New Chapter 11 Filing - Global A&T Electronics Ltd.

Global A&T Electronics Ltd. 

• 12/17/17 Recap: Singapore-based provider of semiconductor assembly and test services for integrated circuits for use in analog, mixed-signal and logic, and memory products across the globe filed for prepackaged bankruptcy...finally. The company had skipped its $56mm interest payment and let its 30-day grace period expire; it has also been the subject of litigation after issuing new notes back in 2014 in exchange for junior debt. The company blames the litigation, an over-levered balance sheet, underspending on capex, and liquidity constraints for its need to reorganize. The company seeks to confirm the case in FOUR DAYS which may be a new record for a bankruptcy of this size. 
• Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Drain)
• Capital Structure: $1.13b 10% '19 first lien notes ($625mm Initial Nots, $502mm Additional Notes)(Citicorp International Limited)
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Marc Kieselstein, Patrick Nash, Gregory Pesce, Michael Slade)
  • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Robert Caruso)
  • Investment Banker: Moelis & Company LLC
  • Disinterested Director: Eugene Davis
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Ad Hoc Group of Initial Senior Secured Noteholders (GSO Capital Partners LP, IP All Seasons Asian Credit Fund, Brigade Capital Management LP, Southpaw Credit Opportunity Master Fund LP)
    • Legal: Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP (Dennis Dunne, Abhilash Raval, Brian Kinney, Michael Price)
    • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners LP
  • Ad Hoc Committee of Additional Senior Secured Noteholders (Taconic Capital Advisors LP, Marble Ridge Master Fund LP, KLS Diversified Asset Management)
    • Legal: Dechert LLP (Michael Sage, Brian Greer, Janet Doherty)
  • Ad Hoc Committee of Additional Senior Secured Noteholders
    • Legal: Ropes & Gray LLP (Gregg Galardi, Stephen Moeller-Sally, Daniel Anderson)
  • TPG
    • Legal: Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP (James Bromley, Benjamin Beller)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - Cobalt International Energy Inc. ($CIE)

Cobalt International Energy Inc.

• 12/13/17 Recap: Houston-based publicly-traded ($CIE) deepwater exploration and production company operating in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico and offshore Angola and Gabon in West Africa has filed for bankruptcy. The company blames "a failed sale of Cobalt’s Angolan assets and the related litigation, the prolonged downturn in the exploration and production industry, and nearly $3.0 billion of funded indebtedness" for its filing. The company seeks a sale in bankruptcy. Other than the failed 2016 Angolan transaction, this story is pretty similar to other E&P bankruptcies we've seen in the past. Upshot: offshore exploration is expensive and with oil in the high 50s (a relatively high number), the economics aren't there to support the capital structure. 
• Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Isgur)
• Capital Structure: $500mm '21 first lien notes (Wilmington Trust NA), $934.7mm '23 second lien notes (Wilmington Trust NA), $619.2mm '19 2.625% unsecured notes (Wells Fargo Bank NA), 3.125% $786.9mm '24 unsecured notes (Wells Fargo Bank NA)
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Marc Kieselstein, Chad Husnick, Brad Weiland, Laura Krucks, Gabor Balassa, Stacy Pepper) & (local) Zach A. Clement PLLC (Zach Clement)
  • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Capital
  • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Notes
    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matt Barr)
  • Ad Hoc Group of Second Lien Notes
    • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (James Savin)
  • First Lien Indenture
    • Legal: Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP (Andrew Goldman)
  • Significant Equityholders: First Reserve GP XI Inc., The Carlyle Group, Riverstone Holdings LLC, Paulson & Co., Hotchkis and Wiley Capital Management LLC

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - Orchard Acquisition Company LLC (The J.G. Wentworth Company)

The J.G. Wentworth Company

• 12/12/17 Recap: What's the statute of limitations for getting tagged with the "Chapter 22" label? While this may be out of bounds thanks to the passage of time, this is not the company's first foray in bankruptcy court, having previously filed during the financial crisis in 2009. It subsequently emerged under new private equity ownership and then IPO'd in 2013. This time around, the specialty-finance company in the business of providing financing solutions ((e.g., mortgage lending (as an approved issuer with Ginnie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Fannie Mae), structured settlement, annuity and lottery payment purchasing, prepaid cards, and personal loans)) filed a prepackaged bankruptcy pursuant to which its lenders will be swapping debt for at least 95.5% of the new equity and some cash. Holders of partnership interests and tax-related claims will get the remaining equity (subject to dilution by the 8% of equity set aside for management allocations). The company will eliminate its $449.5mm of debt and have a $65-70mm revolving credit facility to utilize going forward. The company blames regulatory requirements and a highly competitive market that pressured rates, service levels, products, and fees for its downfall. 
• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Gross)
• Capital Structure: $449.5mm '19 first lien TL (Jefferies Finance LLC)     
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Simpson Thatcher & Bartlett LLP (Elisha Graff, Kathrine McLendon, Edward Linden, Randi Lynn Veenstra, Haley Garrett, Nicholas Baker, Bryce Friedman) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Edmon Morton, Sean Beach)
  • FInancial Advisor: Ankura Consulting
  • Investment Banker: Evercore 
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Jefferies Finance LLC
    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, Natasha Tsiouris, Erik Jerrard) & (local) Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP (Jeremy Ryan, R. Stephen McNeill, D. Ryan Slaugh)
    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (formerly CDG Group LLC)
  • New RCF Commitment Party (HPS Investment Partners LLC)
    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Kelly DiBlasi, Damian Ridealgh) & (local) Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Curtis Miller, Matthew Talmo)

Updated 12/13/17

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - PhaseRX Inc. ($PZRX)

PhaseRX Inc.

