✈️ New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Superior Air Charter LLC (d/b/a JetSuite Air) ✈️

Superior Air Charter LLC

April 28, 2020

Dallas-based Superior Air Charter LLC d/b/a JetSuite Air, a charter air carrier to BSDs who roll as BSDs tend to roll, filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the District of Delaware. Ironically, while it serviced ballers, the debtor was never a baller itself. Founded in 2009, the debtor, despite a history of over 111,000 across a fleet of eighteen planes (down to ten today*), a “nearly” impeccable safety record (🤔), and a good reputation, was “never able to operate profitably.” Demand simply never hit a level where the business could break even, a problem aggravated by the debtor’s inability to penetrate the fat-cat bankers on the East Coast — something the debtor blames on the “unreliability” of acquired aircraft. 😬

Enter COVID-19. Similar to many of the bankruptcy filings we’ve seen to date, the worldwide pandemic and corresponding shutdown proved to be the gentle push of an otherwise teetering business over the goal line into bankruptcy. Per the debtor:

Thus, the Debtor could ill afford the economic destruction that the worldwide Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic would come to cause across a spectrum of industries. In short, it decimated the Debtor’s operations, with potential customers no longer able or willing to seek out the Debtor’s services. Indeed, the aviation industry has been particularly hard hit in light of travel restrictions put in place across all of the states that the Debtor has traditionally served. The Debtor’s cash flows dropped by essentially 100% almost immediately after the restrictions went into place. Because the duration of the COVID-19 crisis is indeterminate, the Debtor expects demand to remain very weak for many months to come. These conditions naturally exacerbated the Debtor’s liquidity issues, and by mid-April 2020, it became apparent the Debtor had little choice but to ground its fleet and furlough most employees and crewmembers.

The debtor has no funded secured debt and approximately $16mm of unsecured debt in the form of promissory notes; it estimates approximately $75mm of general unsecured debt exclusive of breakage costs associated with rejected contracts/leases. A good percentage of that general unsecured debt relates to “suitekey customers” who purchased the ability to fly private within the debtor’s service region. Someone from Netflix Inc. ($NFLX) is listed as the largest unsecured creditor.

The debtor did attempt to tap the relief provided by the US government via the CARES Act but “found the applicable sources of funding under the CARES Act to be expressly prohibited for companies that have sought Chapter 11 protection.” In lieu of a government-provided lifeline, the debtor does have a commitment for $3.6mm of DIP financing from its pre-petition unsecured creditor, JetSuiteX Inc., and seeks to use the chapter 11 process to, more likely than not, wind-down operations and maximize value for its creditors.

*Two aircraft lessors served notices of default on the debtor prior to the petition date and retook possession of aircraft per the terms of the governing leases. The debtor also sold six planes in August 2019. Hence the reduction of the fleet from 18 to 10.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Sontchi)

  • Capital Structure: No funded secured debt (just aircraft financing). $16.2mm unsecured promissory notes (JetSuiteX Inc.)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Bayard PA (Evan Miller, Daniel Brogan, Sophie Macon)

    • Independent Manager: Jonathan Solursh

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: Gavin/Solmonese (Edward Gavin, Jeremy VanEtten)

    • Claims Agent: Stretto (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Lender ($3.6mm): JetSuite X Inc.

      • Legal: Vedder Price PC (Michael Edelman, Jeremiah Vandermark) & Potter Anderson Corroon LLP (Jeremy Ryan, Aaron Stulman)

😷New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Walker County Hospital Corporation (d/b/a Huntsville Memorial Hospital)😷

Walker County Hospital Corporation (d/b/a Huntsville Memorial Hospital)

November 11, 2019

Walker County Hospital Corporation (“WCHC,” d/b/a Huntsville Memorial Hospital) is the latest in a recent string of healthcare bankruptcies. Why?

Per the debtor:

“While the Hospital has outpaced market trends in the region for admissions and revenue, and has little outstanding long-term debt, as a standalone hospital operator, the Debtor faces significant challenges in acquiring competitive pricing for necessary goods and services and favorable managed care contracts as compared to multi-hospital systems.”

If you’re wondering about why private equity firms are rolling-up hospital systems, this ⬆️ ought to give you some perspective.

“As a result, the Hospital has significantly above average operating costs that exceed its revenue generation.”

That, ladies and gentlemen, is what you call a lack of economies of scale.

“In addition, the Debtor’s over-extension into rural healthcare clinics and a failed lab venture and ambulatory surgery center, among other issues, have resulted in an unsustainable balance sheet and liquidity.”

So, uh, that all sucks.

