New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Jason Industries Inc. ($JASN)

Jason Industries Inc.

June 24, 2020

Wisconsin-based Jason Industries Inc. ($JASN) and seven affiliates (the “debtors”) filed a long-anticipated (prepackaged) chapter 11 bankruptcy case in the Southern District of New York on Wednesday — the latest in a line of manufacturers (e.g., Pyxus International Inc., Libbey Glass Inc., Exide Holdings Inc., Pace Industries LLC) to wind its way into bankruptcy court.

The company is an amalgam of decades of growth by acquisition: it launched its components and seating businesses with acquisitions in ‘93 and ‘95, respectively. Everything appeared to be hunky-dory heading into the Great Financial Crisis when things took a turn for the worse.

And so this isn’t the company’s first rodeo in distress. Back in ‘08-’09, the company engaged in a recapitalization transaction supported by Falcon Investment Advisors LLC and Hamilton Lane Advisors; it persevered through the downturn and ultimately sold to a special-purpose-acquisition-company (Quinpairo Acquisition Corp.) in 2014 for $538.6mm. The acquisition was financed through a combination of (i) the $172.5mm raised by the SPAC in its ‘13 IPO, (ii) rollover equity from the aforementioned sponsors (and management), and (iii) $420mm of first and second lien debt. Stick a pin in that last number: it comes back to haunt the debtors. 👻

In the years since, the company streamlined its operations — selling off assets (i.e., its fiber solutions business and a metal components business) and consolidating around two primary business segments. Through their industrial segment, the debtors manufacture a bunch of stuff used for industrial and infrastructure applications; and through their engineered components segment, the debtors manufacture (a) motorcycle seats, (b) operator seats for construction, agriculture, law and turf care and other industrial equipment markets, and (c) seating for the power sports market. Said another way, the company is heavily indexed to the automotive, heavy truck, steel and construction markets. Powered by approximately 700 employees in the US, the company did $338mm in net sales in 2019.

And that is part of the problem. $338mm in net sales represented an 8.2% ($30.1mm) dropoff from 2018. Adjusted EBITDA declined from $36.7mm in ‘18 to $24.8mm in ‘19. Both segments have been underperforming for years. The question is why?

The debtors cite a dramatic dropoff in demand in ‘19. They note:

This reduction was largely caused by reduced end market demand in key industries across the portfolio, specifically, weak economic conditions in Europe and Asia, lower industrial production in North America, and softening end market demand from OEM customers. For example, since as early as the first quarter of 2019, the Company has experienced reduced OEM build and channel inventory destocking. These problems were exacerbated by the operational disruption and demand reduction caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Consequently, the debtors busted out the standard playbook to try and manage liquidity (while parallel-tracking a fruitless pre-petition sale and marketing effort). They (a) intensified focus on growing market segments, (b) reduced capital investment in non-core businesses, (c) cut/furloughed labor and instituted pay reductions for execs and other employees (and eliminated a 401(k) match program), (d) closed plants and manufacturing facilities and deferred rent payments or negotiated reduced rent at leased properties, (e) accelerated the consolidation of plants acquired in a recent acquisition, and (f) invested in automation at their facilities to reduce future operating costs (read: replace expensive human beings) and expand margins. Still, the debtors struggled.

…the pandemic’s impact on orders and revenues, combined with preexisting fixed costs and debt service requirements, have constrained available working capital, reduced profitability and cash flow, and significantly impaired the Company’s ability to adequately finance operations.

Which gets us back to the capital structure:

Given where EBITDA numbers were coming in, this thing’s leverage ratio was through the roof. More to the point, the debtors deferred a March 31 second lien interest payment and had been operating under a series of forbearance agreements ever since. Luckily, the capital structure isn’t all-too-complicated and lends itself well to a prepackaged bankruptcy. And so here we are with a restructuring support agreement and proposed prepackaged plan which will effectively turn the company over to the first lien term lenders and, but for some warrants, wipe out the second lien term lenders. Here’s how the above capital structure breaks down:

Source: PETITION LLC

A couple of notable features here:

• Drop it Likes its Hot. There’s a “first lien put option” baked into the plan pursuant to which any first lien term lender who doesn’t want to own equity or the junior converts can “put” its pro rata share of that equity/converts to a first lien lender, Pelican Loan Advisors III LLC (or lenders as the case may be), which has agreed to backstop this baby. Pelican is managed by Monomoy Capital Partners.