• 12/11/17 Recap: Seattle-based and once-VC-backed publicly-traded ($PZRX) biopharma company focused on therapeutics developed to treat enzyme deficiencies in the liver via intracellular enzyme replacement therapy (after a pivot from from focusing on the treatment of liver cancer) filed for bankruptcy. The company seeks a sale through bankruptcy. 
• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Sontchi)
• Capital Structure: $500k promissory note (Titan Multi-Strategy Fund Ltd.), $16.2mm 8% convertible notes, $4mm 5% term loan, $5.1mm secured loan (Hercules Capital Inc.)
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Polsinelli PC (Christopher Ward, Shanti Katona, Nicholas Griebel)
  • Investment Banker: Cowen & Company 
  • Claims Agent: Donlin Recano & Co. Inc. (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Large Equityholders/Venture Capital: (Arch Venture Fund VII LP, 5AM Ventures, Savoy Therapeutics Corp., Versant Venture Capital III LP)
  • Hercules Capital Inc. 
    • Legal: Cole Schotz PC (Patrick Reilley, Stuart Komrower)

Updated 12/12/17

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - Dextera Surgical Inc. ($DXTR)

Dextera Surgical Inc.

• 12/11/17 Recap: Publicly-traded ($DXTR) California based med-device company that designs and and manufactures proprietary stapling devices that enable the advancement of minimally invasive surgical procedures has filed for bankruptcy to effectuate a sale. Why bankruptcy? Per the company's pleadings, "Dextera invested in obtaining regulatory clearances and product development, evaluation, and manufacturing, but experienced interruptions in the ability to produce both staplers and staple reload cartridges to meet customer demand. It also incurred substantial operating losses that significantly impacted liquidity, ultimately leading to the need to file the Chapter 11 Case." The company has lined up a stalking horse purchaser (Aesculap Inc.) who also happens to be the provider of $1.5mm in DIP financing to effectuate the case. The purchase price is reported to be approximately $17.3mm. 
• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Carey)
• Capital Structure: $4mm 5% secured note     
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP (Mark Minuti, Teresa Currier, Monique DiSabatino)
  • Special Legal: Cooley LLP (Robert Eisenbach)
  • Financial Advisor: JMP Securities LLC
  • Claims Agent: Rust Consulting/Omni Bankruptcy (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • DIP Lender/Stalking Horse Bidder: Aesculap Inc.
    • Legal: Stevens & Lee PC (Joseph Huston Jr., Robert Lapowsky)

Updated 12/13/17

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - Charming Charlie Holdings Inc.

Charming Charlie Holdings Inc.

• 12/11/17 Recap: A mere two weeks before Christmas, another retailer falls into bankruptcy, capping a 2017 retail bloodbath. Here, the Houston-based specialty retailer focused on colorful fashion jewelry, handbags, apparel, gifts, and beauty products follows a long line of retailers into bankruptcy court. In doing so, it demonstrates that the "treasure hunt" experienced often touted as a plus for discount retailers like T.J. Maxx ($TJX), doesn't always hold; it also shows that the difficulties apparent in women's specialty retail are demography-agnostic (here, the core audience is women ages 35-55 - in contrast to, say, rue21). The company blames (i) "adverse macro-trends" and (ii) operational shortfalls, e.g., merchandising miscalculations, lack of inventory, an overly broad vendor base), for its underperformance and reduced sales. EBITDA declined 75% "in the last several fiscal years." 75-effing-percent! With a limited amount of money available under its revolving credit facility and even less cash on hand, "Charming Charlie is out of cash to responsibly operate its business." Ouch. Rough timing. Only subject to a restructuring would lenders support the company; accordingly, the company has entered into a restructuring support agreement with 80% of the term lenders which includes a $20mm new-money cash infusion via a DIP credit facility (the facility includes, in total, a $35mm ABL and a $60mm TL...so yes, a proposed roll-up of $75mm of prepetition debt into a DIP). The company has also commenced the closure of 100 of its 370 stores, a meaningful reduction in its brick-and-mortar footprint (PETITION NOTE: the usual array of landlords, i.e., General Growth Properties ($GGP), have made a notice of appearance). Note the carefully crafted language the company deploys in its initial filing, "The Debtors anticipate 276 go-forward locations following the first round of store closures." Key words, "FIRST ROUND." In other words, the ~100 stores the company notes that it is closing (and that it seeks to retain Hilco for) may just be the beginning. While the company leaves the door open for a sale, the current agreement contemplates the equitization of the term loan (with added equity weight to those providing DIP financing) and a post-emergence debt load of $85mm. 
• Some other takeaways:
  • (1) the fashion industry has suffered a 15% downturn in fashion jewelry sales (and the company experienced a disproportionate 22% decline itself),
  • (2) vendors and factorers continue to be aggressive with constrictive trade terms and protect their turf (similar here to Toys R Us),
  • (3) Kirkland & Ellis LLP appears to effectively deploy its network to populate Boards of Directors (here, one of the independents appointed to the Board in July 2017 has ties to Gymboree and Toys R Us, two Kirkland clients),
  • (4) Guggenheim's efforts to sell this hot mess were unsuccessful pre-petition (query whether they'll have better luck post-petition...we doubt it),
  • (5) recall the words "first round" when you consider that even landlords for locations that remain open will be squeezed as the company seeks "to amend lease terms to reduce occupancy costs and obtain rent abatements for the first quarter of 2018," 
  • (6) this restructuring will lead to some supply chain pain as the company streamlines the vendor base down to 80 from 175, and
  • (7) its hard out there for a pimp (in this case: Charlie Chanaratsopon "vacated" his role as CEO and an interim CEO has taken the helm). 
• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Sontchi)
• Capital Structure: $22mm '20 ABL (Bank of America NA), $132mm '19 TL (Wilmington Savings Trust)  
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Joshua Sussberg, Christopher Greco, Aparna Yemamandra, Rebecca Blake Chaikin, Michael Esser, Anna Rotman) & (local) Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg LLP (Dominic Pacitti, Michael Yurkewicz, Morton Branzburg)
  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLC
  • Investment Banker: Guggenheim Securities LLC (Stuart Erickson)
  • Liquidation Agent: HIlco Merchant Resources LLC (Ian Fredericks)
  • Real Estate Advisor: A&G Realty Partners LLC
  • Claims Agent: Rust Consulting/Omni Bankruptcy (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • DIP ABL Agent/Prepetition ABL Agent: Bank of America NA
    • Legal: Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (Robert Barry, Julia Frost-Davies, Amelia Joiner) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PC (Mark Collins, David Queroli)
  • Ad Hoc Group of Term Loan Lenders
    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Jeffrey Saferstein, Adam Denhoff, Sharad Thaper) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, M. Blake Cleary, Shane Reil)

12/13/17

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - Global Brokerage Inc. ($GLBR)

Global Brokerage Inc.

