🧀 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - CEC Entertainment Inc. 🧀

CEC Entertainment Inc.

June 24, 2020

For our rundown, please go here.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Isgur)

  • Capital Structure: $1.089b funded debt ($760mm TL, $108 RCF, $6mm LOC, $215.7mm notes)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Alfredo Perez, Andrew Citron, Rachael Foust, Scott Bowling)

    • Board of Directors: David McKillips, Andrew Jhawar, Naveen Shahani, Allen Weiss, Peter Brown, Paul Aronzon

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Chad Coben)

    • Investment Banker: PJT Partners LP (Jamie O’Connell)

    • Real Estate Advisor: Hilco Real Estate LLC

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • PE Sponsor: Queso Holdings Inc./AP VIII CEC Holdings, L.P. (Apollo)

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP

    • First Lien Credit Agreement Agent: Credit Suisse AG, Cayman Islands Branch

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Eli Vonnegut) & Rapp & Krock PC (Henry Flores, Kenneth Krock)

    • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Lenders: American Money Management Corp, Arbour Lane Capital Management, Arena Capital Advisors LLC, Ares Management LLC, Bank of Montreal, BlueMountain Capital Management, Carlson Capital LP, Catalur Capital Management LP, Citibank NA, Credit Suisse AG, Deutsche Bank New York, Fidelity Management & Research Co., Fortress Investment Group LLC, GS Capital Partners LP, Hill Path Capital, Indaba Capital Fund LP, ICG Debt Advisors, Jefferies Financ LLC, J.H. Lane Partners Master Fund LP, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, MSD Capital LP, MSD Partners LP, Octagon Credit Investors LLC, Par Four Investment Management LLC, RFG-Clover LLC, Second Lien LLC, UBS AG, Wazee Street Capital Management, Western Asset Management Company LLC, WhiteStar Asset Management, ZAIS Group LLC

      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Philip Dublin, Jason Rubin, Marty Brimmage Jr., Lacy Lawrence)

    • Indenture Trustee: Wilmington Trust NA

      • Legal: Reed Smith LLP (Kurt Gwynne, Jason Angelo)

    • Ad Hoc Group of ‘22 8% Senior Noteholders (Longfellow Investment Management Co. LLC, Prudential Financial Inc., Resource Credit Income Fund, Westchester Capital Management)

      • Legal: King & Spalding LLP (Matthew Warren, Lindsey Henrikson, Michael Rupe)

      • Financial Advisor: Ducera Partners LLC

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors: Wilmington Trust NA, The Coca-Cola Company, National Retail Properties, Performance Food Group, Washington Prime Group, NCR Corporation, Index Promotions

      • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (Eric Wilson, Jason Adams, Lauren Schlussel & Womble Bond Dickinson LLP (Matthew Ward)

7/17/20 Dkt. 352.

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC

Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC

May 7, 2020

Dallas-based Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC, Bergdorf Goodman Inc. and 22 other debtors filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the Southern District of Texas late this week. If anyone is seeking an explanation as to why that may be outside the obvious pandemic-related narrative, look no farther than this monstrosity:

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A quick reality check: that $5b capital structure isn’t attached to an international enterprise with hundreds or thousands of stores. You know, like Forever21. Rather, that horror show backs a 68 store business (43 Neiman Marcus, 2 Bergdorf, 22 Last Call). Ah….gotta love the good ol’ $5b leveraged buyout.

This case is all about “BIG.”

Big capital structure stemming from a big LBO by two big PE funds, Ares Capital Management and CPP Investment Board USRE Inc.

Big brands with big price tags. PETITION Note: top unsecured creditors include Chanel Inc., Gucci America, Dolce and Gabbana USA Inc., Stuart Weitzman Inc., Theory LLC, Christian Louboutin, Yves Saint Laurent America Inc., Burberry USA, and more. There is also a big amount allocated towards critical vendors: $42.5mm. Nobody messes with Gucci, folks. Here’s a live shot of a representative walking out of court confident that they’ll get their money:

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Big fees. More on this below.

Big, complicated — and controversial — multi-year re-designation and asset stripping transactions that were part of the debtors’ (and now non-debtors’) elaborate strategy to restructure out-of-court by kicking the can down the road. This is undoubtedly going to stir a big fight in the case. More on this below too.

Big value destruction.

Here is what will happen to the pre-petition capital structure under the proposed term sheet and restructuring support agreement filed along with the chapter 11 papers — a deal that has the support of 78% of the term lenders, 78% of the debentures, 99% of the second lien notes, 70% of the third lien notes, and 100% of the private equity sponsors:

Screen Shot 2020-05-08 at 4.51.32 PM.JPG

The Asset-Based Revolving Credit Facility and FILO Facility will get out at par. There’ll be a $750mm exit facility. Beyond that? All that red constitutes heaps and heaps of value that’s now essentially an option. It’s a bet that there is a place in the future for brick-and-mortar luxury department stores. Pursuant to the deal, the “Extended Term Loans” will get the lion’s share of equity (87.5%, subject to dilution). The rest of the capital structure will get small slivers of reorganized equity. General unsecured creditors will get “their pro rata share of a cash pool.” The private equity sponsors will get wiped out but for their hoped-for liability releases.

