    • Second Lien Noteholders: Searchlight Capital Partners LP

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Alan Kornberg, Michael Turkel, Irene Blumberg, Elizabeth Sacksteder) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Daniel DeFranceschi, Zachary Shapiro)

    • Southwest Airlines Inc.

      • Legal: Vinson & Elkins LLP (William Wallander, Paul Heath, Robert Kimball, Matthew Struble) & Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP (Lucian Murley)

    • AT&T Corp.

      • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (Brian Lohan) & Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Derek Abbott, Brett Turlington)

    • Terry Steiner International

      • Legal: Loeb & Loeb LLP (Daniel Besikof, Geneva Shi)

    • Telesat International Limited

      • Legal: Hodgson Russ LLP (Garry Graber)

    • Nantahala Capital Management LLC

      • Legal: King & Spalding LLP (Arthur Steinberg, Scott Davidson) & The Rosner Law Group LLC (Frederick Rosner, Jason Gibson)

⛽️ New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Permian Holdco 1 Inc.

Permian Holdco 1 Inc.

July 19, 2020

Permian Holdco 1 Inc. and three affiliates (the “debtors”) filed chapter 11 bankruptcy cases in the District of Delaware. We know. It’s shocking. How in hell could a manufacturer of above-ground wellsite fluid containment and processing systems for oil and gas E&P companies be in trouble?!? The debtors’ pre-pretition lender will serve as DIP lender ($5mm) and stalking horse purchaser, credit bidding the DIP and prepetition credit facility amount ($28.6mm) as appropriate/necessary. Riveting stuff.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of DE (Judge Walrath)

  • Capital Structure: $28.6mm RCF & TL (New Mountain), $19.435mm unsecured promissory notes

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (M. Blake Cleary, Robert Poppiti Jr., Joseph Mulvihill, Jordan Sazant)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: CM Advisory LLC (Chris Maier)

    • Investment Banker: Seaport Gordian Energy LLC

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Corporate Restructuring LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

⛽️ New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Templar Energy LLC ⛽️

Templar Energy LLC

May 31, 2020

Templar Energy LLC (and six affiliates, the “debtors”), an Oklahoma City-based independent oil and gas exploration and production company that operates primarily in the Greater Anadarko Basin of Western Oklahoma and the Texas Panhandle, filed a prepackaged plan of liquidation early Monday morning — the culmination of a multi-year effort to stave off the inevitable.

A quick flashback. Four years ago oil and gas companies were collapsing into bankruptcy left and right. After oil and gas prices fell hard, the oil and gas tide rolled out and left a lot of investors stranded naked on the beach. Most funds were of the view that this was just a hiccup. One fund after another raised billions after billions of dollars thinking that energy was “where it’s at.” We now know how off-kilter that thesis was.

Some companies back then were luckier than others. Thanks in large part to its relatively simple and highly concentrated capital structure and a clear demarcation of value based on prevailing commodity prices of the time, in September 2016, Templar Energy was able to consummate an out-of-court restructuring that extinguished $1.45b of second lien debt. Repeat: $1.45 BILLION of second lien debt — a tremendous amount of value destruction a mere four years after the company’s formation. Of course, as with all things there are nuances here. “Value destruction” is a relative phrase that applies to the par holders of the debt when originally issued. Certain second lien lenders who participated in the out-of-court restructuring may very well have purchased the paper for cents on the dollar once the par guys had to pull the ripcord. Destruction there, therefore, is a function of price. There’s no way to know (from publicly available information) whether any of the original holders of second lien paper came out ahead upon receiving $133mm in cash and 45% of the equity in exchange for their second lien paper. It’s certainly possible that some did.

It’s also highly probable that some didn’t. Take Ares Management LLC, Bain Capital and Paulson & Co. Inc. for instance; they each participated in a rights offering for participating preferred equity in the company in exchange for $220mm dumped into this turd (plus $145mm placed by legacy equity holders). Given that the RBL IS NOW IMPAIRED here, clearly that equity check hasn’t borne fruit. It was also used to pay the aforementioned $133mm of cash recovery so … suffice it to say … this does not seem like one that the aforementioned funds will be referencing in future LP-oriented marketing materials.

Emanating out of that ‘16 transaction is the debtors’ current $600mm RBL. This time around, it is the fulcrum security. The debtors note, “Critically the claims under the RBL Facility are deeply impaired.” And the RBL lenders have no intention of owning the assets — predominantly leases with various oil and gas mineral owners covering non-exclusive working interests in approximately 2,165 oil and gas wells over approximately 273,400 continuous acres of property. Let’s be clear here: first lien lenders generally aren’t in the business of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracking. Of course, right now, the debtors aren’t really in the business of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracking. At least technically speaking. Given where oil and gas prices are — thanks Putin/MBS on the supply side, COVID-19 on the demand side — the debtors aren’t even conducting any drilling. Typically they operate anywhere up to 13 rigs at a time. All of which is to say that the lenders’ position explains why this is a sale + plan of liquidation case rather than a second debt-for-equity play.*

To aid the debtors’ attempts to continue pre-petition sale efforts post-petition, certain of the RBL Lenders have committed to a $37.5mm DIP (with a 0.5-to-1 $12.5mm rollup). Pursuant to a restructuring support agreement, the RBL lenders have agreed to receive their pro rata share of any net sale proceeds and all remaining cash held by the debtors’ estates as of the plan effective date minus (i) cash needed to repay the DIP, (ii) wind down funds, and (iii) monies placed into a professional fee escrow. Royalty owners, materialman and mechanics’ lienholders will be paid in full. General unsecured claimants and equity will get wiped.

*We should note — to hammer home the point — that one of the events that hammered the debtors’ liquidity position was the RBL lenders’ April 1, 2019 redetermination down of the RBL borrowing base to $415mm. This regularly scheduled redetermination analysis created an immediate $22mm “deficiency payment” liability for the debtors as it had $437mm borrowed at the time. The debtors stopped making those payments in November 2019. They’ve been in a state of forbearance with the RBL lenders ever since.

$37.5mm DIP with $12.5 rollup

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge )

  • Capital Structure:

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Paul Basta, Robert Britton, Sarah Harnett, Teresa Li) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, Jaime Luton Chapman, Tara Pakrouh)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC

    • Investment Banker: Guggenheim Securities LLC (Morgan Suckow)

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Agent ($37.5mm): Bank of America NA

    • Consenting RBL Lenders

      • Legal: Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (Amy Kyle, Andrew Gallo) & Richards Layton & Finger PA

      • Financial Advisor: RPA Advisors LLC

    • Large Class A equityholders: Ares Management LLC, Paulson & Co. Inc., Bain Capital, Lord Abbett, Archview Investment, Bank of America, Seix Advisors, Bardin Hill/Halcyon Loan Invest Management, Oppenheimer Funds

🔋New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Exide Holdings Inc.🔋

Exide Holdings Inc.

May 19, 2020

Georgia-based Exide Holdings Inc. and four affiliates (the “debtors”), among the world’s largest producers and recyclers of lead-acid batteries used in cars, boats, golf carts and more, filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the District of Delaware earlier this week. The filing sparked an entire industry to ask “is it a Chapter 22 or a Chapter 33?” The answer, depending upon your look-back period, is the latter. The fairer answer is probably the former and even that was 7 years ago with emergence 5 years ago (PETITION Note: the Exide Creditors’ Liquidating Trust had to make a notice of appearance in these new cases so, there’s that). Going back nearly two decades seems to be an impossible standard to hold any business to but 5-7 years seems much fairer.

Since we’re discussing labels, here’s another one: failure. Per the debtors:

Notwithstanding the Company’s efforts to implement its business plan following its emergence from the 2013 Chapter 11 Case and the support of its new owners and lenders, the Company continued to face liquidity, performance, and operational challenges that were more persistent and widespread than anticipated. Coupled with adverse industry and market factors as well as substantial environmental costs, these challenges have resulted in reduced liquidity.

Sooooo…that sucks. We admit it: we were hoping that this was a disruption story. That Elon Musk and the increasingly large cohort of lithium-ion battery using OEMs pushing out electric vehicles were putting the lead-acid battery manufacturers out to pasture. But that is not a state reason for this chapter 3…uh…chapter 2…uh, whatever the f*ck this is. Rather, the debtors state that their post-emergence liquidity issues stem from (a) mounting environmental remediation costs and litigation, (b) rising production costs (PETITION Note: because the debtors shut two recycling facilities, they are now subject to pricing pressures from outside manufacturers rather than just using their own recycled inputs), (c) operational inefficiencies caused by legacy mixed-use facilities, and (d), of course…wait for it…COVID-19. Duck for COVID-cover folks! The debtors say that the pandemic’s impact on demand for product is the cherry on top.