Interestingly, the State of Texas helped bury the debtor:

In 2018, the State of Texas shifted its health insurance coverage for state employees from United Healthcare to Blue Cross Blue Shield. This shift materially impacted the Debtor’s revenue, as the Debtor’s contract with Blue Cross Blue Shield has less favorable reimbursement rates and a large portion of the Hospital’s patient population is employed by the State. The Debtor has been in negotiations with Blue Cross Blue Shield since 2016, in an attempt to obtain a managed care contract with the insurer at a fair market rate, but efforts thus far have remained unsuccessful.

Because of this and other issues, the debtor’s revenue dipped and it tripped covenants in its pre-petition credit facility AND defaulted under its operating agreements with the Walker County Hospital District. The debtor has been operating under forbearance agreements with both for some time now while it sought to find a buyer. It failed. This bankruptcy is intended to provide one chance for such a sale: the debtor already has a sale process motion on the docket. It does not have a stalking horse purchaser, it does have some hope that the District will be a participant in an auction. To allow that process to play out, the debtor obtained a $5mm DIP credit facility commitment from its pre-petition (direct) lender, MidCap Financial Trust.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Jones)

  • Capital Structure: $2mm RCF (MidCap Financial Trust)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Waller Lansden Dortch & Davis, LLP (Ryan Cochran, Blake Roth, Tyler Layne, Andrea Cunha, Evan Atkinson)

    • Financial Advisor: Healthcare Management Partners LLC (Steven Smith)

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Corporate Restructuring LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Lender: MidCap Financial Trust

      • Legal: Vedder Price P.C. (Michael Eidelman, David Kane) & Porter Hodges LLP (John Higgins, Kiran Vakamudi)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - Maurice Sporting Goods Inc.

Maurice Sporting Goods Inc.

  • 11/20/17 Recap: Another retailer with a deep legacy in this country has filed for bankruptcy. The plan is to sell to Middleton Management Company LLC, which has entered into a letter of intent with the company. We bet its for a fire sale price. But, first, let's take a step back: here, an Illinois-based manufacturer and distributor of 60,000 SKUs of outdoor sporting goods (fishing products, terminal tackle products, shooting sports accessories, etc.) has filed for bankruptcy, potentially leaving its relationship with its single largest customer, Walmart ($WMT), in limbo. The company blamed its debt (some of which was taken on to fund an acquisition spree from 2004-2011), a cost-overrun investment in a new state-of-the-art combined distribution center, the general retail environment, and dominoes. Wait, what? Dominoes? From the First Day Declaration, "The Debtors have also faced losses as a result of the recent bankruptcies of several retailers, including The Sports Authority, MC Sports (also known as Michigan Sporting Goods Distributors), Gander Mountain and Sport Chalet, and a generally challenging retail environment." We'd start the funeral dirge for sporting goods, generally, but earlier this week Hibbett Sports Inc. ($HIBB) reported earnings and surprised to the upside. Today, alone, the stock was up 13.74%. And Dick's Sporting Goods Inc. ($DKS) was up 1%. So have no fear kids: there are still gonna be physical places where you can check out some tackle products and, gulp, maybe shooting sports accessories...??
  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Sontchi)
  • Capital Structure: $45mm debt (BMO Harris)    
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Robert Brady, Michael Nestor, Justin Rucki, Ashley Jacobs, Tara Pakrouh)
    • Financial Advisor: Portage Point Partners
    • Investment Banker: Livingstone Partners
    • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • BMO Harris
      • Legal: Vedder Price PC (Douglas Lipke) & (local) Pepper Hamilton LLP (David Stratton)

Updated 11/23/17

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - Appvion Inc.

Appvion Inc.