• 12/11/17 Recap: Holding company which holds, as its primary asset, an interest in a non-debtor online forex trading company filed a prepackaged bankruptcy to restructure its balance sheet. Troubles for the company began in early 2015 when "unprecedented volatility" in the euro-to-franc currency rate led the Swiss National Bank to eliminate its 1.2 france per euro floor. Instantly, the company was in breach of certain regulatory capital requirements and had to cease operations. After getting rescue financing from Leucadia National Corp. - bridging the company back into regulatory compliance - the company knew that the short term bridge would become an issue. A looming NASDAQ delisting triggered a "fundamental change" call provision on the notes which, of course, the company couldn't pay. The company's plan, solicited prior to filing, is basically an amend-and-extend. The term loan maturity is pushed one year and the converts will get (secured) take-back paper in the same nominal amount with maturity extended five years (with an interest rate uptick from 2.25% to 7%...PIK Toggle, of course). 
• Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Wiles)
• Capital Structure: $300mm secured term loan (Leucadia National Corp), $172.5mm 2.25% convertible notes (Bank of New York Mellon)    
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: King & Spalding LLP (Arthur Steinberg, Michael Handler, Sarah Borders, Thaddeus Wilson, Elizabeth Dechant)
  • Financial Advisor: Perella Weinberg Partners
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Ad Hoc Group of Convertible Noteholders (683 Capital Partners LP, Lazard Asset Management LLC, Penderfund Capital Management Ltd., Phoenix Investment Advisor LLC, Wolverine Flagship Fund Trading Limited)
    • Legal: Vinson & Elkins LLP (Steven Abramowitz, David Meyer, Lauren Kazer, Eric Hilmo)
  • Leucadia National Corp.
    • Legal: Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP (Eric Ivestor, Gregory Fernicola)
  • Significant Equityholder: Franklin Resources Inc. 

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - Herald Media Holdings Inc.

Herald Media Holdings Inc.

• 12/8/17 Recap: Boston-based 170-year old legacy print news media company that owns and publishes (i) the Boston Herald and (ii) the bostonherald.com digital media site has filed for bankruptcy to effectuate an expedited 363 sale to Gatehouse Media Massachusetts I, Inc for "an all-in value of not less than $5,000,000." In a sign of the times known to literally everyone, the Company notes in its filing that "there has been an increase in news source and advertising alternatives that has continued to erode traditional print media sources of revenue. Incremental digital revenue has not been sufficient to offset the decline in print revenue." Interestingly - given that there is a lot of discussion today about the state of media and the push-pull of advertising dollars vs. subscription revenue - the company derives approximately 67% of its revenue from paid circulation (single copy sales and subscription sales) and approximately 33% from print and online advertising. Nevertheless, the company's projections reflect a nearly $3mm loss for fiscal year 2018. In an effort to combat declining revenues, the Company pursued cost-cutting initiatives (e.g., headcount reductions, outsourcing, etc.,) but no more levers remained available to pull. Indeed, "[g]iven the general economic climate for the newspaper industry and the company’s significant pension and retirement liabilities, no financing options are available for the company to continue with its current capital structure." Note that the company's top list of creditors reflects various unions under four different collective bargaining agreements (CBAs): those fixed costs aren't easy to shed outside of bankruptcy. Employee-related expenses including payroll, benefits and pension/retirement contributions account for 58% of operating expenses while production and distribution of the paper accounts for 23% of total operating expenses. Looking at those numbers, it becomes pretty obvious why this business became unsustainable. Notably, the propose sale is conditioned upon the Company rejecting all CBAs in bankruptcy so that the asset transfer is free and clear of those obligations. Gatehouse is offering a $500k DIP credit facility to fund the administration of the case.
• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Silverstein) 
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Brown Rudnick LLP (William Baldiga, Sunni Belville, Tristan Axelrod) & (local) Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Curtis Miller, Tamara Minott, Jose Bibiloni)
  • Investment Banker: Dirks Van Essen & Murray
  • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:

Updated 12/9/17 10:20 am CT

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - Woodbridge Group of Companies LLC