Back to those big fees. The biggest issue for this week was the debtors’ proposed $675mm new money DIP credit facility (that comes in junior to the existing ABL in priority…in other words, no roll-up here). The DIP is essentially 13% paper chock full of fees (including a backstop fee payable in “NewCo equity” at 30% discount to plan value). One disgruntled party, Mudrick Capital Management, a holder of $144mm of the term loan, appears to have beef with Pimco and other DIP backstop parties — saying that the backstop agreement is inappropriate and the DIP fees are outrageous, likening the fee grab to a COVID hoarding mentality — and therefore felt compelled to cross-examine the debtors’ banker as to the reasonableness of it all. If you’ve ever imagined a kid suing other kids for not picking him for their dodgeball team, it would look something like this did.

And so Lazard’s testimony basically boiled down to this:

“Uh, yeah, dude, nobody knows when the economy will fully open up. The company only has $100mm of cash on the petition date. And IT’S NOT OPERATING. That money is enough for maybe 3 weeks of cash burn given that the debtors intend to continue paying rent (unlike most other retailers that have filed for bankruptcy lately). Damn pesky high-end landlords. Anyway, so we’ll burn approximately $300mm between now and when stores are projected to reopen in July/August. No operating cash flow + meaningful cash burn = risky AF lending environment. It’s unprecedented to lend into a situation with a cash burn that, while it pales in comparison to something like Uber, is pretty damn extreme. Look at the J.Crew DIP: it ain’t exactly cheap to lend in this market. There are no unencumbered assets; there certainly isn’t a way to get junior financing. And a priming fight makes no sense here given the impossibility of showing an equity cushion. So stop being an entitled little brat. There’s no obligation on anyone to cut you into the deal. And if you’re going to cry over spilled milk, take up your beef with Pimco and f*ck right off. Alternatively, you can subscribe to your pro rata portion of the DIP and enjoy all of the fees other than the backstop fee.”

The Judge was convinced that the above rationale constituted good business judgment and approved the DIP on an interim basis.

The hearing also foreshadowed another contentious issue in the case: the myTheresa situation. See, the Debtors’ position is the following: “The ‘17 MyTheresa designation as unrestricted subs + the ‘18 distribution of the myTheresa operating companies to non-debtor Neiman Marcus Group Inc. (a/k/a the “asset stripping” transaction) + a ‘19 wholesale amend-and-extend + cost-saving initiatives + comparable same store sales growth for 7 of 10 quarters + “significantly expanded margins” during the holiday period = rocket ship future growth but for the damn pandemic. On the flip side, Marble Ridge Capital LP takes the position that:

…the Debtors’ financial troubles were entirely foreseeable well before recent events. The Company has operated at leverage multiples more than twice its peers since at least 2018 (prior to the fraudulent transfers described herein). And last year’s debt restructuring increased the Company’s already unsustainable annual interest expense by more than $100 million while only reducing the Company’s debt load by $250 million leaving a fraction of adjusted EBITDA for any capital expenditures, principal repayment, taxes or one-time charges. Sadly, the Debtors’ financial distress will come as no surprise to anyone.

This ain’t gonna be pretty. Marble Ridge has already had one suit for fraudulent transfer dismissed with prejudice at the pleading stage. Now there are defamation and other claims AGAINST Marble Ridge outstanding. And subsequent suits in the NY Supreme Court. Have no fear, though, folks. There are independent managers in the mix now to perform an “independent” investigation into these transactions.

The debtors intend to have a plan on file by early June with confirmation in September. Until then, pop your popcorn folks. You can socially distance AND watch these fireworks.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Jones)

  • Capital Structure: See above.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Anup Sathy, Chad Husnick, Matthew Fagen, Austin Klar, Gregory Hesse, Dan Latona, Gavin Campbell, Gary Kavarsky, Mark McKane, Jeffrey Goldfine, Josh Greenblatt, Maya Ben Meir) & Jackson Walker LLP (Matthew Cavenaugh, Jennifer Wertz, Kristhy Peguero, Veronica Polnick)

    • Independent Managers of NMG LTD LLC: Marc Beilinson, Scott Vogel

      • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Brian Lennon, Todd Cosenza, Jennifer Hardy, Joseph Davis, Alexander Cheney)

      • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Dennis Stogsdill)

    • Independent Manager of Mariposa Intermediate Holdings LLC: Anthony Horton

      • Legal: Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

    • Neiman Marcus Inc.

      • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Jeffrey Bjork)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: Berkeley Research Group LLC (Mark Weinstein, Kyle Richter, Marissa Light)

    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC (Tyler Cowan)

    • Claims Agent: Stretto (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Pre-petition ABL Agent: Deutsche Bank AG New York Branch

      • Legal: White & Case LLP (Scott Greissman, Andrew Zatz, Rashida Adams) & Gray Reed & McGraw LLP (Jason Brookner, Paul Moak, Lydia Webb)

    • FILO Agent: TPG Specialty Lending Inc.

      • Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (Adam Harris, Abbey Walsh, G. Scott Leonard) & Jones Walker LLP (Joseph Bain)

    • Pre-petition Term Loan Agent: Credit Suisse AG Cayman Islands Branch

      • Legal: Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP (Paul Zumbro, George Zobitz, Christopher Kelly) & Haynes and Boone LLP (Charles Beckham, Martha Wyrick)

    • Second Lien Note Agent: Ankura Trust Company LLC

    • Third Lien Note Agent: Wilmington Trust NA

    • Unsecured Notes Indenture Trustee: UMB Bank NA

      • Legal: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP (Douglas Mannal, Rachael Ringer)

    • 2028 Debentures Agent: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

    • Ad Hoc Term Loan Lender Group (Davidson Kempner Capital Management LP, Pacific Investment Management Company LLC, Sixth Street Partners LLC)

      • Legal: Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz (Joshua Feltman, Emil Kleinhaus) & Vinson & Elkins LLP (Harry Perrin, Kiran Vakamudi, Paul Heath, Matthew Moran, Katherine Drell Grissel)

      • Financial Advisor: Ducera Partners LLC

    • Ad Hoc Secured Noteholder Committee

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Andrew Rosenberg, Alice Belisle Eaton, Claudia Tobler, Diane Meyers, Neal Donnelly, Patricia Walsh, Jeffrey Recher) & Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins, Eric English, M. Shane Johnson)

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

    • Large Creditor: Chanel Inc.

      • Legal: Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (Justin Bernbrock, Michael Driscoll)

    • Large Creditor: Louis Vuitton USA Inc.

      • Legal: Barack Ferrazzano Kirschbaum & Nagelberg LLP (Nathan Rugg)

    • Large Creditor: Moncler USA Inc.

      • Legal: Morrison Cohen LLP (Joseph Moldovan, David Kozlowski)

    • Marble Ridge Capital LP & Marble Ridge Master Fund LP

      • Legal: Brown Rudnick LLP (Edward Weisfelner, Sigmund Wissner-Gross, Jessica Meyers, Uchechi Egeonuigwe)

    • Mudrick Capital Management LP

      • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Michael Rosenthal, Mitchell Karlan, David Feldman, Keith Martorana, Jonathan Fortney)

    • Sponsor: CPP Investment Board USRE Inc.

      • Legal: Debevoise & Plimpton LLP (Jasmine Ball, Erica Weisgerber) & Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP (Hugh Ray, William Hotze, Jason Sharp)

    • Sponsor: Ares Capital Management

      • Legal: Milbank LLP (Dennis Dunne, Thomas Kreller)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

      • Legal: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Richard Pachulski) & Cole Schotz PC (Daniel Rosenberg)

      • Financial Advisor: M-III Advisory Partners LP (Mohsin Meghji)

      • Valuation Expert: The Michel-Shaked Group (Israel Shaked)

🚢 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Speedcast International Limited 🚢

Speedcast International Limited

April 22, 2020

This is a fun one.

Speedcast International Limited, a publicly-traded Australian company headquartered in Houston and 32 affiliates (the “debtors”) filed rare freefall bankruptcy cases in the Southern District of Texas earlier this week. In a week where another 4.4mm people filed for unemployment, one thing seems abundantly clear: the Texas’ bankruptcy courts are going to need help. While Delaware has also been extremely busy, both the Northern District and Southern District of Texas are seeing rock solid bankruptcy flow these days. If the judges got volume bonuses, they’d be rolling in it.

Who’s the big loser? Well, with all of these bankruptcy hearings conducted telephonically, we reckon it’s the city of Houston. In normal times, there’d be a steady stream of suits flushing through the local economy there: staying at the hotels, eating at the restaurants, drinking at the bars. Brutal. But we digress. 🤔

One thing the restructuring industry gives us is an open window into how one domino can topple over others. For instance, the energy and cruise industries are clearly effed currently and so it stands to reason that service providers to those industries would also feel pain. This is where Speedcast comes in: it is a provider of information technology services and (largely satellite-dependent) communications solutions (i.e., cybersecurity, content solutions, data and voice apps, IoT, network systems) to customers in the cruise, energy, government and commercial maritime businesses. They plug a hole: they offer telecom services to users in remote parts around the world, “primarily where there is limited or no terrestrial network.” Picture some evildoer in some decked out yacht-lair somewhere plotting to take over the world Austin Powers-style. He is probably leveraging Speedcast for IT solutions (PETITION Note: we’re just painting a picture folks; we’re not suggesting that the company merely deals with shady-a$$ mofos. Don’t @ us.). The business is truly international in scope.