  • 10/2/17 Recap: The 100+-year old Appleton Wisconsin-based manufacturer of specialty coated paper has filed for bankruptcy. The company operates in two segments, the thermal paper segment and the carbonless paper segment. The thermal paper segment, on the surface, seems like it would be the most susceptible segment to technological disruption. It is used in four principal end markets: 1) point-of-sale for retail receipts and coupons (PETITION Note: you could understand why this would seemingly be in decline with Square and other P.O.S. stations now emailing receipts - not to mention more and more retail being done online); 2) label products for shipping, warehousing, medical and clean-room supplies (PETITION Query: perhaps the shipping labels offsets the paper receipts?); 3) tags and tickets for airline/baggage applications, events and transportation tickets, lottery and gaming applications (PETITION Note: one of us bought a baseball a scannable paperless ticket the other day from Stubhub...hmmm); and 4) printer, calculator and chart paper for engineering, industrial and medical diagnostic charts. The thermal paper segment is 60% of the company's net sales and has enjoyed annual average growth rates between 1-3%. Somewhat shockingly. PETITION Note: We would have liked to have seen those four sub-segments separated out. Meanwhile, the carbonless paper segment accounts for the other 40% of net sales; it produces coated paper products for design and print applications. The paper is used in a variety of end markets including government, retail, financial, insurance and manufacturing. This segment has been in structural decline since 1994, down approximately 7-11% annually due to the rise of new technologies in digital laser, inkjet and thermal printers. Oh, and electronic communications: the company just throws that in their bankruptcy papers like it's an afterthought. In other words, government and corporations are relying more on email than on the printed page which, duh, obviously impacts this segment. The company owns there manufacturing plants and leases three warehouses; it also has 915 union employees - owed $112.6mm in obligations - who probably ought to get ready to get bent (they are represented by the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union (the “USW”). The company blames the chapter 11 filing on negative industry trends, an unsustainable degree of balance sheet leverage, inability to adequately address near-term maturities and rapidly deteriorating liquidity. Liquidity became even more of an issue after the company issued a "going concern" warning and received an S&P credit downgrade - two things that obviously made suppliers skittish and resulted in demands for disadvantageous trade terms. Recognizing decreased liquidity, the company appears to have taken as much cost out of the business as it can which, from the looks of the company's papers, may be artificially inflating the numbers on the thermal side in the face of technological innovation. PETITION Note: the assumptions the bankers concoct for this side of the business ought to be watched very carefully. Somewhat surprisingly, despite a full slate of advisors and months of lead-up to the filing, this is a classic free-fall into bankruptcy: there doesn't appear to be any restructuring support agreement with the lenders whatsoever. There is, however, a proposed $325.2mm DIP credit facility which would include $85mm of new money and a $240.2mm rollup of pre-petition money (in other words, the full amount of pre-petition TL & RCF monies outstanding, ex-interest). Nothing like being senior in the cap stack. Final PETITION Note: anyone think this will be the last paper-related bankruptcy in, say, the next 12 months? This is starting to look like 2007 all over again...
  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware
  • Capital Structure: $335mm first lien TL & $100 RCF ($240.8mm outstanding included accrued/unpaid interest), $250mm '20 9% second lien senior notes, $24mm A/R securitization, $6mm Industrial Development Bonds, $500k TL with the State of Ohio
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: DLA Piper (US) LLP (Richard Chesley, Stuart Brown, Jamila Willis, Kaitlin Edelman)
    • Financial Advisor/CRO: AlixPartners LLP (Alan Holtz, Pilar Tarry, Nathan Kramer)
    • Investment Banker: Guggenheim Securities LLC (Ronen Bojmel)
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
    • Strategic Communications Consultant: Finsbury LLC
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • DIP Admin Agent: Wilmington Trust, NA
      • Legal: Covington & Burling LLP (Ronald Hewitt) & (local) Pepper Hamilton LLP (David Fournier)
    • DIP Lenders
      • Legal: O'Melveny & Myers LLP (George Davis, Daniel Shamah, Matthew Kremer, Jennifer Taylor) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger P.A. (Mark Collins, Michael Merchant, Brett Haywood)
    • Prepetition Credit Agreement Admin Agent: Jefferies Finance LLC
      • Legal: Jones Day (Scott Greenberg, Brad Erens) & (local) Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Laura Davis Jones, Timothy Cairns)
    • Key Bank National Association
      • Legal: Reed Smith LLP (Peter Clark II, Jennifer Knox, Emily Devan)
    • Fifth Third Bank
      • Legal: Vedder Price PC (Michael Eidelman, Michael Edelman) & (local) Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP (Jeremy Ryan, R. Stephen McNeill, D. Ryan Slaugh)
    • Ad Hoc Committee of Holders of the 9% '20 Second Lien Senior Secured Notes (ADK Capital LLC, ALJ Capital Management LLC, Archer Capital Management LP, Armory Advisors LLC, Barings LLC, Mackenzie Investments, MAK Capital One LLC, Nomura Corporate Research and Assset Management, Riva Ridge Master Fund Ltd., Rotation Capital Management LP, Scott's Cove Management LLC)
      • Legal: Stroock Stroock & Lavan LLP (Jayme Goldstein, Samantha Martin) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Edmon Morton, Matthew Lunn)
    • Second Lien Senior Secured Notes Indenture Trustee: US Bank NA
      • Legal: Foley & Lardner LLP (Richard Bernard, Derek Wright, Mark Prager)
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Lowenstein Sandler LLP (Kenneth Rosen, Jeffrey Prol, Wojciech Jung) & (local) Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg LLP (Michael Yurkewicz, Morton Branzburg, Sally Veghte)

Updated 10/26/17