• F*ck You Pay Me. Those first lien lenders who consented to forbearances all of those months are about to get paaaaaaayyyyyyyyydd. They’ll receive a pro rated share of and interest in $10mm worth of open market purchases by the debtors of first lien credit agreement claims held by consenting first lien lenders AND a forbearance fee equal to 4.00% of the principal amount of the first lien credit agreement loans held by the consenting lenders as of a date certain. The open market purchases were, presumably, accomplished prior to the filing with 2% of the fee already paid and the remaining 2% to be paid-in-kind on the earlier of the termination date of the RSA or the plan effective date.

• It’s a Trap! Warrants are technically going to be issued to the first lien term lenders and “gifted” to the second lien lenders. But only if they vote to accept the plan. Given the midpoint total enterprise value of $200mm and resultant deficiency claim, this is a nice absolute priority rule workaround. As reflected in the graphic above, the allowed deficiency claim of $64.9mm is obviously impaired and will get a big fat 🍩.

And so this is what the capital structure will look upon emergence:

The first lien lenders have consented to the use of their cash collateral to fund the cases.*

* ⚡️July 15, 2020 Update: The Second Lien Ad Hoc Committee, however, filed a limited objection to the cash collateral motion on the basis that a final order should (a) limit any credit bid to their collateral (noting that a material amount of assets — including 35% of the equity in foreign subs — are excluded from the first lien lenders’ collateral package, and (b) require a finding that there’s diminution of value of the first lien lenders’ collateral such that they, despite providing no new financing, ought to be granted a superpriority lien on previously unencumbered assets. The Committee also previewed objections it will have to the plan of reorganization. For a purportedly “prepackaged” chapter 11, this one looks like it could be more contentious than most. A final hearing on the cash collateral motion is set for July 22, 2020.⚡️

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• Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Drain)

• Capital Structure: see above.

• Company Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Jonathan Henes, Emily Geier, Laura Krucks, Dan Latona, Jake Gordon, Yates French)

  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP (Rebecca Roof)

  • Investment Banker: Moelis & Company LLC (Zul Jamal)

  • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Large equityholder: Wynnefield Capital Management LLC

  • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Creditors (Credit Suisse Asset Management LLC, Voya CLO Ltd., American Money Management Corp., First Eagle Alternative Credit LLC, Angel Island Capital Services LLC, Monomoy Capital Partners LP, Z Capital Partners LLC)

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Ryan Preston Dahl, Alexander Welch)

    • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

  • First Lien Agent: The Bank of New York Mellon

  • Second Lien Agent: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

    • Legal: Seward & Kissel LLP (John Ashmead, Gregg Bateman)

  • Ad Hoc Group of Second Lien Lenders: Corre Partners Management LLC, Newport Global Advisors

    • Legal: Brown Rudnick LLP (Steve Pohl, Shari Dwoskin, Kenneth Aulet)

    • Financial Advisor: DC Advisory LLC

Update July 17, 2020

💊 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - AAC Holdings Inc. ($AACH)💊

AAC Holdings Inc.

June 20, 2020

Tasteless joke alert: if there’s one thing that we would’ve thought would benefit from COVID it would be addiction. Our expenses are WAY DOWN across the board with one exception: alcohol.

We joke about it but the sad and honest truth is that there were a lot of people who likely needed help over the last several months that were unable to get it. Overdose deaths are spiking across the country. And so we hope that people are able to (safely) find answers/help now that things are finally opening back up across most of the country. Our tastelessness aside, it really isn’t a joking matter.