The debtors’ capital structure doesn’t help. Look at this beaut:

With that much funded debt, the debtors’ leverage ratio stands at 9.2x. Debt service averages approximately $26.8mm/year.

So, confronted with all of these factors, the debtors have been engaged in a marketing process since 2018. The continued deterioration of the business, however, ultimately led to a restructuring path and now the debtors intend to use the bankruptcy process to effectuate a sale of (i) the entire business or (ii) the Americas business and/or (iii) the sale of its Europe/Rest-of-World business or (iv) a liquidation (PETITION Note: the debtors fall into chapter 11 largely separated into four main business groups). The Ad Hoc Group has submitted a binding credit bid for the Europe/ROW business group which will serve as a stalking horse bid; they have also committed $15mm in DIP financing to service certain non-debtor affiliates in Europe with an additional $25mm DIP commitment for the administration of the cases coming from Blue Torch Capital LP. The debtors hope to go “effective” by the end of August: this means that everyone has a lot of work to do to try and and locate a buyer for the rest of the debtors’ businesses in the interim.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Sontchi)

  • Capital Structure:

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Ray Schrock, Jacqueline Marcus, Sunny Singh, Samuel Mendez, Alyssa Kutner, Jason Hufendick) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Daniel DeFranceschi, Zachary Shapiro, Brendan Schlauch)

    • Independent Directors: Alan Carr, William Transier, Harvey Tepner, Mark Barberio

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: Ankura Consulting (Roy Messing)

    • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition ABL Agent: Bank of America NA

      • Legal: Otterbourg PC (Daniel Fiorillo, David Morse, Jonathan Helfat)

    • Indenture Trustee

      • Legal: Arent Fox LLP (Andrew Silfen, Jordana Renert)

    • DIP Agent ($40mm): Blue Torch Capital LP

      • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Robert Klyman, Matthew Bouslog, Michael Farag) & Cole Schotz PC (Norman Pernick, Patrick Reilley)

    • Ad Hoc Group

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Alice Belisle Eaton, Robert Britton, Eugene Park, Claudia Tobler, Jacqueline Rubin, Douglas Keeton, David Weiss, David Giller) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, Sean Greecher, Andrew Magaziner, Ian Bambrick)

    • Large equityholders: Mackay Shields LLC, AllianceBernstein LLP, D.E. Shaw Galvanic Portfolios LLC, Neuberger Berman Group LLC

    • Exide Creditors’ Liquidating Trust

      • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (Dane Kane, Konstantinos Katsionis)

💊 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Akorn Inc. ($AKRX) 💊

Akorn Inc.

May 20, 2020

Akorn Inc. ($AKRX), a specialty pharmaceutical company based in Illinois that develops, manufactures and markets generic and branded prescription pharmaceuticals, finally filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy.

Why “finally?” Well, back in January 2019 the company, in conjunction with an announcement of new executive and board appointments, noted that restructuring professionals (Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP, PJT Partners LP and AlixPartners LLP)* were assisting with the formulation of a business plan and discussions with stakeholders. In December 2019, the publicly-traded company acknowledged in an SEC filing that bankruptcy was on the table, sending the stock into a 33% freefall. Subsequently, in February 2020, the company announced in connection with its Q4 and annual earnings that it had reached an agreement with its lenders to execute a sale of the business “potentially using Chapter 11 protection.” A sale, however, could not generate sufficient value to cover the outstanding funded indebtedness under the company’s term loan credit agreement. Shortly thereafter in March, the company defaulted under said agreement and the company and its lenders pivoted to discussions about a credit bid with an ad hoc group of term lenders serving as stalking horse purchaser of the assets in chapter 11. Alas, here we are. The company and 16 affiliates (the “debtors”) “FINALLY” find themselves in court with recently inked asset purchase and restructuring support agreements in tow. The debtors will use the bankruptcy process to further their sale process and market test bids against the term lenders’ proposed $1.05b credit bid; they hope to have an auction in the beginning of August with a mid/late-August sale hearing.

The sale process, however, is not where the excitement is here.

We are now in an age — post COVID-19 — where M&A deals falling apart is becoming commonplace news and debates about force majeure and “material adverse effect” rage on in the news and, eventually, in the courts. In that respect, Akorn was ahead of the curve.

In April 2017, Akorn and Fresenius Kabi AG ($FSNUY), a massive German healthcare company, announced a proposed merger with Akorn shareholders set up to receive $34/share — a sizable premium to the then prevailing stock price in the high-20s. (PETITION Note: for purposes of comparison, the stock was trading at $1.26/share on the aforementioned announcement of annual earnings). Akorn shareholders approved the merger but then the business began to suffer. Per the debtors:

…Akorn began to experience a steep and sustained drop-off in financial performance drive by a variety of factors, including, among other things: consolidation of buyer power leading to price reductions; the FDA’s expedition of its review and approval process for generic drugs, leading to increased competition and resultant additional price and volume erosion; and legislative attempts to reduce drug prices.

Almost exactly a year later — after all kinds of shady-a$$ sh*t including anonymous letters alleging data integrity and regulatory deficiencies at Akron facilities and sustained poor financial performance — Fresenius was like “we out.” Lawsuits ensued with Akorn seeking to enforce the merger and Fresenius parrying with “material adverse effect” defenses. The Delaware Chancery Court agreed with Fresenius.

This is America so lawsuits beget lawsuits and Fresenius’ announcement that the merger was at risk spawned (i) federal class action litigation against Akron and certain of its present and former directors and officers and (ii) federal and state law derivative litigation. Akorn ultimately settled the class action litigation but four groups of hedge funds opted out and continue to pursue claims against Akorn. Meanwhile, Akorn lost its appeal of the Delaware Chancery Court decision and a decision on Fresenius’ claims for damages remain reserved. Fresenius has at least a $74mm claim.

This litigation overhang — coupled with the debtors’ $861.7mm in term loans (emanating out of strategic acquisitions in 2014) — is what drives this bankruptcy. The debtors believe that, upon resolution of these issues, it is well-positioned to thrive. They had $682mm revenue in ‘19 and $124mm of adjusted EBITDA. In Q1 ‘20, the company achieved adjusted EBITDA of $59mm (PETITION Note: “adjusted” being an operative word here). Large wholesale distributors like AmerisourceBergen Corporation ($ABC), Cardinal Health Inc. ($CAH), and McKesson Corporation ($MCK) are large customers. The U.S. healthcare system is shifting towards generics and big brand-name pharmaceuticals are rolling off-patent and “driving generic opportunities.” Pre-petition efforts to find a buyer who shares the debtors’ optimism, however, proved unfruitful.

Armed with a $30mm DIP commitment from certain of the term lenders in the ad hoc group, the debtors will swiftly determine whether the prospect of owning these assets “free and clear” will generate any higher or better offers.

*Kirkland & Ellis LLP, in its quest for 32,892,239% restructuring market share, ultimately displaced Cravath.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Owens)

  • Capital Structure: $861.7mm ‘21 Term Loans (Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Patrick Nash, Nicole Greenblatt, Gregory Pesce, Christopher Hayes) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Paul Heath, Amanda Steele, Zachary Shapiro, Brett Haywood)

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

    • Investment Banker: PJT Partners LP (Mark Buschmann)

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Term Loan & DIP Agent ($30mm): Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

      • Legal: Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP

    • Ad Hoc Group of Term Lenders

      • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher (Scott Greenberg, Steven Domanowski, Jeremy Evans, Michael J. Cohen) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Robert Brady)

      • Financial Advisor: Greenhill & Co. LLC (Neil Augustine)

    • Large equityholders: Blackrock Inc., The Vanguard Group, Akorn Holdings LP, Stonehill Capital Management LLC

🚗New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Pace Industries LLC🚗

Pace Industries LLC

April 12, 2020

Arkansas-based Pace Industries LLC and ten affiliates (the “debtors”) — fully-integrated suppliers and manufacturers of aluminum, zinc, and magnesium die cast and finished products in service of several industries (auto, powersports, lawn & garden, lighting & electric, appliances & industrial motors etc.) — filed fully-accepted prepackaged chapter 11 bankruptcy cases in the District of Delaware over the holiday weekend. The plan features one impaired class which voted 100% to equitize pre-petition debt.