Woodbridge Group of Companies LLC

• 12/4/17 Recap: Real estate finance and development company focused on buying, improving, and selling high-end luxury homes has filed for bankruptcy. It is a "group of companies" because there are literally scores of individual debtor properties that are set up in special purpose vehicles (Propcos) wholly-owned by other related special purpose vehicles (Holdcos). It's like Inception: an SPV within an SPV. 140 Propcos are debtors and 127 Holdcos are debtors. As you can imagine, there are a ton of intercompany transfers here. The company has been the subject of an SEC investigation since September 2016 on the basis of "potential securities law violations, including the alleged offer and sale of unregistered securities, the sale of securities by unregistered brokers, and the commission of fraud in connection with the offer, purchase and sale of securities." Indeed, the company allegedly raised over $200mm from retail investors. But, wait: there's more. The company has also received information requests from state securities regulators in "approximately" 25 states. PETITION NOTE: what do they mean by "approximately"? There are a finite number of states. Have the requests become SO VOLUMINOUS that they company has lost track of how many there've been? The company has secured a $100mm DIP credit facility from Hankey Capital LLC and attempts to have a plan of reorganization confirmed by the end of 2018. 
• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Carey)
• Capital Structure: $750mm seller financing.    
• Company Professionals:
  • Current Legal: Klee Tuchin Bogdanoff & Stern LLP 
  • Previous Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Samuel Newman, Oscar Garza, Daniel Denny, J. Eric Wise, Matthew Kelsey, Matthew Porcelli) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Sean Beach, Edmon Morton, Ian Bambrick, Allison Mielke)
  • Current Restructuring Advisor/CRO: Development Specialists Inc. (Bradley Sharp) 
  • Previous Restructuring Advisor: SierraConstellation Partners LLC (Larry Perkins, John Farrace, Robert Shenfeld, Reece Fulgham, Miles Staglik, Lissa Weissman)
  • Independent Manager of Affiliate: Beilinson Advisory Group LLC (Marc Beilinson)
  • Claims Agent: Garden City Group (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • DIP Lender: Hankey Capital LLC
    • Legal: Buchalter (William Brody, Paul Arrow) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (John Knight, Christopher De Lillo)
  • Former CEO: Robert Shapiro
    • Legal: DLA Piper LLP (US) (Eric Goldberg, Stuart Brown)

Updated 3/24/18 9:45 CT

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - Walter Investment Management Corp.

Walter Investment Management Corp. 

• 11/30/17 Recap: Mortgage banking firm focused primarily on the servicing and origination of loans, including forward and reverse loans, has filed a much-anticipated prepackaged bankruptcy with the intention of shedding nearly $800mm of debt from its balance sheet. The company originates "conventional conforming loans eligible for securitization by government-sponsored enterprises, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, or eligible for guarantees by government agencies, such as Ginnie Mae MBSs." If that was painful reading, imagine how the lawyers felt drafting that. Even more painful is understanding that this bankruptcy is directly attributable to decisions the company made in the aftermath of the financial crisis. From 2010 through 2015, the company went on a debt-ridden acquisition spree (including once bankrupt Residential Capital LLC) which just goes to show that, while one's crisis is another's opportunity, one's crisis could be one's crisis. With this deleveraging transaction, the company hopes to be more competitive in the market going forward.

• Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Garrity)

• Capital Structure: $100mm '18 RCF, $1.4b '20 TL (Credit Suisse AG), $540mm 7.875% '21 senior unsecured notes (Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB), $242mm '19 senior subordinated convertible notes (Wells Fargo Bank NA)(public equity: $WAC)

• Company Professionals:

  • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Ray Schrock, Matthew Barr, Sunny Singh)

  • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC (David Coles)

  • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc. (Reid Snellenbarger, Jeffrey Levine, Jeffrey Lewis, James Page, Daniel Martin, Derek Kuns)

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on case name above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Administrative Agent: Credit Suisse AG

    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Brian Resnick, Michelle McGreal)

  • Consenting Term Lenders (Carlson Capital LP, TAO Fund LLC, Credit Suisse Asset Management LLC, Marathon Asset Management LP, Nuveen, Symphony Asset Management LLC, Eaton Vance Management)

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Patrick Nash, Gregory Pesce)

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc.

  • Consenting Senior Noteholders (Canyon Capital Advisors LLC, CQS UK LLP, Deer Park Road Management Company LP, Lion Point Capital LP, Oaktree Capital Management LP, Omega Advisors Inc.)

    • Legal: Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP (Dennis Dunne, Gregory Bray, Haig Maghakian, Rachel Franzoia)

    • Financial Advisor: Moelis & Co.

  • Prepetition Indenture Trustee: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

    • Legal: Pryor Cashman LLP (Patrick Sibley, Seth Lieverman, Matthew Silverman)

  • Prepetition Convertible Notes Indenture Trustee: Wells Fargo Bank NA

    • Legal: Thompson Hine LLP (Curtis Tuggle)

  • Administrative Agent for DIP Warehouse Facilities: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Capital LLC

    • Legal: Alston & Bird LLP (Gerard Catalanello, Karen Gelernt, James Vincequerra)

  • Fannie Mae

    • Legal: O'Melveny & Myers LLP (Darren Patrick, Steve Warren, Jennifer Taylor)

  • Freddie Mac

    • Legal: McKool Smith (Paul Moak, Kyle Lonergan)