Unfortunately, American Addiction Centers ($AACH) has been kicking around the bankruptcy bin for a very long time now — long before COVID struck. Everyone knew a bankruptcy filing was coming. S&P Ratings has a “D” rating on this thing; Moody’s is rocking a Caa2. The first lien term loan due 2023 was, as of last week, just a hair over 41. Suffice it to say, all the signs were out there for the Tennessee-based inpatient and outpatient provider of substance abuse services.

And so AAC has finally met its fate. The company filed for chapter 11 in the District of Delaware in a rare Saturday night filing, listing $517.4mm of total debts against $449.4mm of total assets. That is textbook insolvency right there.

The company has a commitment of $62.5mm in DIP financing from its pre-petition lenders to fund the cases, operate in the ordinary course while in bankruptcy, and pursue a marketing process for the sale of its assets; it will use the bankruptcy process to de-lever its balance sheet; it notes that there’ll be no layoffs or facility closures as a result of the filing and that the company hopes to emerge from bankruptcy within 125 days. To this end, the company has an RSA with 89% of its first lien senior lenders and more than 50% of its junior lenders.

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Dorsey)

• Capital Structure: $47mm senior lien facility, $316.6mm junior lien facility

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Greenberg Traurig LLP (David Kurzweil, Alison Elko Franklin, Dennis Meloro) & Chipman Brown Cicero & Cole LLP

  • Directors: Scott Vogel, Michael Logan

  • Financial Advisor: Carl Marks Advisors (Jette Campbell)

  • Investment Banker: Cantor Fitzgerald

  • Claims Agent: Donlin Recano & Co. Inc. (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • DIP & Pre-Petition Agent: Ankura Trust Company LLC

New Chapter 33 Bankruptcy Filing - NorthEast Gas Generation LLC

NorthEast Gas Generation LLC

June 18, 2020

Texas-based NorthEast Gas Generation LLC (along with three affiliates, the “debtors”), an indirect subsidiary of non-debtors Talen Energy Corporation and NorthEast Gas Generation Holdings LLC (f/k/a MACH Gen LLC), filed for bankruptcy in the District of Delaware. This is the third chapter 11 in six years. You could be excused for thinking that, after two prior rodeos, the balance sheet would be pretty light. Alas, that is not the case. The debtors have $585.2mm of funded indebtedness split between a $554.7mm first lien credit facility and a much smaller $30.5mm second lien credit facility (PETITION Note: there are also LOCs of $23.2mm). Behind all of that is approximately $10.5mm of trade debt.

Low natural gas prices have persisted, unfortunately, and that has placed downward pressure on electric energy prices. Moreover, supply continues to outpace demand thanks to energy saving tech, alternatives, and more. Apparently global warming ain’t helping either: a warmer-than-normal winter reduced home heating levels. All of these factors affected the debtors’ ability to generate revenue and service their debt. The bankruptcy filed was tripped by the urgent need for liquidity and the ability to enter into a DIP financing agreement. This critical funding will bridge the debtors to some sort of transaction that will “allow them to effectuate an orderly restructuring process in chapter 11, pursuant to which the Debtors anticipate consummating a transaction that will transfer, sell, or otherwise convey substantially all of the Debtors’ assets to the First Lien Secured Parties or their designee.”

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Walrath)

• Capital Structure: $585.2mm

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Richards Layton & Finger PA (Mark Collins, Dan DeFranceschi, Jason Madron, Brendan Schlauch)

  • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC

  • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • DIP Admin Agent & DIP Lenders: CLMG Corp. & Beal Bank USA & Beal Bank SSB

    • Legal: White & Case LLP (Scott Greissman, Philip Abelson, Elizabeth Feld, Rashida Adams) & Fox Rothschild LLP (Jeffrey Schlerf)

  • Talen Energy Supply LLC

    • Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matt Barr, Bryan Podzius, Alexander Welch, Ronit Berkovich & Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Robert Dehney, Taylor Haga)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Aldrich Pump LLC

Aldrich Pump LLC

June 18, 2020

Another day, another asbestos-sparked bankruptcy. Man. These things have legs. Aldrich Pump LLC and Murray Boiler LLC are recently formed LLCs spun out of a recent reorganization of Trane Technologies plc, a publicly-traded manufacturer of climate solutions for buildings, homes and transportation (and, via a subsidiary, successor by merger to Ingersoll-Rand Company).