A quick digression before we delve into what happened here. COVID-19 provides the ultimate cover for any and all businesses that file for chapter 11 over the next several months. You’re going to see all kinds of companies “clean out the junk” over earnings reports. It will be important, therefore, to parse through company messaging to determine whether they’re just massaging matters or whether, on the other hand, there were fundamental problems confronting the business prior to COVID-19 rearing its ugly head and shutting down the US economy. Where a company discloses that problems existed prior to March, there is absolutely no reason NOT to believe them. So it’s important that the collective we — newsletters writers, journalists, the twitterverse — get things right when talking about the carnage created by COVID-19.

And this case is only partially a COVID-19 story. Given the rush to sensationalize headlines and tweets, this is something we now feel compelled to note with each new bankruptcy filing. While the debtors, like everyone else, have been affected by the virus, it was not the catalyst to the debtors’ filing. The debtors have been seeking new capital sources since the summer of 2018; they initially sought an equity investment but when that couldn’t get done, the debtors shifted towards a sale and marketing process. Any and all initial interest in the debtors’ assets dissipated, however, when the debtors suffered from a poor Q4 ‘19. Interestingly, the disappointing performance was attributable to lower demand in the lighting, BBQ grill and appliance markets. To make matters worse, General Motors Inc’s ($GM) employees went on strike further compressing decreasing automobile production volumes. Moreover, the company self-inflicted some wounds: production inefficiencies relating to new products also hurt performance. Bankruptcy lawyers and advisors were hired in January — long before COVID stormed through and complicated matters further.

The debtors solicited their plan prior to their filing making this a true prepackaged plan. In other words, old school. None of this new solicitation technology; no straddle stuff. The only impaired class, the pre-petition noteholders, voted to accept the plan pursuant to which they would swap $232.1mm in notes for (i) equity in a reorganized LLC (subject to dilution from a management incentive plan AND warrants issued to the debtors’ post-petition DIP term loan lenders) and (ii) take-back term loan paper. This means the new owners will be TCW and Cerberus.

The cases feature a roll-up DIP ABL (which will ultimately be refi’d out through an exit facility) and a post-petition DIP term loan that will be refi’d out via a new term loan exit facility. The aforementioned warrants could amount to 51% of the new post-reorg equity.

This should be a quick case. The DIP terminates in 90 days from the petition date. Given that acceptance was 100% and that general unsecured creditors will be paid in full, this case should, absent other crazy externalities, be in and out of bankruptcy relatively quickly.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge )

  • Capital Structure: $92.1mm ABL, $232.1mm pre-petition notes

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Matthew Feldman, Rachel Strickland, Debra Sinclair, Melany Cruz Burgos) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Robert Brady, Edmon Morton, Joseph Mulvihill)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: FTI Consulting Inc. (Patrick Flynn, Johnathan Miller)

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Revolver Agent ($125mm): Bank of Montreal

      • Legal: McGuireWoods LLP (Wade Kennedy, Alexandra Shipley, Brian Swett) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (John Knight, Amanda Steele, David Queroli)

    • DIP Term Agent ($50mm): TCW Asset Management Company LLC

      • Legal: Schule Roth & Zabel LLP (Adam Harris, Kelly Knight) & Landis Rath & Cobb LLP (Adam Landis)

👖New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - True Religion Apparel Inc.👖

True Religion Apparel Inc.

4/14/20

TMI: we’ve had a hard enough time getting Johnny to even wear pants at all over the last few weeks let alone put on jeans. That one Zoom call where he spilled coffee on himself and jumped out of his chair emblazoned an image in our minds that we’ll need some real therapy to get over. We had to take out an enterprise Headspace account as a result. But enough about us.

To the topic at hand: True Religion Apparel Inc. Here’s the good news: True Religion and its four affiliates (the “debtors”) legged it out long enough to avoid PETITION’s dreaded Two-Year Rule violation. Any retailer that can stave off a chapter 22 bankruptcy filing for as long as True Religion did (30 months) has, in fact, achieved a “successful” restructuring in our book. That said, the brand is nevertheless back in bankruptcy court. If that logic strikes you as perverse well, yes, we admit it: the bar for bankrupted retailers is, in fact, that low.

Interestingly and somewhat counter-intuitively, there has been a dearth of retail restructuring activity during the COVID-19 strike. We went through some explanation for that here and the theme was subsequently picked up and expanded upon by the MSM: there were countless articles about how busy restructuring professionals are and yet very few filings (though there has been a lot of activity this week). Why? It’s hard for retailers to conduct GOB sales when stores aren’t open. DIP financing is harder to come by. Buyers are few and far between. Everyone is having trouble underwriting deals when it’s so difficult to gauge if and when things will return to “normal.”

True Religion couldn’t afford to wait. It has 87 retail stores. They’re closed. It’s wholesale business — dependent, of course, on other open brick-and-mortar shops — is also closed. This was an immediate 80% hit to revenue.* The company — which had posted a $50mm net loss for the TTM ended 2/1/20 (read: it was already pretty effed) — suddenly found itself facing an accelerated liquidity crisis. Stretching payables, stretching rent, furloughing employees. All of those measures were VERY short-term band-aids. A bankruptcy filing became absolutely necessary to gain access to much needed liquidity. This filing is about a DIP credit facility folks. Without it, they’d be looking at Chapter 7 liquidation. Per the debtors:

The Debtors must have access to the DIP Facilities to continue to pay essential expenses—including employee benefits, trust fund taxes and other critical operating expenditures—while they use the breathing spell provided by the Bankruptcy Code to wait out the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and attempt to pursue a value-maximizing transaction for all stakeholders.

Critical operating expenditures? Yup, e-commerce maintenance and fulfillment, wholesale and restructuring expenses baby. The plan is to “mothball” the business and hope for a tiered reopening of stores “at the conclusion fo the COVID-19 pandemic.” In the meantime, the debtors intend to pull a Modell’s/Pier 1 and get relief from having to pay rent. This as pure of a “breathing spell” as you can get.

Back to the financing. The debtors have approximately $139mm of funded debt split between a $28.5mm asset-backed term loan (inclusive of LOCs) and a $110.5mm first lien term loan. The debtors also had access to a $28.5mm revolver subject to a “borrowing base,” as usual, but that facility wasn’t tapped. We’re guessing Crystal Financial ratcheted up reserves and didn’t leave much opportunity for drawing that money outside of a filing.

In March 2020 the debtors sought, in earnest, new financing, talking to their existing lenders and third-party lenders. They also considered the possibility of tapping funds via the recently-enacted CARES Act. They note:

In addition to the Debtors’ efforts in the private marketplace, the Debtors and their Restructuring Advisors evaluated the availability of government appropriations through the CARES Act. After careful consideration, the Debtors determined that they were not eligible for government funding, or to the extent that there was a possibility that they would be eligible, they would not be able to wait the time necessary to find out whether a loan would be available under the CARES Act. The Debtors are hopeful that future stimulus packages will target companies such as the Debtors – i.e. mid-market companies with 1000 employees that are currently in chapter 11, but that could utilize government financing when emerging from chapter 11.

New third-party financing didn’t come to fruition. Among other reasons, lenders cited “the timing, complexity and overall challenges in the retail industry in light of COVID-19.” It’s hard out there for an underwriter. Ultimately, the debtors settled on financing offered by some of its first lien term lenders.

Now, we don’t normally get too deep into DIP details but given the difficulty financing retailers today, we thought the structure merited discussion. Here’s what the debtors negotiated:

  • A $29mm senior secured super-priority asset-based revolver (rollup);

  • A $59.89mm senior secured super-priority delayed-draw term loan credit facility of which $8.4mm is new money, a bit over $3mm is for LOCs, and the rest constitutes a rollup of pre-petition debt.

Major equityholder and pre-petition lender Farmstead Capital Management LLC is a big player in the term loan. The DIP is subject to a “strict” 13-week budget based on a four-month case with an eye towards either a section 363 sale or a reorganization by mid-May. Seems ambitious. For obvious reasons. But Farmstead ain’t suffering no fools. Per the debtors:

…the Debtors’ lenders are unwilling to fund a contentious chapter 11 case and they have made this clear to the Debtors over the course of the negotiations. Any material delay or significant litigation during these cases will result in the Debtors’ default of its covenants and send the Debtors spiraling into a fire-sale liquidation.

Given that Farmstead is taking half of its DIP fee paid-in-kind, they may be looking to own this sucker on the backend via a credit bid. Hats off to those guys.