Putting aside yacht-loving villains, Speedcast has high profile clients. Carnival Corp. ($CCL), for instance, contracted with Speedcast in December 2018 — long before any of Carnival’s customers contracted with the coronavirus. Cruisers streaming reports about their horrific cruise-going experiences likely used Speedcast product to get the word out. 😬 This was a growing business segment. Revenue increased by $36.5mm from fiscal year 2018 to 2019.

Likewise, the debtors’ energy business had also been growing. The debtors provide “high-bandwidth remote communication services to all segments of the global energy industry, including companies involved in drilling and exploration, floating production storage, offloading, offshore service, general service, engineering, and construction.” Revenue there increased from $158.3mm in FY18 to $164.5mm. We’re pretty sure we know which direction that number is heading in FY20.

Similarly, the debtors’ other business segments — Enterprise & Emerging Markets and Government — demonstrated growth between ‘18 and ‘19. All in, this is a $722.3mm revenue business. Unfortunately, it also had net losses of $459.8mm in FY19. So, yeah. There’s that. The debtors’ rapid expansion over the years apparently didn’t lead to immediate synergistic realization and the debtors suffered from margin compression, revenue declines from specific business lines, and other ails that affected performance and liquidity.

While there have been operational issues for some time now, those were just jabs. COVID-19 and the attendant global shutdown body slammed the company. The debtors note:

Further, the lasting and distressed market conditions in the maritime and oil and gas industries, and the recent and dramatic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, have impacted all players in the global marketplace. The Company has been particularly hard hit by these adverse market conditions. The outsized impact on the Company’s Maritime Business and Energy Business customers has manifested in a dramatic reduction in cash receipts. This macroeconomic downturn, along with the above-mentioned headwinds that contributed to the lower than expected FY19 financial results, made clear that the Company would not satisfy the Net Leverage Covenant under the Credit Agreement.

Right. The debt. $689.1mm of it, to be exact (exclusive of financing arrangements) — of which approximately $590mm is a term loan. With a capital structure this simple, one would think that this is a case that is ripe for a prearranged deal memorialized via a pre-petition restructuring support agreement. But no. There isn’t one here. Why not?

The term lenders argue that the debtors engaged them too late in the game. Therefore, there wasn’t enough time to conduct due diligence on the business, they say. Surely quarantine ain’t helping matters on that front. Nor is the fact that the company is international in nature.

And so this is a traditional freefall balance sheet and operational restructuring — something you don’t really see much of anymore. This case looks headed towards either a sale — which we’re guessing is the term lenders preferred outcome (par plus accrued baby!) — or a plan that would equitize the term lenders and put the go-forward financing needs of the debtors on the shoulders of the term lenders. A plan would preserve the debtors’ net operating losses which, as noted above, could be meaningful.

The debtors and the ad hoc lenders did nail down a commitment for a multiple-draw super-priority senior secured term loan DIP which includes a $90mm new money portion ($35mm on an interim basis) and a $90mm roll-up ($35mm on an interim basis). Judge Isgur took some exception to the interim roll-up portion of the proposed facility but the debtors and the lenders were hand-in-hand saying that — particularly under the circumstances today — the interim roll-up was necessary and appropriate because the lenders need a “big incentive” to lend and “the lenders’ capital providers are getting squeezed themselves.” 🤔 (PETITION Note: The DIP market sounds vicious — though some of that, here, is attributable to the nature of the assets. Delta Airlines can place senior secured notes right now at around 7% because, well … duh … planes!). Judge Isgur did caution however that he wants no part of professionals throwing this interim roll-up in his face as precedent in an upcoming case (Um, we’ll see how that plays out…this financing environment ain’t exactly reversing overnight). While the ad hoc lenders are clearly in pole position for the DIP commitment, they’re syndicating the loan now (which would obviously affect the roll-up too). The DIP will push the professionals towards a path forward over the next couple of weeks and the hope is for a result to be consummated within six months.

Interestingly, the largest single unsecured creditor is an entity that suffers from its own issues and has reportedly hired bankruptcy professionals for advice: Intelsat SA is owed $44mm. In late March, Intelsat terminated their contract with the debtors in a pretty savage leverage play. We talk about leverage a lot in PETITION. There’s balance sheet leverage and then there is situational leverage. Intelsat flexed its muscles and exercised the latter. In exchange it got critical vendor designation, acknowledgement of the full amount of their pre-petition claim and mutual releases. Significantly, the debtors stressed the importance of the relationship, noting that the IT services were needed more than ever as vessels sail adjusted routes due to COVID (read: boats are circling around because governments won’t let passengers disembark).