First Day Declaration

Updated 11/30/17 10:05 CT

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - Shiekh Shoes LLC

Shiekh Shoes LLC

• 11/29/17 Recap: More retail in bankruptcy. Here, the retailer of footwear, apparel and accessories aimed at the urban subculture has filed for bankruptcy. Of note, the company has 124 specialty retail store locations across ten states; it also owns "e-tailer" Karmaloop, which, itself, was in bankruptcy a few years ago. Interestingly, the Karmaloop transaction is now riddled in controversy and serves as a cautionary tale to any purchaser of distressed retail assets like customer lists which, as we've seen from a variety of retail bankruptcies of late, is often one of the more "valuable" assets a retailer has. Data, baby, data! Of course, the data needs to be current and relevant as opposed to technologically engineered and enhanced. Which, the company alleges, is exactly what Comvest Partners did with Karmaloop's customer lists. The company notes, "The Debtor’s decision to acquire Karmaloop was based on Comvest’s representation that it had accumulated approximately 6 million unique customer email addresses, 3.7 million of which were alleged to be responsive/active consumers. After the acquisition was finalized in March of 2016, however, the Debtor found out that more than 80% of these emails were no longer valid and the overall health status of the Karmaloop email database/system was in very poor condition." The company continues, "The evidence discovered by the Debtor’s CTO and E-Commerce Director further indicated a concerted effort by Comvest/Karmaloop executives, and third party email ecommerce marketer, Klaviyo, to conceal the poor condition of the email list to give the appearance to prospective buyers that Comvest had “stabilized” losses and “grown” the business since taking over after Karmaloop’s prior bankruptcy in 2015 (out of which Comvest purchased Karmaloop). This was achieved by, among other means, constantly switching IP addresses so the company would not be blacklisted, as well as changing the code on both the Karmaloop and PLNDR sites to double-count traffic on the websites. Interestingly, the “double-pixel” (the means through which Karmaloop was doublecounting traffic on the websites to create the appearance the websites were experiencing increased traffic) was removed from Karmaloop’s website shortly before the Debtor took over and site traffic quickly nosedived. Thus, the Debtor has reason to believe Comvest knew the representations it made in the offering memoranda were false and it took affirmative steps to cover it up." As if this wasn't enough, the company also discovered that its "confidential" email list was in the possession of another business, the result of a previously-undisclosed pre-acquisition settlement between Karmaloop and a vendor. On account of these issues, it looks like the company and Comvest are primed for a bankruptcy court battle royale. Compounding matters is the company's reliance on Nike Inc. ($NKE) for product. Nike, the company notes, refused to ship product to the company without cash in advance payment; it also didn't support the company's attempted Midwest expansion. Unfortunately, that lack of support came after the company had already committed the capital to pursue said expansion. Whoopsies. Now, the company is unwinding those efforts. The company is also planning to close 31 stores. Yay #retailapocalypse! The company has no plan in bankruptcy other than to leverage the appropriate provisions of the bankruptcy code to pursue a restructuring of leases and its debt. Liquidation isn't out of the realm of possibility which, naturally, isn't great Christmas news for the company's 1,743 employees. One final note: the company noted soft sales in men's shoes (Nike and Brand Jordan): this seems consistent with the broader footwear narrative that specialty footwear and Adidas are eating into Nike's market share. 
• Jurisdiction: C.D. of California (Judge Zurzolo)
• Capital Structure: $20mm RCF (State Bank and Trust Company & Comvest Capital II LP), $15mm unsecured LOC    
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal:  SulmeyerKupetz PC (David Kupetz, Asa Hami, Steven Werth)
  • Financial Advisor:  KGI Advisors Inc.
  • Real Estate Advisors: Gordon Brothers Retail Partners LLC
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Comvest Partners II LP
    • Legal: Goldberg Kohn Ltd. (Randall Klein, Dimitri Karcazes) & (local) Robins Kaplan LLP (Scott Gautier, Kevin Meek)

Updated 11/30/17

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - Cumulus Media Inc.

Cumulus Media Inc.

• 11/29/17 Recap: It has become routine for a company to tout the synergistic benefits of an acquisition. But synergies only come from solid execution and integration of the new properties into the existing franchise. As we often see, that's a pipe dream that often fails to come to fruition. Take, Cumulus Media, for instance, which from 1998 through 2013, "completed approximately $5 billion worth of acquisitions to grow its network and station businesses," including two large recent acquisitions (Citadel Broadcasting in 2011 and Westwood One in 2013). Notably, "[t]he Company struggled to develop the management and technology infrastructure required to integrate the acquired assets and to support and manage its expanding portfolio. Additionally, certain of the acquisition projections proved erroneous and a number of subsequent management decisions failed to achieve their desired results. The Company was thus unable to achieve the cash flow projections it had made to support the prices paid for those acquisitions...." Projections didn't translate to reality? Color us shocked. Combine these operational challenges with "industry challenges" and you've got a recipe for decreased YOY trends in ratings, revenue and EBITDA. Since 2012. Yikes. But like most bankruptcies, this is a storm of multiple elements. Clearly, the above-noted transactions led to a tremendous amount of incurred debt, capex for integration, and interest expense on that debt. But, in addition, "advertiser and listener demand for radio overall has been negatively impacted by the availability of content and advertising opportunities in growing digital streaming and web-based digital formats, resulting in declines in radio industry revenue and listenership. As a result of these general industry pressures, high acquisition prices and subsequent poor performance, Cumulus Media found itself with an excessive level of debt relative to its earnings and rapidly approaching maturities on its funded debt." So, in other words, blame the debt, Facebook ($FB), Google ($GOOGL), Netflix ($NFLX), Amazon ($AMZN), podcasts, etc., for the decline in radio consumption. So, now the company is in bankruptcy with a restructuring support agreement in place to equitize the term loan. The term loan lenders will get take-back paper and 83.5% percent of the reorganized company. The noteholders will get 16.5% of the equity subject to management incentive plan. Shareholders will get bupkis. 
• Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Chapman)
• Capital Structure: $1.73b TL (JP Morgan Chase Bank NA), $637mm 7.75% senior notes (U.S. Bank NA)   
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Paul Basta, Lewis Clayton, Jacob Adlerstein, Claudia Tobler)
  • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC (David Miller)
  • Investment Banker: PJT Partners LP
  • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Board of Directors: Mary Berner, Jill Bright, Ralph Everett, Jeffrey Marcus, Ross Oliver, Jan Baker
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Ad Hoc Group of Term Loan Lenders (Eaton Vance Management and Boston Management & Research, Franklin Mutual Advisors, Highland Capital Management LP, JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, Silver Point Finance LLC, Symphony Asset Management LLC and Nuveen Fund Advisors, Voya Investment Management Co. LLC, Beach Point Capital Management LP)
    • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (Michael Messersmith, Michael Solow, Seth Kleinman)
    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting LLC
  • Ad Hoc Senior Noteholder Group (Angelo Gordon & Co. LLP, Brigade Capital Management, Capital Research and Management Co., Greywolf Capital Management LP, Waddell & Reed Investment Corporation)
    • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Michael Stamer, Meredith Lahaie, Abid Qureshi, Kate Doorley)
  • Administrative Agent: JP Morgan Chase Bank NA
    • Legal: Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (Elisha Graff, Nicholas Baker)

Updated 11/30/17

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - Maurice Sporting Goods Inc.