*The papers are not entirely clear but they appear to indicate that e-commerce “accounts for less than 26% of sales” out of $209mm or ~$54mm. Given layoffs across the country, we have to think that e-commerce fell off a cliff in February and March too. Said another way, there’s no way it could’ve generated enough revenue to keep the business afloat. Also, JP Morgan ($JPM) included the following chart in its earnings deck this week:

Screen Shot 2020-04-22 at 4.17.58 PM.png

**We’d be remiss if we didn’t note the financial performance here. Again, the debtors highlighted a $50mm net loss in the fiscal year that just closed on February 1, 2020. Here are the financial projections that True Religion filed as part of its disclosure statement during its first chapter 11 filing:

That’s a savage miss.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Sontchi)

  • Capital Structure: $28.5mm Asset-Backed Term Loan (Crystal Financial LLC), $110.5mm First Lien TL (Delaware Trust Company)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Cole Schotz PC (Justin Alberto, Seth Van Aalten, Michael Trentin, Kate Stickles, Patrick Reilley, Taylre Janak) & Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Arik Preis, Kevin Eide)

    • Board of Directors: Eugene Davis, Lisa Gavales, Stephen Perrella, Robert McHugh

    • Financial Advisor: Province Inc. (Michael Atkinson)

    • Real Estate Advisor: RCS Real Estate Advisors

    • Claims Agent: Stretto (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Pre-petition ABL & DIP ABL Agent: Crystal Financial LLC

      • Legal: Choate Hall & Stewart LLP (John Ventola, Jonathan Marshall) & Womble Bond Dickinson US LLP (Matthew Ward, Morgan Patterson)

    • Pre-petition TL & DIP TL Lenders

      • Legal: Proskauer Rose LLP (Brian Rosen, Lucy Kweskin) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Jaime Luton Chapman)

    • Major equityholders: Farmstead Capital Management LLC, Waddell & Reed, Towerbrook Capital Partners, Apex Credit Partners LLC, Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs Asset Management

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - LSC Communications Inc.

LSC Communications Inc.

April 13, 2020

Chicago-based LSC Communications Inc. ($LSC) and 21 affiliated debtors (the “debtors”), a provider of traditional and digital print products, print-related services and office products, filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York. The company is the result of a 2016 spinoff from R.R. Donnelley & Sons and though it subsequently diversified its business into logistics, it still deals with old-school categories like print magazines, catalogs, books, directories, various other print-related services, and office products. In fact, it is one of the largest printers of books in the US. All of which is to say that the debtors were ripe for disruption.

Nothing about this ought to be surprising to people who have been paying attention to the retail and media landscape over the last decade. Nevertheless, it is painful to read:

Although the Company is a market leader in the printing and printing related services industries, the Company’s product and service offerings have been adversely impacted by a number of long-term economic trends. Digital migration has substantially impacted print production volume, in particular with respect to printed magazines as advertising spending continues to move away from print to electronic media. Catalogs have experienced volume reductions as retailers and direct marketers allocate more of their spending to online advertising and marketing campaigns and some traditional retailers and director marketers go out of business in the face of increased competition from online retailers. The Company saw an unprecedented drop in demand for magazines and catalogs in 2019, with the faster pace of decline in demand primarily due to the accelerating movement from printed platforms to digital platforms.

Thanks Facebook Inc. ($FB). Clearly all of the Restoration Hardware Inc. ($RH) catalogues in the world couldn’t offset the shift of advertising away from print media and soften this blow.

And then there’s this:

Demand for printed educational textbooks within the college market has been adversely impacted by electronic substitution and other trends such as textbook rental programs and free open source e-textbooks. The K-12 educational sector has seen an increased focus on e-textbooks and e-learning programs, but there has been inconsistent adoption of these new technologies across school systems. Consumer demand for e-books in trade and mass market has impacted overall print book volume, although e-book adoption rates have stabilized and industry-wide print book volume has been growing in recent years.

Apropos to the brief discussion above about Mary Meeker’s presentation, we’ve got news for these guys: these trends away from printed textbooks are going to gather steam post-COVID. And while we’re happy to see an uptick in physical book production, it’s unclear whether that is a short-term trend or a longer-term rebound. Someone is going to have to get comfortable betting on the latter. More on this in a moment.

As if the secular trends weren’t bad enough, the debtors’ attempt to consolidate with Quad/Graphics Inc. ($QUAD) (synergies!) in late 2018 met with resistance. The DOJ filed a civil antitrust lawsuit seeking to block the proposed merger and ultimately the parties agreed to terminate the merger. While LSC received a reverse termination fee that exceeded the amount of transaction costs, the proposed merger (i) hindered the debtors’ ability to make much-needed operational fixes (i.e., plant consolidation and footprint optimization), (ii) affected new business development efforts and strained existing customer relationships, and (iii) created uncertainty among the employee ranks that, in some respects, sparked attrition.

All of the above led to an internal restructuring. The debtors set their sights on nine plant closures and footprint reductions — primarily in magazines and catalog manufacturing; they also renegotiated a number of unprofitable customer contracts. Bear in mind: all of this was pre-COVID. Matters can only have gotten worse.

What does all of this look like from a financial perspective? The debtors filed their annual report in early March and the numbers don’t lie:

LSC Annual Report 3/2/20

LSC Annual Report 3/2/20

Net sales declined 13% and while there was a corresponding decline in the cost of sales, SG&A remained constant and restructuring costs ballooned.* The magazines/catalogues/logistics segment declined 7.3%. The book segment fell 3.6%. Office products were a rare bright spot up 8.1% (PETITION Note: this is a relatively small portion of the debtors’ business and we’ll see how that plays out going forward given that there may be a huge shift there).

Due to this piss poor operating performance, the debtors tripped their consolidated leverage ratio and minimum interest ratio covenants in their credit agreement. That’s right: you didn’t think this story would be complete without a significantly over-levered balance sheet, did you?

The company has $972mm of total funded indebtedness broken out among a revolver ($249mm + $50.8mm in outstanding letters of credit), a term loan ($221.9mm) and senior secured notes ($450mm at 8.75%). The term loan requires quarterly principal payments of $10.625mm. While the entire capital structure is secured by an “equal first-priority" ranking with respect to the collateral, the revolver has a “first-out” priority and is entitled first to any proceeds from the collateral while the term loan and the senior secured notes enjoy pari passu status. This is where the rubber meets the road: that’s a lot of parties to get to agree on a transaction.

Before it could agree to anything, however, the debtors needed time and therefore entered into a widely reported forbearance in early March. S&P Global Ratings promptly slapped a downgrade on the company saying that it believed a debt restructuring was likely within 90 days. What a genius call!! While all of this was happening, the debtors continued to deteriorate:

During its March discussions with creditors, the Debtors began to see a significant decrease in their available liquidity, driven in part by the long-term industry trends discussed above and made acute by the severe economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Which begs the question: what is the value of this business? Cleary nobody can agree on that: there is no restructuring support agreement here. Instead, there appears to be an arms-locked resignation that a parallel-path is needed to (i) nail down some DIP financing to shore up liquidity ($100mm at L+6.75%) and buy time, (ii) continue to discuss a balance sheet restructuring, AND (iii) simultaneously market test the business via a strategic marketing process. A lot of people will need to wait and see how this plays out, primarily pensioners owed over $50mm and various trade creditors including the bankruptcy-familiar RR Donnelley & Sons Co. ($RRD), Eastman Kodak Company ($KODK) and Verso Paper Holding LLC.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Lane)

  • Capital Structure: $249mm funded RCF (plus $50.8mm LOCs), $221.9mm funded TL (Bank of America NA), $450mm ‘23 8.75% senior secured notes (Wells Fargo Bank NA)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Andrew Dietderich, Brian Glueckstein, Alexa Kranzley, Christian Jensen) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

    • Investment Banker: Evercore Group LLC

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Agent ($100mm): Bank of America NA

      • Legal: Moore & Van Allen PLLC (David Eades, Charles R. Rayburn III, Zachary Smith)

    • Ad Hoc Group of Term Lenders: Bardin Hill Investment Partners LP, Eaton Vance Management, HG Vora Capital Management, LLC, Marathon Asset Management, Shenkman Capital Management, Sound Point Capital Management LP, and Summit Partners Credit Advisors, L.P.

      • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (Michael Messersmith, Sarah Gryll, Lucas Barrett)

    • Ad Hoc Group of Secured Noteholders: Capital Research and Management Company, Manulife Investment Management, Atlas FRM LLC, TD Asset Management Inc.

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Andrew Rosenberg, Alice Eaton, Claudia Tobler)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

      • Legal: Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (Frank Merola, Brett Lawrence, Erez Gilad, Harold Olsen, Gabriel Sasson)

🏈New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Alpha Entertainment LLC (XFL) 🏈

Alpha Entertainment LLC

April 13, 2020

“This is the future. And the future moves fast.”

Whoa boy does it move fast.