We should know within a few weeks what a deal may look like here.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Isgur)

  • Capital Structure: $87.7mm RCF, $591.4mm Term Loan, $10.6mm LOC

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Gary Holtzer, Alfredo Perez, David Griffiths, Brenda Funk, Martha Martir, Kelly DiBlasi, Stephanie Morrison, Paul Genender, Amanda Pennington Prugh, Jake Rutherford) & Herbert Smith Freehills LLP

    • Independent Director: Stephe Wilks, Grant Scott Ferguson, Michael Martin Malone, Peter Jackson, Carol Flaton, David Mack)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: FTI Consulting Inc. (Michael Healy)

    • Investment Banker: Moelis & Company Co. (Paul Rathborne, Adam Waldman)

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Ad Hoc Group of Secured Lenders

      • Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, David Schiff, Jonah Peppiatt, Jarret Erickson) & Rapp & Krock PC (Henry Flores, Kenneth Krock)

      • Financial Advisor: Greenhill & Co. Inc.

    • DIP Agent: Credit Suisse AG

      • Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP (Steven Messina, George Howard, Albert Hogan III, David Wagener)

    • Large Creditor: Intelsat SA

      • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Edward Sassower, Steven Serajeddini, Anthony Grossi) & Jackson Walker LLP (Matthew Cavenaugh)

    • Large Creditor: Inmarsat Global Limited

      • Legal: Steptoe & Johnson LLP (Michael Dockterman) & Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP (Jason Boland, Bob Bruner)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

      • Legal: Hogan Lovells US LLP (S. Lee Whitesell, John Beck, David Simonds, Ron Silverman, Michael Hefter) & Husch Blackwell LLP (Randall Rios, Timothy Million)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - LBI Media Inc.

LBI Media Inc.

November 21, 2018

Happy Thanksgiving y’all!! LBI Media Inc. and several affiliates FINALLY filed for bankruptcy today in the District of Delaware after years of questions about its financial health. The company is a privately held minority-owned Spanish-language broadcaster that owns or licenses 27 Spanish-language television and radio stations in the largest US markets; it services the largest media markets in the nation, including Los Angeles, New York City, Chicago, Miami, Houston and Dallas. It is also a victim of disruption.

The company notes that it has “faced the market pressures that have broadly affected U.S. television and radio broadcasters, including the 2008 recession and the diversion of advertising spend by companies to digital media.” Insert Facebook Inc. ($FB) here. That’s not all, though, of course: the company is also hampered by “a substantial debt load and corresponding interest expense obligations” which has stunted LBI’s financial performance, ability to invest and grow, and liquidity.

To address this situation, the company obtained an investment from its now-DIP lender, HPS Investment Partners, in April 2018 for a new first lien credit facility. This provided the company with much needed liquidity and, in turn, briefly extended the company’s runway out of bankruptcy court. The “make-whole” provision attached to the facility, however, became the subject of much controversy and an ad hoc group of second lien noteholders sued in New York state court for an injunction to hinder the transaction. Ultimately, the state court denied the noteholders.

But…but…the noteholders persisted. And this, apparently, left a bitter taste in the mouth’s of company management (and its counsel). Junior Noteholders, meet bus. 🚌🚌 The company notes:

Following the closing of the transaction, LBI sought to continue its growth efforts. However, such efforts were weakened by the Junior Noteholder Group, which continued to litigate against the Company, its founder and CEO, and HPS, the Company’s sole senior lender. The Junior Noteholder Group commenced multiple lawsuits, and threatened several more, distracting management from operations. These actions and threats not only hindered the Debtors’ efforts to improve their operations, but certain actions, including seeking to enjoin the first lien financing, risked pushing LBI into a precipitous freefall bankruptcy.

When coupled with the Debtors’ tightening liquidity (which was exacerbated by the expense of the Junior Noteholder Group litigation), the Junior Noteholder Group’s actions made it substantially more difficult for LBI to achieve the growth it had hoped for, and the Company determined that a comprehensive reorganization may be necessary.

Thereafter, settlement talks with the Junior Noteholders proved unsuccessful and, now, therefore, the company marches into bankruptcy court with a Restructuring Support Agreement (“RSA”) in hand with HPS whereby, subject to a “fiduciary out,” HPS will serve as (prearranged but hardly set in stone) Plan sponsor and swap its $233mm first lien senior secured notes for a majority equity interest in the company. The Plan — which at the time of this writing isn’t on the docket yet — reportedly provides for recoveries for other “supporting” constituencies. What’s that we hear? IT’S A (DEATH) TRAP!?!

(PETITION NOTE: for the uninitiated, a “death trap plan” is an inartful term for when the Debtor proposes and the senior lenders allows a recovery to trickle down the “priority waterfall” to junior lenders but only on account of said junior lenders’ support of, or vote for, the proposed Plan. In essence, its consideration for dispensing with “holdup value.” A “fiduciary out” gives the Debtor flexibility to, despite the RSA, agree to an alternative transaction that bests the HPS transaction without penalty or the need to pay a “break-up fee.”).

The plan provides the company with 75-day period to run a marketing process. While the company will market the company to potential strategic and financial investors, it is also making overtures to the Junior Noteholders to take out HPS’ claim(s) (without needing to satisfy the make-whole) and become the Plan sponsor such that it could walk away with 100% equity in the company.