Maurice Sporting Goods Inc.

• 11/20/17 Recap: Another retailer with a deep legacy in this country has filed for bankruptcy. The plan is to sell to Middleton Management Company LLC, which has entered into a letter of intent with the company. We bet its for a fire sale price. But, first, let's take a step back: here, an Illinois-based manufacturer and distributor of 60,000 SKUs of outdoor sporting goods (fishing products, terminal tackle products, shooting sports accessories, etc.) has filed for bankruptcy, potentially leaving its relationship with its single largest customer, Walmart ($WMT), in limbo. The company blamed its debt (some of which was taken on to fund an acquisition spree from 2004-2011), a cost-overrun investment in a new state-of-the-art combined distribution center, the general retail environment, and dominoes. Wait, what? Dominoes? From the First Day Declaration, "The Debtors have also faced losses as a result of the recent bankruptcies of several retailers, including The Sports Authority, MC Sports (also known as Michigan Sporting Goods Distributors), Gander Mountain and Sport Chalet, and a generally challenging retail environment." We'd start the funeral dirge for sporting goods, generally, but earlier this week Hibbett Sports Inc. ($HIBB) reported earnings and surprised to the upside. Today, alone, the stock was up 13.74%. And Dick's Sporting Goods Inc. ($DKS) was up 1%. So have no fear kids: there are still gonna be physical places where you can check out some tackle products and, gulp, maybe shooting sports accessories...??
• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Sontchi)
• Capital Structure: $45mm debt (BMO Harris)    
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Robert Brady, Michael Nestor, Justin Rucki, Ashley Jacobs, Tara Pakrouh)
  • Financial Advisor: Portage Point Partners
  • Investment Banker: Livingstone Partners
  • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • BMO Harris
    • Legal: Vedder Price PC (Douglas Lipke) & (local) Pepper Hamilton LLP (David Stratton)

Updated 11/23/17

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - REAL ALLOY (Real Industry Inc.)

REAL ALLOY - Real Industry Inc.

• 11/17/17 Recap: This one is going to be a snorer for those of you who don't like to geek out over the technical intricacies of commodities businesses. Here, REAL ALLOY is a publicly-traded holding company ($RELY) that leverages its substantial net operating losses to improve the free cash flow position of various undervalued businesses that it acquires. The company acquired Real Industry in 2015 from Aleris Corporation (formerly bankrupt) for $554.5mm, substantially leveraging its balance sheet in the process. Post-acquisition, Real Alloy became one of the largest aluminum recyclers in North America and Europe with products and services availed to wrought alloy processers, automotive original equipment manufacturers (read: big car companies), foundries and casters. In other words, the company serves the automotive, consumer packaging, aerospace, building and construction, steel and durable goods industries by processing new scrap, old scrap, and various aluminum byproducts. All of this puts the company squarely into the aluminum recycling supply chain. The company blames the filing on weakness in the steel industry, the strong U.S. dollar creating arbitrage opportunity, operational setbacks (heightened, to some degree, by Hurricane Harvey), and a reduction in credit insurance and tightening supplier terms. The company is seeking approval of a $365mm DIP credit facility to facilitate the case wherein it hopes to preserve the value of its NOLs and pursue a transaction with a new strategic partner.  
• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware 
• Capital Structure: $96mm ABL (Bank of America, NA), $305mm '19 10% senior secured notes (Wilmington Trust, NA)  
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Gary Lee, Todd Goren, Mark Lightner, Benjamin Butterfield, J. Alexander Lawrence, Geoffrey Peck) & (local) Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP (Mark Minuti, Monique Bair DiSabatino, Sharon Levine)
  • Financial Advisor: Berkeley Research Group LLC
  • Investment Banker: Jefferies LLC
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Ad Hoc Noteholder Group
    • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Richard Levy, Jason Gott, Ted Dillman) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (MIchael Nestor, Kara Hammond Coyle)

Updated 11/17/17

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - Velocity Pooling Vehicle LLC

Velocity Pooling Vehicle LLC

• 11/15/17 Summary: A few weeks ago we questioned whether the restructuring industry ought to be focusing more on the automotive space, asking whether the bankruptcy of GST Autoleather Inc. was the canary in the coal mine. Now, here, Velocity Pooling Vehicle LLC (d/b/a Motorsport Aftermarket), an Indianapolis-based motorcycle aftermarket parts seller has filed for bankruptcy to address its balance sheet in the face of declining trends in the motorcycle market. The company has announced a consensual restructuring pursuant to which it will equitize its debt; it intends to fast-track the case and emerge from bankruptcy in Q1 '18. The company has secured a $135mm DIP credit facility. Term lenders Monomoy Capital Partners, BlueMountain Capital and Contrarian Partners are coming out with the equity in the company. More to come.
• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Carey)
• Capital Structure: $295mm '21 TL (Wilmington Trust NA), $85mm '22 second lien TL     
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Proskauer Rose LLP (Jeff Marwil, Paul Possinger, Christopher Hayes, Jeramy Webb) & (local) Cole Schotz P.C. (Norman Pernick)
  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP
  • Claims Agent: Donlin Recano & Co. Inc. (*click on company name above for free docket access once link appears)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • Administrative Agent: Wells Fargo Bank, NA
    • Legal: Goldberg Kohn Ltd. (Randall Klein, Prisca Kim) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (John Knight, Brett Haywood)
  • Ad Hoc Group
    • Legal: Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (Jayme Goldstein, Daniel Ginsberg, Matthew Garofalo) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Edmon Morton, Matthew Lunn)

Updated 11/17/17 6:11 CT

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - B. Lane Inc. (d/b/a Fashion to Figure)

Fashion to Figure (@FTFSnaps)