Connecticut-based Alpha Entertainment LLC — the legal entity behind the XFL — is now a chapter 11 debtor, an unfortunate blemish on the creative and investment record of Vincent K. McMahon (100% Class A equityholder, 75.5% Class B) and the World Wrestling Entertainment Inc. ($WWE)(23.5% Class B equityholder). Was this idea destined to fail?

The debtor paints an unfortunate picture. This thing was doing great, they assert, until that pesky COVID-19 thing had to come in and decimate anything and everything involving crowds. They note:

Prior to the Petition Date, the XFL provided high-energy professional football, reimagined for the 21st century with many innovative elements designed to bring fans closer to the players and the game they love, during the time of year when they wanted more football. The league debuted on February 8, 2020 to immediate acclaim. Nearly 70,000 fans attended the opening weekend’s games, and more than 12 million viewers tuned in on television. Just weeks after the first XFL games were played, however, the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic forced every major American sports league to suspend, if not cancel, their seasons. On March 20, 2020, the XFL canceled the remainder of its inaugural season, costing the nascent league tens of millions of dollars in revenue.

Man, how’s that for sh*tty timing? The post-Week 1 numbers reflect some initial success. Week 2 attendance rose from approximately 70k to 76.2k and Week 3 attendance hit 81.9k. The XFL was actually showing signs of promise until, in late February, attendance took a dive down to 70.2k in Week 4 and to 64.2k in Week 5.* Were people already beginning to hunker down? Given that Seattle and St. Louis proved to be the largest markets and Washington State was the first state in the union to get pummeled by COVID, that seems fairly safe to presume.

Frankly, nobody on the PETITION team has ever watched a minute of XFL football but … to be honest … it sounds like a whole lot of degenerate fun! Quicker games? ✅ In-game access to participants on the field? ✅ Encouraged gambling? ✅ Sounds awesome. What else are we gonna watch in February? Hockey? Please. This actually sounds like it was not, actually, destined to fail. Like a startup it needed time to build a brand and grow. Absent, say, a worldwide once-every-blue-moon pandemic that literally shuts down the world economy, it might have actually made great strides to do so. Alas:

It is estimated that cancellation of the final five weeks of league’s regular season “negated approximately $27 million in fan spending on gameday-related items” such as ticket sales and food, beverage, and merchandise purchases, to say nothing of the revenue from playoff games or the lost opportunities for sponsorship revenue and brand development. With the league shuttered and no games being played (or revenue being generated), the COVID-19 pandemic left the Debtor facing near-term liquidity issues. With the duration of the pandemic uncertain and the Debtor’s operating expenses continuing unabated, the Debtor was left with few viable alternatives outside of chapter 11.

Mr. McMahon provided the company with a $9mm secured bridge loan but, once it became clear that there was no end in sight to the shutdown, he and his advisors concluded that building a bridge without knowing where the end is probably doesn’t make for good business. Per the the chapter 11 filing papers, the bankruptcy, therefore, is intended to find a buyer for the assets — which include all of the teams (this is not a franchise model), equipment and intellectual property. Revenue for the business was $14mm with a net loss of $44mm. Mr. McMahon has committed to provide a $3.5mm DIP credit facility to fund the cases/sale. Given that the debtor has several million of cash on hand, however, Judge Silverstein did not approve the DIP at the debtors’ first day hearing. Likewise, she shelved the debtor’s plan to issue refunds to season ticket holders.

No sale-related pleadings are yet on file. Per the DIP — which, again, was not approved — a sale motion is required to be on file by April 21 and a sale conducted by July 15, 2020. The debtor has already filed motions rejecting all of its player contracts and practice facility and venue use agreements. McMahon, a billionaire, is well-positioned to credit bid his debt here, wipe out all unsecured creditors, and shelve the IP for a time in the future if he wants.

*There is some question as to whether “attendance” is the proper metric given that there were suspicions that the numbers reflect tickets “distributed” rather than tickets “sold” or actual attendance. Whichever way you measure it, the St. Louis BattleHawks “had reportedly sold 45,000 tickets to their next game before the league shut down due to the coronavirus outbreak.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Silverstein)

  • Capital Structure: $9mm pre-petition secured note (Vince McMahon)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Michael Nestor, Matthew Lunn, Kenneth Enos, Travis Buchanan, Shane Reil, Matthew Milana)

    • Independent Manager: Drivetrain Advisors LLC (John Brecker)

    • Claims Agent: Donlin Recano & Co. Inc. (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Pre-Petition & DIP Lender ($3.5mm): Vince McMahon

🎢New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - TZEW Holdco LLC (a/k/a Apex Parks Group LLC)🎢

Apex Parks Group LLC

April 8, 2020

California-based TZEW Holdco LLC and six affiliates (including Apex Parks Group LLC, the “debtors”) filed for bankruptcy in the District of Delaware. The debtors are Carlyle-owned family entertainment centers located in California, Florida and New Jersey. Here’s what the debtors’ website says about their business prospects:

According to a 2011 International Association of Amusement Parks survey, 25% of Americans surveyed visited an amusement park within the last 12 months, with 43 percent of Americans indicating they plan to visit in the next 12 months. Consumers have a desire to get out of the house for fun, but want their entertainment dollars to represent a good value for the entire family. In America, people visit amusement parks nearly 300 million times each year and generate more than $12 billion in revenue.

Eesh. That’s a tough read these days. 😬😷

The purpose of the filing is to eliminate debt and sell the business to their pre-petition secured lenders. Troubles have been brewing here since 2019: indeed, the debtors have been “perpetually distressed.” Per the debtors:

The Company suffered from a number of challenges leading to these chapter 11 cases, including, among others, increased industry competition and consolidation, heavy operational expenditure requirements, the seasonal nature of the business, general litigation, and irregular management turnover. In the years and months leading up to the Petition Date, the Company initiated multiple go-forward operational initiatives to increase profitability, such as implementing strategic pricing and season pass sales, redesigning food and beverage offerings, optimizing operating calendars, and generally investing in the maintenance and improvement of its locations. Despite these efforts, the Company continued to experience negative cash flows and, ultimately, an unsustainable balance sheet. In the months leading up to the Petition Date, the Company faced rapidly dwindling liquidity and, in order to maintain day-to-day operations, needed to increasingly rely on discretionary disbursements under its prepetition financing agreement.

The Disney Effect!!

Indeed, the debtors blame Disney Inc. ($DIS) and Six Flags Entertainment Corporation ($SIX) for being bigger, better, and deep-pocketed. Well, and having much better IP. Anyone looking for a bullish reason to buy DIS stock — assuming COVID-19 is a short-term issue — can see here, in the words of a competitor, why DIS’ IP strategy over the years has been solid. Per the debtors:

For example, estimates suggest that Universal Studio Orlando's first Harry Potter attraction boosted attendance by 50% over the attraction's first three years. Similarly, Disney has recently constructed Star Wars themed attractions at Walt Disney World it Orlando, Florida and Disneyland in Anaheim, California, as part of a $2 billion investment Disney has made in its theme parks. This industry competition and consolidation by major corporations in recent years has been a key driver in a string of closures of small and middle market theme parks across the country.

The debtors were in the midst of parallel-tracking their marketing process while also talking to their lenders about additional sources of liquidity. COVID-19 didn’t help matters. The debtors shut down their parks and now that people are Amazon Priming their cotton candy, the revenue spigot is off.

As you well know, interest payments are, absent waivers/forbearance from lenders, still due. The debtors owe $79mm to lender, Cerberus Business Finance LLC. An affiliate thereof will serve as stalking horse purchaser of the debtors’ assets with an eye towards the EBITDA-rich June-September period — assuming people are allowed out and are willing to go to amusement parks by then. Cerberus is also providing the DIP. In other words, Cerberus is driving the bus here. The DIP commitment requires a sale hearing no later than May 11, 2020.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Sontchi)

  • Capital Structure: $79mm (Cerberus Business Finance LLC)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Laura Davis Jones, David Bertenthal, Timothy Cairns)

    • Independent Directors: Michael Short, Jeffrey Dane

    • Financial Advisor: Paladin Management Group LLC (Scott Avila, Jennifer Mercer)

    • Investment Banker: Imperial Capital

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Administrative Agent: Cerberus Business Finance LLC

      • Legal: KTBS Law LLP (Michael Tuchin, David Fidler, Jonathan Weiss, Sasha Gurvitz) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Michael Nestor, Robert Poppitti Jr.)

    • Stalking Horse Purchaser: APX Acquisition Company LLC

    • Largest Equityholders: Benefit Street Partners & Edgewater Growth Capital Partners

🍿New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - VIP Cinema Holdings Inc.🍿

VIP Cinema Holdings Inc.