All of which is to say: don’t let the terms “RSA” and “Plan” fool you. This is far from a consensual case being presented to the Bankruptcy Court Judge wrapped up in a shiny bow. The Junior Noteholders have been fighting the company and HPS for months: there is no reason to suspect that that will stop now merely because the company is a chapter 11 debtor.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Lane)

  • Capital Structure: $233mm 10% ‘23 senior secured notes, $262mm 11.5/13.5 ‘20 PIK toggle second priority secured notes, $27.95mm 11% ‘22 PIK unsecured Intermediate senior Holdco notes (TMI Trust Company), $8.46mm 11% ‘17 unsecured Holdco notes (U.S. Bank NA)    

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Ray Schrock, Garrett Fail, David J. Cohen) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (Daniel DeFranceschi)

    • Board of Directors: Jose Liberman, Lenard Liberman, Winter Horton, Rockard Delgadillo, Peter Connoy, Neal Goldman

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC

    • Investment Banker: Guggenheim Securities LLC

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Corporate Restructuring LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition First Lien & DIP Lender: HPS Investment Partners LLC ($38mm)

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Paul Basta, Jeffrey Safferstein, Sarah Harnett) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, M. Blake Cleary)

    • First Lien Trustee: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

      • Legal: Morrison & Foerster (Jonathan Levine) & (local) Ashby & Geddes PA (William Bowden)

    • Collateral Trustee for First Lien Notes: Credit Suisse AG

      • Legal: Locke Lorde LLP (Juliane Dziobak)

    • Ad Hoc Group of (Junior) Second Lien Noteholders

      • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Rachel Strickland)

    • Ad Hoc Group of Holdco Noteholders

      • Legal: Landis Rath & Cobb LLP (Matthew McGuire)

Updated 11/21/18 at 8:27 CT

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - Rentech WP U.S. Inc.

Rentech WP U.S. Inc.

  • 12/19/17 Recap: Publicly-traded ($RNTK) Colorado-based wood fibre processing company that services large pulp, paper and packaging manufacturers with three core businesses: (i) contract wood handling and chipping services; (ii) the manufacture and sale of wood pellets for the U.S. heating market; and (iii) the manufacture, aggregation, and sale of wood pellets for the utility and industrial power generation market, has filed for bankruptcy to effectuate a sale to FFI Acquisition Inc. as buyer (Scott Davis Chip Company Inc. is the affiliate guarantor of the buyer). The company's wood fibre is used in the manufacturing of boxboard, containerboard, paper, and medium density fiberboard for building products. The company blames a strategic pivot from the development and commercialization of certain alternative energy tech to the the wood fibre processing business for its ultimate downfall. The company incurred debt to complete various acquisitions and cost overruns in connection with the development of various facilities combined to limit the company's liquidity. Now, the company intends, under cover of the use of cash collateral, to use pursue a plan pursuant to a plan of reorganization. 
  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Sontchi)
  • Capital Structure: $19.5mm Term Loan (GSO/Credit Suisse AG), $20mm L/C (Bank of Montreal)
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Peter Gilhuly, Kimberly Posin, Adam Malatesta) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Michael Nestor, Matthew Lunn)
    • Financial Advisor: RPA Advisors LLC
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Prepetition Term Lenders (GSO Special Situations Master Fund LP, GSO Palmetto Opportunistic Investment Partners LP, GSO Credit-A Partners LP, Steamboat Credit Opportunities Master Fund LP, GSO Coastline Credit Partners LP, GSO Cactus Credit Opportunities Fund LP, and GSO Aiguille des Grands Montets Fund II LP)
      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Daniel Fisher, Kevin Eide) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (Paul Heath, Joseph Barsalona)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - Walter Investment Management Corp.

Walter Investment Management Corp. 

  • 11/30/17 Recap: Mortgage banking firm focused primarily on the servicing and origination of loans, including forward and reverse loans, has filed a much-anticipated prepackaged bankruptcy with the intention of shedding nearly $800mm of debt from its balance sheet. The company originates "conventional conforming loans eligible for securitization by government-sponsored enterprises, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, or eligible for guarantees by government agencies, such as Ginnie Mae MBSs." If that was painful reading, imagine how the lawyers felt drafting that. Even more painful is understanding that this bankruptcy is directly attributable to decisions the company made in the aftermath of the financial crisis. From 2010 through 2015, the company went on a debt-ridden acquisition spree (including once bankrupt Residential Capital LLC) which just goes to show that, while one's crisis is another's opportunity, one's crisis could be one's crisis. With this deleveraging transaction, the company hopes to be more competitive in the market going forward.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Garrity)

  • Capital Structure: $100mm '18 RCF, $1.4b '20 TL (Credit Suisse AG), $540mm 7.875% '21 senior unsecured notes (Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB), $242mm '19 senior subordinated convertible notes (Wells Fargo Bank NA)(public equity: $WAC)

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Ray Schrock, Matthew Barr, Sunny Singh)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC (David Coles)

    • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc. (Reid Snellenbarger, Jeffrey Levine, Jeffrey Lewis, James Page, Daniel Martin, Derek Kuns)

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on case name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Administrative Agent: Credit Suisse AG

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Brian Resnick, Michelle McGreal)

    • Consenting Term Lenders (Carlson Capital LP, TAO Fund LLC, Credit Suisse Asset Management LLC, Marathon Asset Management LP, Nuveen, Symphony Asset Management LLC, Eaton Vance Management)

      • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Patrick Nash, Gregory Pesce)

      • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc.