• 11/13/17 Recap: Another retailer finds its way to bankruptcy. Here, the New York-based plus-size women's specialty retailer with 26-mall-and-outlet-center-based locations has filed for bankruptcy in New Jersey. The company appears to be suffocating under the weight of its brick and mortar locations but purports to have successful e-commerce and wholesale channels. It intends to pursue a sale of all of its assets "to be consummated as soon as possible given the upcoming critical holiday shopping season commencing on 'Black Friday'...." Wait, huh? The company is filing NOW to get out AHEAD of Black Friday? No wonder this company is bankrupt. Of course, the company is also considering vacating locations and "expeditiously conducting going out of business" sales. To this end, the company has filed a bid procedures motion with a joint venture of liquidators, SB Capital Group LLC and 360 Merchant Solutions LLC, lined up as stalking horse bidder for the assets; it also intends to continue to pursue a sale to "one of the largest department store chains in the United States," which apparently expressed some interest pre-petition. Meanwhile, no background on a bankrupt retailer is complete without some private equity shop getting thrown under the bus. Here, the company states (without overtly identifying the PE fund for whatever reason), "In 2012, prompted by a [$15mm] private equity investment, the Company embarked on a rapid expansion of the business. The expansion, however, proved ill-fated and ill-timed, coming at a time when traditional brick and mortar retail was on the decline. Specifically, the Company over-expanded into the shopping mall retail space at a time when market trends were shifting away from traditional brick and mortar stores and towards online retail." Ah, private equity. Speaking of private equity, a fund affiliated with Perella Weinberg Partners is listed as the primary equityholder with a 20.5% position. Curious. Otherwise, it looks like a slate of "friends and family" type investors got burned here. Speaking of getting burned, the list of top creditors reflects a who's who of landlords that the distressed world has become accustomed to seeing at the top of the "Top 30 Creditors" list: Washington Prime Group Inc. ($WPG)(listed once), Westfield Corp. ($WFD)(twice), Simon Property Group Inc. ($SPG)(six times), and Macerich Co. ($MAC)(listed twice). Nothing to see here.
• Jurisdiction: D. of New Jersey (Judge Sherwood)
• Capital Structure: $1.0mm secured debt (ACM Capital Fund I LP), $250k (Cowen Overseas Investment LP)
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Lowenstein Sandler LLP (Kenneth Rosen, Bruce Buechler, Philip Gross, Keara Waldron, Michael Papandrea)
  • Prepetition Investment Banker: Cowen and Company LLC
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • ACM Capital Partners LLC
      • Legal: Shraiberg Landua & Page (Bradley Shraiberg)
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Hahn & Hessen LLP (Mark Powers, Alison Ladd) & (local) Fox Rothschild LLP (Richard Meth, Paul Labov)
      • Financial Advisor: EisnerAmpner LLP (Edward Phillips)

Updated 5/5/18

New Chapter 11 Filing - Pacific Drilling S.A.

Pacific Drilling S.A.

• 11/12/17 Recap: Another offshore driller finds its way into bankruptcy and, boy!, does its filing attempt to paint one rosy optimistic picture of its particular "competitive strength[]" in the offshore drilling space. But, first, let's take a step back: here, Pacific Drilling ($PACDF), an offshore drilling company formed in 2011 under Luxembourg law, filed bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York after over a year - and we mean YEAR - of speculation that this would end up where it now is. After all, when oil prices are where they are and you provide global ultra-deepwater drilling and complex well construction services to the oil and natural gas industry with high-specification drillships generally stationed in the Gulf of Mexico, the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, well, we'd venture an educated guess that the math simply ain't gonna add up. Certainly not at "day rates" averaging an estimated $155k. And so the company has three drillships contracted currently: two on short term agreements and, luckily, one at a well-above market contractual dayrate through September 2019. The others sit "smart-stacked." Choice quote, "My view in light of over 20 years in the industry is that recovery in the market for drilling contracts is a question of “when” not “if”. Pacific Drilling continues to have advantages over competitors with older fleets, as high-specification drilling units are generally better suited to meet the requirements of customers for drilling in deepwater, complex geological formations with challenging well profiles or remote locations. Furthermore, the uniformity and mobility of the Company’s fleet allow a Smart Stacking strategy that will continue to yield cost savings and flexibility if the downturn is prolonged." Clearly those advantages weren't so clear as to form consensus around the negotiating table with the various parties in interest as there is no restructuring support agreement in place here. Nothing like a good old-fashioned free fall into bankruptcy court, an increasingly-rare occurrence these days. 
• Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York
• Capital Structure: $3.188b total debt. Ship Group A Debt: $475mm RCF (Citibank NA), $750mm '20 5.375% Notes (Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas), $718mm Term Loan B Credit Facility (Citibank NA). Ship Group B Debt (SSCF): $492.5mm 3.75% commercial tranche and $492.5mm (Wilmington Trust NA), combined post-amort equaliing $661.5mm outstanding. Ship Group C Debt: $438.4mm '17 7.25% senior secured notes (Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas)
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Andrew Dietderich, Brian Glueckstein, John Hardiman, Noam Weiss) & Togut Segal & Segal LLP (Albert Togut, Frank Oswald, Scott Ratner)
  • Financial Advisor: Evercore Partners International LLP 
  • Investment Banker: AlixPartners LLP (James Mesterharm)
  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
• Other Parties in Interest:
  • RCF Agent: Citibank NA
    • Legal: Shearman & Sterling LLP (Fredric Sosnick)
    • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners LP
  • Ad Hoc Group of RCF Lenders
    • Legal: White & Case LLP
  • SSCF Agent: Wilmington Trust NA
    • Legal: Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP (Dennis Dunne, Tyson Lomazow, Matthew Brod)
    • Financial Advisor: Moelis & Company LLC
  • Ad Hoc Group of Ship Group C Debt, 2020 Notes and Term Loan B
    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Andrew Rosenberg, Elizabeth McColm, Christopher Hopkins)
    • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey
  • 2017 and 2020 Notes Indenture Trustee(s): Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas
    • Legal: Moses & Singer LLP
  • Large Equityholder: Quantum Pacific (Gibraltar) Limited
    • egal: Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP (Jay Goffman, George Howard)

Updated 11/15/17 at 5:09 pm CT

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - Styles for Less Inc.