February 18, 2020

VIP Cinema Holdings Inc. and four affiliates (the “debtors”) filed prepackaged chapter 11 bankruptcy cases in the District of Delaware; they are manufacturers of luxury seating products for movie theaters. Here’s the problem: end user customers stopped ordering their stuff. Yup, that’s right, there’s a finite market for luxury seating in movie theaters. Who knew?

Here are some of the problems this company confronted:

  • They made chairs that were too good. That’s right. Too good. The chairs had a longer lifecycle than the company likely wanted. Either that or people are engaging in too much Netflixing and chilling and not enough movie-going.

  • Movie theaters slowed down their renovation activities and construction of new locations. Perhaps people are engaging in too much Netflixing and chilling and not enough movie-going.

  • Movie theaters reduced capital investment — mostly because they haven’t exactly performed very well themselves and have their own debt and equityholders to contend with. Also, people are engaging in too much Netflixing and chilling and not enough movie-going.

  • They conquered the total addressable market, securing 70% market share with little to no room to grow thanks to all of the foregoing bulletpoints.

Are we being too flip about $NFLX? Well, don’t take our word for it. Here’s the company explaining one of the reasons why it’s in trouble:

“Continued proliferation of online streaming services and alternative viewing experiences, which has led to declining movie attendance, a poor outlook sentiment for the overall U.S. movie theatre industry and particularly put significant pressure on the stock price of AMC, a key customer for the Company.”

Because of all of the foregoing factors, the debtors triggered an event of default under their first lien credit agreement and have been in a state of forbearance with their lenders ever since — all with the hope of negotiating an out-of-court restructuring transaction.

That hope was extinguished when Odeon reduced seating orders, napalming everyone’s financial models upon which the proposed out-of-court transaction was premised. Now we’re in prepackaged bankruptcy territory with a restructuring support agreement that will shed $178mm of debt and infuses the company with a $33mm DIP credit facility — of which $13mm is new money and $20mm is a roll-up of prepetition debt. Here is the pre-petition capital structure:

Screen Shot 2020-02-18 at 8.52.34 PM.png

The liquidity is highly necessary. The debtors are burning cash like Rick Dalton burns interlopers bursting into his Hollywood Hills mansion. The debtors filed for bankruptcy with just $1mm in liquidity remaining.

Speaking of burning cash, that’s pretty much what you can say about the $200-or-so-million that previously went into these debtors. The restructuring support agreement will (a) convert first lien loans to preferred and common equity, (b) donut the second lien claims, and (c) donut the general unsecured claimants (unless they opt-in to a release, in which case they’ll get $5k). Critical to everything is the fact that HIG Capital LLC, the existing shareholder in the company, will write a new-money check of $7mm and enter in a management services agreement with the reorganized newco. In exchange for this investment, HIG will get preferred equity and 51% of the common equity.* Everyone is going to be holding their breath for the next 6 weeks, hoping that no other large chains cancel or downsize orders. If that happens, this deal could blow up.

*Suffering PTSD from the last-minute collapse of the out-of-court deal, HIG also negotiated the ability to walk if the debtors have less than $1.5mm of available unrestricted cash on the “Exit Date.”


  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Walrath)

  • Capital Structure: see above.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Ropes & Gray LLP (Gregg Galardi, Christine Pirro Schwarzman) & Bayard PA (Erin Fay, Daniel Brogan, Gregory Flasser)

    • Independent Director: Michael Foreman

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: AlixPartners LLP (Stephen Spitzer)

    • Investment Banker: UBS Securities LLC

    • Claims Agent: Omni Agent Solutions Inc. (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • First Lien Agent: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

      • Legal: Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP (Andrew Goldman, Benjamin Loveland) & Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Robert Dehney, Joseph Barsalona II, Tamara Mann, Andrew Workman)

    • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Lenders

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, Adam Shpeen) & Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Robert Dehney, Joseph Barsalona II, Tamara Mann, Andrew Workman)

      • Financial Advisor: M-III Partners LP

    • Second Lien Agent & Second Lien Lenders: Oaktree Fund Administration LLC

      • Legal: Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (Jayme Goldstein, Daniel Ginsburg, Joanne Lau) and Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Matthew Lunn, Edmon Morton, Betsy Feldman)

    • Sponsor: HIG Capital LLC & HIG Middle Market LBO Fund II LP

      • Legal: McDermott Will & Emery LLP (Brooks Gruemmer, Jay Kapp)

🍎New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Earth Fare Inc.🍎

Earth Fare Inc.

February 4, 2020

Screen Shot 2020-02-04 at 1.38.30 PM.png

North Carolina-based Earth Fare Inc. is the latest grocer to descend into the Delaware bankruptcy courts, closing a horrific stretch for the grocery space in which multiple chains — including Fairway Market and Lucky’s Market — capitulated into chapter 11. Signs were out there. On January 26th, we noted that the chain was quietly closing locations, a clear indication of trouble and precursor to bankruptcy. Subsequently, The Wall Street Journal reported that the grocer had begun closing approximately 50 stores. The thing is: it has about 50 stores (across 10 states) so that effectively signaled that the company was kaput. Twenty minutes later, the company confirmed as much, issuing a press release that it would liquidate inventory at all of its stores and pursue a sale of its assets. 3,270 people appear poised to lose their jobs. It’s brutal out there, folks.* But at least sumo mandarins are back, bringing all new meaning to “get them before they’re gone.”

Earth Fare is owned, as of 2012, by Oak Hill Capital Partners III LP (72.1%) and MCP Heirloom LLC (18.76%), an ironic name given that there isn’t expected to be much left of this sucker going forward. Which means that we all should suspect yet another onslaught of “Private Equity Kills X” pieces in the media. Because, like, those have been all the rage lately. See, e.g., The New York Times and Payless, and Slate and Fairway.

So what’s the story? Well, for starters, you know you’ve got a dumpster fire on your hands when the company’s first day declaration to be entered into evidence in support of the filing is a whopping 18 pages long. Clearly the expectations here aren’t particularly optimistic.

Similar to Lucky’s Market Parent Company LLC, it appears that the company took on too much debt and expanded too much, too soon. Ah, private equity. Consequently, it has approximately $76.8mm of funded debt including a revolving credit facility held by Fifth Third Bank and Wells Fargo Bank NA and a term loan with a mysterious “Prepetition Term Loan Lender” that the company was apparently fearful of identifying by name in its papers. Like, for some reason. Like, as if, uh, we won’t find out who that sucker is who dumped $14.8mm into this horror show a mere 6 months ago. In addition to the funded debt, the company owes $60mm in trade and other unsecured obligations.

The company blames its failure on a now-standard lineup of excuses that include (i) crazy amounts of competition,** (ii) significant capex, and (iii) too much debt.

Riiiiight. Back to that debt. The company has been in a perpetual state of amend-and-extend since 2017 when, in May of that year, it secured an amendment/extension of its revolving loan maturity to April 2019. Those private equity bros who are sure to get bashed put $10mm of equity capital into the company at that point. Then in August 2018, the company entered into another amendment pushing out its maturity. In connection therewith, those private equity bros who are sure to get bashed put another $9mm of equity capital into the company. Another extension followed in April 2019 in which those private equity bros who are sure to get bashed put another $5mm of equity capital into the company. They likely would have had more fun just putting all of that money on "black” at the roulette table.

Meanwhile, the company’s efforts to refinance its debt and/or sell stalled badly. It sold 5 underperforming stores but the rest of the company’s inventory will be the responsibility of Hilco Merchant Resources LLC and Gordon Brothers Retail Partners LLC to sell; the sale of its locations the responsibility of A&G Realty Partners LLC; and the sale of the company’s IP, the responsibility of Hilco Streambank. This mandate is raining liquidators!! Toss in legal, a financial advisor and a strategic communications advisor and the question is: is there anyone left to hire to wind down this company?

*Interestingly, The Charlotte Observer reported that “[t]he number of grocery stores in the [Charlotte] metro area has grown by 38% in five years,” a real head-turner of a stat.

** GroceryDive reported:

“They made some strategic mistakes expanding too far into some non-continuous markets,” Burt Flickinger, managing director of Strategic Resources Group in New York, told Grocery Dive. He said Earth Fare’s key markets “were some of the most over-stored on the Eastern seaboard.”

They also note that the pain is pervasive:

Given their large size and market overlap with Earth Fare and Lucky’s, Sprouts and Whole Foods appear to be the main beneficiaries of this round of specialty store closures, sources said. But these chains certainly don’t have it easy. Whole Foods has not returned to profitable growth under Amazon, according to that company’s quarterly earnings reports, while Sprouts’ stock has dropped with the news from Lucky’s and Earth Fare.

“It’s an unforgiving market out there,” Flickinger said.