    • Consenting Senior Noteholders (Canyon Capital Advisors LLC, CQS UK LLP, Deer Park Road Management Company LP, Lion Point Capital LP, Oaktree Capital Management LP, Omega Advisors Inc.)

      • Legal: Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP (Dennis Dunne, Gregory Bray, Haig Maghakian, Rachel Franzoia)

      • Financial Advisor: Moelis & Co.

    • Prepetition Indenture Trustee: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

      • Legal: Pryor Cashman LLP (Patrick Sibley, Seth Lieverman, Matthew Silverman)

    • Prepetition Convertible Notes Indenture Trustee: Wells Fargo Bank NA

      • Legal: Thompson Hine LLP (Curtis Tuggle)

    • Administrative Agent for DIP Warehouse Facilities: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Capital LLC

      • Legal: Alston & Bird LLP (Gerard Catalanello, Karen Gelernt, James Vincequerra)

    • Fannie Mae

      • Legal: O'Melveny & Myers LLP (Darren Patrick, Steve Warren, Jennifer Taylor)

    • Freddie Mac

      • Legal: McKool Smith (Paul Moak, Kyle Lonergan)

First Day Declaration

First Day Declaration

Updated 11/30/17 10:05 CT

New Chapter 11 Filing - The Gymboree Corporation

The Gymboree Corporation

  • 6/12/17 Recap: Yawn...another private equity owned retailer in bankruptcy. Why? Standard fare for everyone following the retail story at this point: a substantial brick-and-mortar presence (1300 stores) in need of rightsizing, higher expenses than web-based competitors, an underdeveloped wholesale operation, an underdeveloped web presence, insufficient "omnichannel" capabilities (the go-to buzzword for retailers these days), and more debt than competitors like Children's Place and the Gap. In other words, private equity, that's why (here, Bain Capital Private Equity LP). Notably, "[a]pproximately 35% of their domestic real estate space is concentrated with Simon Property Group, Inc. and GGP Inc. (previously General Growth Properties, Inc.)" ($SPG, $GGP) and, in the first instance, the company is seeking to close 450 stores. Hmmm. The Company will operate under a $105mm DIP term loan credit facility ($35mm new money) and a $273.5mm DIP revolving credit facility; it will also seek to avail itself of $80mm in new equity capital by way of a fully-backstopped rights offering. The upshot of all of this financial mumbo-jumbo is that the term lenders will own the majority of the company. 
  • Jurisdiction: E.D. of Virginia
  • Capital Structure: $81mm '17 ABL RCF (Bank of America NA), $47.5mm '17 ABL Term Loan (Pathlight Capital LLC), 788.8mm '18 TL (Credit Suisse), $171mm '18 unsecured notes (Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas)    
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Anup Sathy, Joshua Sussberg, Steven Serajeddini, Matthew Fagen, Laura Elizabeth Krucks, Timothy Bow, Gabor Balassa, Ben Tyson) & (local) Kutak Rock LLP (Michael Condyles, Peter Barrett, Jeremy Williams)
    • Legal (Special Committee): Munger Tolles & Olson LLP (Thomas Wolper, Seth Goldman, Kevin Allred)
    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLC (James Mesterharm, Liyan Woo)
    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC (David Kurtz, Christian Tempke)
    • Real Estate Consultant: A&G Realty Partners LLC (Andrew Graiser)
    • Liquidators: Tiger Capital Group LLC and Great American Group LLC
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Consenting Term Loan Lenders & DIP Term Loan Agent: Credit Suisse AG, Cayman Islands Branch
      • Legal: Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP (Dennis Dunne, Evan Fleck) & (local) McGuireWoods LLP (Dion Hayes, Sarah Boehm, K. Elizabteh Sieg)
      • Financial Advisor: Rothschild & Co.
    • DIP ABL Administrative Agent
      • Legal: Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (Julia Frost-Davies, Robert A.J. Barry, Amelia Clark Joiner) & (local) Hunton & Williams LLP (Tyler Brown, Justin Paget)
    • DIP ABL Term Agent
      • Legal: Choate Hall & Stewart LLP (Kevin Simard, Jennifer Fenn) & (local) Whiteford Taylor Preston LLP (Christopher Jones)
    • Sponsor: Bain Capital Private Equity LP 
      • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Robert Lemons) & (local) Wolcott Rivers Gates (Cullen Speckhart)
    • Ad Hoc Group of Senior Unsecured Noteholders
      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Daniel Golden, Jason Rubin)
    • Pathlight Capital
      • Legal: Choate Hall & Stewart LLP (Kevin Simard, Jonathan Marshall) & (local) Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLP (Christopher Jones)
    • Indenture Trustee: Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas
      • Legal: Moses & Singer LLP (Alan Gamza, Kent Kolbig, Jessica Boneque) & (local) Hirschler Fleischer PC (Robert Westermann, Rachel Greenleaf)
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Hahn & Hessen LLP (Mark Power, Mark Indelicato, Janine Figueiredo, Alison Ladd) & (local) Tavenner & Beran PC (Lynn Tavenner, Paula Beran, David Tabakin)