Styles for Less Inc.

• 11/6/17 Recap: Another retailer finds its way in bankruptcy court. Here, the company has 93 retail women's clothing stores in California, Nevada, Texas, Arizona and Florida. The company claims, in its bankruptcy papers, to "offer the hottest trendy clothing, shoes, accessories and more at discounted prices...." Which, naturally, begs the question: well then why the hell did it file for bankruptcy? Well, naturally, the company answers this question in its bankruptcy papers and its the now-typical litany of retail excuses: (i) "increased industry discounting" (read: price and margin compression), (ii) "online penetration" (read: e-commerce), and (iii) "shifts in consumer spending away from 'fast fashion' and toward services and experiences (read: Snapchat...okay, maybe NOT Snapchat...but...millennials!) - all of which have contributed to cash flow pressures and liquidity problems. We make light but this story really is becoming pandemic. And the story includes the closure of 55 brick-and-mortar locations, 311 lost jobs, and decreased pay for those who kept their jobs. To stay alive, the company continues to negotiate with landlords and pursue operational expense reductions. The company will operate using Wells Fargo Bank's cash collateral while it tries to figure out a reorganization plan. Notably, the service list includes representatives of General Growth Properties Inc. ($GGP) and Simon Property Group ($SPG). Nothing to see here.
• Jurisdiction: C.D. of California (Judge Wallace)
• Capital Structure: $915k secured debt (Wells Fargo Bank NA)
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Winthrop Couchot Golubow Hollander LLP (Marc Winthrop, Garrick Hollander)

Updated 11/7/17

New Chapter 11 Filing - ExGen Texas Power LLC

ExGen Texas Power LLC

• 11/7/17 Recap: The last 12 months haven't been friendly to companies in the power space. The following have filed for bankruptcy: Panda Temple Power LLC, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC, GenOn Energy Inc., Illinois Power Generating Co., and La Paloma Generating Company LLC. Here, the owner of five natural-gas-fired power generation projects in the great state of Texas filed for bankruptcy in the face of significant headwinds. Literally. In its bankruptcy papers, the company primarily blames decreased demand and, in turn, decreased revenue, on an increase in wind production. And mild weather. Indeed, unlike retailers who incessantly blame weather for poor performance, this is actually believable. The company notes, "public policy initiatives and incentives continue to promote the development of additional wind capacity, placing downward pressure on wholesale power prices. Such additional capacity, coupled with low natural gas prices and mild and windy weather, have exacerbated the Debtors' financial struggles. By way of example, the cost per megawatt hour in 2008 was more than $70; in 2016, it was less than $25, and just prior to the Petition Date, it was approximately $25. These factors have persisted, as additional wind and other capacity is being added to the grid, which has driven down prices in light of relatively flat demand, thereby further constricting the Debtors' revenues and cash flow." In light of these issues, the company hired a banker to market the assets and only non-Debtor Exelon Generation Company LLC bit on one of the five debtor projects to the tune of $60mm (plus various forms of other consideration). The debt in the other four projects will be equitized and the term lenders will now be owners of power generation projects, subject to approval of a plan of reorganization. Interestingly, this all comes in the same week that a proposed tax overhaul bill by the House Republicans seeks to significantly curtail wind energy production tax credits. 
• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Shannon)
• Capital Structure: $660mm first lien TL (funded, ex-interest)(Bank of America NA)     
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Richards Layton & Finger PA (Daniel DeFranceschi, Paul Heath, Zachary Shapiro, Joseph Barsalona)
  • Financial Advisor/CRO: FTI Consulting (David Rush)
  • Investment Banker: Scotia Capital (USA) Inc.
  • Independent Board of Director: Alan Carr
  • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on company name for docket)
• Other Parties in Interest: 
  • Asset Purchaser: Exelon Generation Company LLC
    • Legal: DLA Piper (US) LLP (Richard Chesley, Daniel Simon)
  • TL Agent: Bank of America NA
    • Legal: Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP (Louis Strubeck, Greg Wilkes) & (local) Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Derek Abbott)
  • Commodity Hedge Counterparty: Merrill Lynch Commodities Inc.
    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Marshall Heubner, Angela Libby) & (local) Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP (Jeremy Ryan, R. Stephen McNeill, D. Ryan Slaugh)

Updated: 11/8/17 at 1:00pm CT (No UCC)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - Bestwall LLC

Bestwall LLC

• 11/2/17 Recap: Nothing like a big juicy asbestos case. Here, the company filed for bankruptcy to establish an asbestos trust to deal with current and future asbestos claimants on a permanent and equitable basis. It has been dealing with litigation for nearly 40 years - over the course of hundreds of thousands of cases - and because it thinks it will be the target of continued litigation "through at least 2050," it thought it best to file and take advantage of the Bankruptcy Code's scheme for dealing with asbestos-related claims. 
• Jurisdiction: W.D. of North Carolina (Judge Beyer) 
• Company Professionals:
  • Legal: Jones Day (Gregory Gordon, Daniel Prieto, Jeffrey Ellman, Amanda Rush, Brad Erens) & (local) Robinson Bradshaw & Hinson PA (Garland Cassada, David Schilli, Andrew Tarr)
  • Claims Agent: Donlin Recano & Co. Inc. (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Creditor: Georgia-Pacific LLC
      • Legal: Debevoise & Plimpton (Natasha Labovitz, Mark Goodman)

Updated 11/8/17