Indeed!

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Owens)

  • Capital Structure: $43.33mm RCF (Fifth Third Bank), $21.67mm RCF (Wells Fargo Bank NA), $14.8mm Term Loan

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP (Pauline Morgan, M. Blake Cleary, Sean Greecher, Shane Reil)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: FTI Consulting Inc. (Charles Goad)

    • Asset Disposition Advisor: Malfitano Advisors LLC

    • Liquidation Consultants: Hilco Merchant Resources LLC and Gordon Brothers Retail Partners LLC

      • Legal: Pepper Hamilton LLP (Douglas Hermann, Marcy McLaughlin Smith)

    • Real Estate Consultant: A&G Realty Partners LLC

    • IP Consultant: Hilco Streambank

    • Strategic Communications Advisor: Paladin Management Group LLC (Jennifer Mercer)

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:



New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - American Blue Ribbon Holdings LLC

American Blue Ribbon Holdings LLC

January 27, 2020

Man. The restaurant space is active AF when it comes to BK filings these days. Sysco Corporation ($SYY) must be sweating bullets. On the same day that BL Restaurants Holding LLC (Bar Louie) filed for bankruptcy and a mere week after The Krystal Company filed and less than six months after industry segment brother Perkins and Marie Callender’s filed for bankruptcy, Tennessee-based American Blue Ribbon Holdings LLC and four affiliated entities — the operators of 75 Village Inn and 22 Bakers Square family dining restaurant brands — filed for bankruptcy in the District of Delaware — the 8th significant bankruptcy filing in Delaware in 2020 (far outpacing any other jurisdiction).

This filing may come as a surprise to some. Why? Well, this August 2019 article in the Nashville Post dripped with optimism about the company’s proposed turnaround — a turnaround which included 50 pre-petition store closures. Despite these efforts, the debtors revenues were only $318mm in ‘19, a decline of $36mm.

Unlike BL Restaurants Holding LLC (Bar Louie), the debtors aren’t drowning in funded debt. In fact, they don’t have any secured debt at all. Unsecured claims total only $14mm.

They are, however, drowning due to industry-wide issues. If the factors leading to this filing sound familiar, well…they are:

  • Increased competition in the restaurant business. ✅

  • Increased competition from grocery stores’ expanded prepared meai offerings which, by and large, represent a much better value proposition. ✅

  • Rising labor costs ($2mm hit). ✅

  • Above-market rent. ✅

  • Declining foot traffic due to “an increase in convenience via takeout and delivery at the expense of dine-in customers at restaurants.” DISRUPTION!! ✅

  • Over-expansion. ✅

For all of these reasons, the debtors have been bleeding cash. They lost $11mm in ‘18 and $7mm in ‘19. So, sure, the turnaround was taking hold, it seems, but the $4mm in savings weren’t enough. Indeed, the debtors’ filing was precipitated due to a lack of liquidity.

The debtors will use the “breathing spell” provided by the filing to access $20mm in emergency liquidity (from their indirect ultimate majority owner, Cannae Holdings Inc. ($CNNE)) and pursue strategic options (without a banker….uh…ok, sure).


  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Silverstein)

  • Capital Structure: N/A

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: KTBS Law LLP (Michael Tuchin, David Fidler, Jonathan Weiss, Sasha Gurvitz) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Robert Poppiti Jr.)

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:


🍸New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - BL Restaurants Holding LLC (Bar Louie)🍸

BL Restaurants Holding LLC

January 27, 2020

Another day, another Sun Capital Partnersportfolio company* in bankruptcy. Texas-based BL Restaurants Holding LLC — known to most as Bar Louie — and 3 affiliated entities filed for bankruptcy in the District of Delaware. Bar Louie is a gastrobar concept that operates 110 owned locations plus 24 franchises across 26 states and the District of Columbia. In 2019, it did $252mm of sales, down 3.7% YOY.

We hate to feed into the private-equity-destroys-everything-it-touches-trope but, well, judge for yourself…

The company notes:

Over the past several years, the opening of new locations was the primary driver for sales and profit growth for the Company. This growth was partially funded through new debt, but also utilized cash flow from operations, which ultimately over time restricted liquidity otherwise needed for store refreshes and equipment maintenance and modernization, resulting in inconsistent delivery of the brand promise across the system. This inconsistent brand experience, coupled with increased competition and the general decline in customer traffic visiting traditional shopping locations and malls, resulted in less traffic at the Company’s locations proximate to shopping locations and malls and contributed to sales falling short of forecast. These customer declines were also driven by major changes in consumer behavior, including the general national trend away from casual dining. The combination of these factors had a particularly major impact on a significant segment of the Company’s footprint.

Indeed, all of that growth — coupled with disruptive trends confronting both malls and casual dining — took its toll. Indeed, 38 locations, in particular, really saddled the company. Apparently it’s a bad sign when a third of your footprint has negative same store sale comps of 10.9%. 😬 This brought down the rest of the enterprise (which “only experienced a 1.4% SSS decline.”). Only. The debtors closed the aforementioned 38 locations pre-filing.

What of the debt? The company has $87mm of funded debt, $8mm of trade debt and approximately $6mm of other unsecured debt excluding lease termination claims. Things aren’t looking so great for the trade. The pre-petition lenders have agreed to place a $22mm DIP.

So now the debtors will use that DIP to give themselves time to attempt a sale in bankruptcy. The debtors’ first lien secured lenders and the pre-petition first lien secured agent will serve as a stalking horse via a credit bid. They are owed approximately $56.4mm. Pursuant to the sale motion filed with the court, they seek a 3% breakup fee in connection with the agreement to be the stalking horse which, if you asked us, seems a bit ridiculous under the circumstances. Why do they need a breakup fee at all when they’re trying to shed this turd? Do they really want to own this business? A multi-month pre-petition marketing campaign would seem to indicate otherwise. This reeks of greed and ought to spark an objection from creditors who will be hoping there’s some buyer who comes out of the wood work and overbids for this thing.

We wouldn’t bet on it.

*The debtors’ first day declaration only refers to its private equity sponsors as “its current owners”. While it’s not entirely clear from the bankruptcy papers, it appears that Sun Capital may also be the second lien lender agent here (and lenders) — a presumption that is bolstered by the appearance of Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP as counsel. Morgan Lewis has represented Sun Capital portfolio companies in a number of recent chapter 11 bankruptcy filings. Curious how, with one exception, there was virtually no mention of Sun Capital’s involvement in any of the papers.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Walrath)

  • Capital Structure: $42mm Term Loan + $14.4mm RCF (Antares Capital LP), $23.6mm second lien debt (BL Restaurants Group Holding Corp.)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg LLP (Domenic Pacitti, Michael Yurkewicz)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: Carl Marks Advisory Group LLC (Howard Meitiner)

    • Investment Banker: Configure Partners LLC (Vin Batra)

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition First Lien Secured Agent and DIP Agent: Antares Capital LP

      • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (James Ktsanes, Jeremy Webb) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Michael Nestor, Andrew Magaziner)

    • DIP Lenders: Midcap Funding XVI Trust, Midcap Funding XXX Trust, Midcap Financial Trust, Woodmont 2017-2 Trust, Woodmont 2017-3 LP, Woodmont 2018-4 Trust

    • Prepetition Second Lien Agent:

      • Legal: Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (Barbara Shander)

    • Purchaser: BLH Acquisition Co., LLC

New Chapter 11 Filing - Paddock Enterprises LLC

Paddock Enterprises LLC

January 6, 2020

Ohio-based Paddock Enterprises LLC (aka Owens-Illinois Inc.) is the latest victim of asbestos-related liabilities to find itself in bankruptcy court. And by “latest” we mean the first in, like, a few days. Just last week, another Ohio-based manufacturer, ON Marine Services Company LLC, filed for bankruptcy after having had enough of dealing with decades-worth of claims within the tort system. ON filed for bankruptcy to address 6,000 claims emanating out of the 70s; Paddock filed for bankruptcy because its alternative to the tort system — “administrative claims agreements” — became increasingly untenable and it must still address 900 claims stemming from the 40s and 50s. That’s right, the 40s and 50s!! The purpose of filing for bankruptcy is to establish a 524(g) trust to deal with current and future asbestos claimants.

This case seems rather straight-forward and so we’ll spare you the long summary. In a nutshell, if a company at one time manufactured product with asbestos, it is generally f*cked. But there is an interesting commentary herein about these types of lawsuits and why bankruptcy is warranted. In the context of discussing its reserve coverage of asbestos-related tort expenditures ($722mm!), the company notes:

The Debtor believes that, although the established reserves are appropriate under ASC 450, its ultimate asbestos-related tort expenditures cannot be known with certainty because, among other reasons, the litigation environment in the tort system has deteriorated generally for mass tort defendants and Administrative Claims Agreements are becoming less reliable.