Updated 7/11/17 at 7:25 pm CT

New Chapter 11 Filing - Ignite Restaurant Group

Ignite Restaurant Group

  • 6/6/17 Recap: Publicly-traded ($IRG) Houston-based owner of 112 Joe's Crab Shack locations and 25 Brick House Tavern + Tap locations filed for bankruptcy because people can't tear their eyes off of whatever mobile device they're towing around long enough to sit at a casual dining spot. "The market for casual dining has been deteriorating for some time." No kidding, dudes. That said, someone clearly still believes in the space as the company has lined up a stalking horse bidder to purchase the company in bankruptcy for $50mm and some assumed liabilities (subject to deductions/increases). That "someone" is KRG Acquisitions Co LLC, an affiliate of Kelly Investment Group. Maybe it's the "'I'm relaxed' restaurant experience" that the buyer finds compelling...? (Serious question: is weed legal in Texas yet?). Anyway, good luck with that. 
  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas
  • Capital Structure: $30mm RCF & $165mm TL (Credit Suisse AG)     
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: King & Spalding LLP (Sarah Borders, Jeffrey Dutson, Edward Ripley, Elizabeth Dechant)
    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (John Tibus)
    • Investment Banker: Piper Jaffray & Co. (Richard Shinder, Teri Stratton)
    • Real Estate Advisor: Hilco Real Estate LLC 
    • Claims Agent: Garden City Group LLC (*click on company name above for the free docket)
    • Other Parties in Interest:
      • Credit Suisse AG
        • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Keith Simon, David Hammerman, Hugh Murtagh) & (local) Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins)
      • KRG Acquisition Co LLC 
        • Legal: Goldberg Kohn Ltd. (Randall Klein, Prisca Kim) & (local) Okin Adams LLP (Matthew Okin, Ryan O'Connor)
      • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
        • Legal: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Jeffrey Pomerantz, Bradford Sandler) & (local) Cole Schotz PC (Michael Warner)
      • Potential Buyer: Landry's Inc.
        • Legal: Haynes and Boone LLP (Patrick Hughes, Arsalan Muhammad, Jonathan Pressment, Sarah Jacobson)

Updated 7/17/17 11:23 am CT

New Chapter 11 Filing - Answers Holdings Inc.

Answers Holdings Inc.

  •  3/3/17 Recap: Apax Partners' backed website operator has filed for bankruptcy because it never evolved from Internet 1.0, has too much debt, its main site, Answers.com, is the red-headed step-child of Quora, and, quite frankly, not a single person receiving the PETITION newsletter has visited the site(s) since 2006. Yahoo, FacebookAmazon (AWS), Amex and Silicon Valley Bank are among the top 10 creditors. The debtors solicited a prepackaged plan and so all of the above will be unimpaired - somewhat ironic given that algorithmic changes by Google and Facebook - in addition to a mountain of debt - are the real root causes of the company's decline.
  • Jurisdiction: SD of New York
  • Capital Structure: $40mm revolver, $325mm '21 first lien TL, $180mm '22 second lien TL.   
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Jonathan Henes, Christopher Greco, Melissa Koss, John Weber, Anthony Grossi)
    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Justin Schmaltz, Erin McKeighan)
    • Investment Banker: Rothschild (Steven Antinelli)
    • Claims Agent: Rust Bankruptcy/Omni Consulting (*click on company name for docket)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Ad Hoc Group of Consenting First Lien Lenders
      • Legal: Jones Day LLP (Scott Greenberg, Michael Cohen, Bryan Kotliar)
      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey
    • First Lien Agent: Credit Suisse AG
      • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP (David Feldman, J. Eric Wise)
    • Ad Hoc Group of Consenting Second Lien Lenders (Deerpath Capital Management LP, North Haven Credit Partners LP, Summit Partners Credit Advisors LP)
      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Haur & Feld LLP (David Botter, David Simonds)
        • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc.
    • Second Lien Agent: Wilmington Trust NA
      • Legal: Alston & Bird LLP (Jason Solomon, David Wender)
    • Sponsor Entities: Apax Partners LP, Clarity Holdco LP, Clarity GP LLC
      • Legal: Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (Elisha Graff, Edward Linden)
    • Proposed Board of Directors of the Reorganized Entity: William Ruckelshaus, Eric Ball, Peter Daffern, Eugene Davis, John Federman, Lonne Jaffe, Brian Mulligan.

Updated 4/2/17