It gets better (PETITION Note: this is a long but worth-it passage):

What is certain is the incredible disparity between what the Debtor has historically paid, and is now being asked to pay, for Asbestos Claims, given the extent of its historical asbestosrelated operations. As of September 30, 2019, the Debtor had disposed of over 400,000 Asbestos Claims, and had incurred gross expense of approximately $5 billion for asbestos-related costs. In contrast, its total Kaylo sales for the 10-year period in which it sold the product were approximately $40 million. Asbestos-related cash payments for 2018, 2017, and 2016 alone were $105 million, $110 million, and $125 million, respectively. Although these cash payments show a modest decline, the overall volume and claimed value of Asbestos Claims asserted against the Debtor has not declined in proportion to the facts that (i) over 60 years have passed since the Debtor exited the Kaylo business, (ii) the average age of the vast majority of its claimants is now over 83 years old, (iii) these demographics produce increasingly limited opportunities to demonstrate legitimate occupational Kaylo exposures, and (iv) other recoveries are available from trusts established by other asbestos defendants. Rather, increasing settlement values have been demanded of the Debtor. And because the Debtor has settled or otherwise exhausted all insurance that might cover Asbestos Claims, it must satisfy all asbestos-related expenses out of Company cash flows.

Oh man. You’ve gotta love the plaintiff’s Bar. Those numbers are staggering. $40mm in 1940-1950 dollars would be equal to approximately $565mm in 2018 dollars. As compared to $5b in liability. And more to come. SHEEEESH. (PETITION Note: none of the foregoing is intended to disrespect any of the victims of the debtor’s product. Yes, we feel obligated to say that.)

There’s also a structural issue: the debtor entity subject to these extensive liabilities was incorporated in December 2019 as a direct wholly-owned subsidiary of O-I Glass Inc. ($OI), a $2b market cap glass container manufacturer. This is the classic “good company,” “bad company” structural separation. We suspect there’ll be at least some fireworks in bankruptcy court over this structure as creditors — almost exclusively the plaintiffs’ law firms — try to broaden the pool of potential proceeds from which they can recover monies for their clients.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Silverstein)

  • Capital Structure:

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (George Davis, Jeffrey Bjork, Christina Craige, Jeffrey Mispagel, Helena Tseregounis, Michael Faris, Lisa Lansio) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (John Knight, Michael Merchant)

    • Board of Directors: Kevin Collins, John Reynolds, Scott Gedris

    • Estimation Agent: Bates White LLC

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • O-I Glass Inc.

      • Legal: Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Derek Abbott, Joseph Halsey)

    • Future Claims Representative: James Patton Jr.

      • Legal: Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP

      • Claims Analyst: Ankura Consulting Group LLC

🐄New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Borden Dairy Company🐄

Borden Dairy Company

January 5, 2020

Dallas-based Borden Dairy Company and 17 affiliated companies joined fellow dairy manufacturer, Dean Foods Company (which we’ve written about here, here, here and, lastly, here upon its chapter 11 filing) in bankruptcy court this week. Why? “Like other milk producers and distributors, Borden is facing a multi-year trend of shrinking margins and increasing competition. These negative trends have been exacerbated by declining margin over milk at retail even as the price of raw Class 1 milk has been increasing.” Boo Moo.

What a storied history. Founded by Gail Borden in 1856 (PETITION Note: read the link if you want to feel awful about yourself and what you’ve accomplished in your life), the New York Condensed Milk Company started the first successful condensed milk processing plant in 1861. In the latter part of the 19th century, the company added processed and evaporated milk to its offerings and pioneered the use of glass milk bottles.

In 1919, the company changed its name to Borden Company in honor of Mr. Borden. This was a period of great uncertainty — one captured in Hemingway’s “The Sun Also Rises” — but that didn’t stop Mr. Borden’s descendants from expanding their dairy-fueled reign. They acquired two of the largest ice cream manufacturers in the US, while also adding cheese and acquiring a chemicals company. Over those years, Borden acquired over 200 companies. “Elsie the Cow” was born in 1936 and became a well known mascot.

By the 80s, Borden was the world’s largest dairy operator with sales exceeding $7.2b. Then gravity prevailed. By the early 90s, the company experienced financial distress borne out of two much expansion over the years and sold to KKR for $2b. KKR then dismantled Borden by selling off divisions and brands to various buyers.

The debtors underwent a comprehensive restructuring in 2017. At the time of the restructuring, the debtors took on a $275mm credit facility held, in tranches, by PNC Bank and KKR. The effective interest rate on the term loan facilities was 9.3% as of 12/31/19, which is on top of the 4.95% interest due under the revolving portion of the loan. So, yeah, debt and the debtors’ interest expense nut is a big part of this bankruptcy filing.

The company is no longer the behemoth it once was. Nevertheless, it employees over 3000 people and makes tens of thousands of service calls to its customers (e.g., Walmart Inc. & Sam’s Club ($WMT)), Kroger Inc. ($KR), 7-Eleven, CVS HealthCorp. ($CVS), Starbucks Inc. ($SBUX), etc.).

But its number suck. In 2018, the company had a total net income loss of $14.6mm on ~$1.2b of sales. In 2019, the loss widened to $42.4mm. Liquidity, therefore, is a big issue — and it’s compounded by (a) interest expense and amort payments on the term loan and (b) employee obligations under mandatory retirement plans and settlements related to pension funds. More on this below.

The macro reasons for the debtors’ problems sound like a Dean Foods’ encore:

  • The milk industry is highly competitive ✅;

  • Non-dairy products and beverages are stealing share (DISRUPTION!!) ✅;

  • Discount grocers have “intensified competition and reduced the margin over milk at retail” ✅; and

  • Walmart and other retailers who use milk as a loss leader are napalming margins ✅;

  • Commodity and freight costs are up ✅.

The company doesn’t tip its hand as to what it hopes to achieve in bankruptcy other than a “breathing spell” to get its sh*t in order. The Wall Street Journal noted:

Borden Chief Executive Tony Sarsam told The Wall Street Journal that he believes Acon, which took a major stake in the company in 2017, will be the primary owner of the business after the bankruptcy. He declined to say how much debt Borden would erase as part of its bankruptcy restructuring.

Acon is currently one of the debtors’ majority owners.

*****

There’s one thing that the Wall Street Journal doesn’t pick up on though. The debtors’ pensioners are about to get the royal screw.

The debtors note that, pre-filing, they made periodic payments pursuant to two settlement agreements they entered into in connection with their withdrawal from its (a) Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund terminated in ‘14 (“Central States”) and (b) Retail, Wholesale and Department Store International Union pension fund terminated in ‘16 (“RWDSU”). In connection with the ‘17 restructuring, the debtors established a special purpose account funded with $30mm to fund these settlement payments — $185,225/month to Central States and $6,000/month to RWDSU. The account now has $26.6mm in it.

The debtors are laying claim to this money; they note that it is unencumbered by their lenders nor the pensioners.

This hasn’t been a great time for pensioners. With coal bankruptcies galore, Jack Cooper, and now the dairy producers, anxiety levels must be through the roof.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Sontchi)

  • Capital Structure: $275mm of funded debt (see above). $30mm Term Loan A (PNC), $175mm Term Loan B (KKR Credit Advisors US LLC), $70mm RCF (PNC)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer (D. Tyler Nurnberg, Seth Kleinman, Sarah Gryll, Jeffrey Fuisz) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (M. Blake Cleary, Kenneth Enos, Elizabeth Justison, Betsy Feldman)

    • Independent Directors: Harold Strunk, Andrea Fischer Newman

    • Claims Agent: Donlin Recano (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • ACON Dairy Investors LLC

    • New Laguna LLC

    • Agent, RCF Facility Lenders & Term Loan A Facility Lenders: PNC Bank NA

      • Legal: Blank Rome LLP (Regina Stango Kelbon, Josef Mintz, John Lucian, Gregory Vizza)

    • Term Loan B Facility Lenders: KKR Credit Advisors US LLC/Franklin Square Holdings LP

      • Legal: King & Spalding LLP (Roger Schwartz, Peter Montoni, Christopher Boies, Stephen Blank) & Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Robert Dehney, Curtis Miller, Matthew Harvey, Matthew Talmo)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

      • Legal: Sidley Austin LLP (Matthew Clemente, Genevieve Weiner, Michael Fishel, Michael Burke) & Morris James LLP (Carl Kunz III, Eric Monzo, Brya Keilson)