While the debtors don’t mine or use asbestos in manufacturing products, they made industrial products that, in some cases, used asbestos-containing components manufactured and designed by third parties. As a result, the debtors’ have been subject to asbestos litigation going as far back as 1982. Year over year, the debtors now face “thousands upon thousands” of asbestos-related claims. The bankruptcy cases are meant to “…permanently, globally and fairly resolve the asbestos claims….” Here comes another 524(g) trust y’all.

• Jurisdiction: W.D. of North Carolina (Judge Whitley)

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Jones Day LLP (Gregory Gordon, Brad Erens, David Torborg, James Jones, Mark Cody, Caitlin Cahow, Genna Ghaul) & Rayburn Cooper & Durham PA

  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP (Carrianne Basler)

  • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

💊 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Proteus Digital Health Inc.💊

Proteus Digital Health Inc.

June 15, 2020

In a week chock full of chapter 11 bankruptcy filings, in our opinion, the filing of California-based medtech company Proteus Digital Health Inc. is the most interesting and unique. Sure Extraction Oil & Gas ($XOG) is a publicly-traded oil and gas exploration and production company but, aside from the fact that it operates primarily in Colorado rather than Texas or Oklahoma, there’s nothing particularly fresh or interesting about it. We get it already: oil and gas is f*cked.

In contrast (and with apologies for the long block quote), when’s the last time you read about a chapter 11 debtor that does this:

The Debtor is a pioneer and leader of the “Digital Medicines” industry. “Digital Medicines” are oral pharmaceuticals formulated with an ingestible sensor aimed at tracking a patient’s adherence to prescribed medication treatments. When patients use Digital Medicines, their mobile devices collect information about medication taken and safely transmit the data via the cloud to the healthcare provider. Care teams are able to see if their patients are properly taking their medication and observe and analyze real-time data regarding the patient’s overall health such as heart rate, activity and rest. Digital Medicines enable care teams to manage larger patient populations and make medical decisions without the need for a patient to physically travel to the doctor’s office. Digital Medicines can help accelerate the trend toward conducting medical consultations over the internet. This opportunity is especially pronounced in rural areas and developing economies both domestically and internationally, particularly in light of challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting social distancing measures.

That’s like some Minority Report sh*t right there. Founded in 2002, the debtor has spent the better part of two decades developing its tech, testing its tech, commencing clinical trials, obtaining FDA approval of its drug-device combination product, entering into a marketing and distribution relationship with Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. ($OTSKY)(which it later expanded the scope of), and agreeing to a multi-year outcomes-based initiative with the State of Tennessee’s Medicaid program with a focus on hepatitis C treatment of underserved populations. The company currently “…has a panel of more than 20 Digital Medicines that treat cardiovascular and metabolic diseases including hypertension and diabetes being prescribed to patients in the United States.” Its patent portfolio is 400 strong.

On the flip side, the company is currently “pre-revenue.” And as you can imagine, accomplishing all of the above required a significant amount of upfront capital. There’s a reason why this company raised venture capital all the way through a Series H round: $461.5mm, actually, according to Angelist, with the last round of $50mm taking place in April 2016. The company’s cap table includes, among many others, The Carlyle Group ($CG)(Series B & C rounds), Medtronic PLC ($MDT)(Series D round), Novartis Pharma AG ($NVS)(Series E & F rounds), and PepsiCo Inc. ($PEP)(Series G round). The company also has a $9.5mm pre-petition credit facility.

In late 2019, the company experienced a severe liquidity crisis due, in part, to complications arising out of the expanded collaboration agreement with Otsuka. The debtor nearly wiggled its way out of trouble; it negotiated a synchronized deal with Otsuka and its prepetition lender that would coordinate (a) payments in from Otsuka and (b) payments out to the lender and (c) let the company get back to business as usual and buy it some time to source additional financing. But then COVID-19 struck and the company again found itself in a position where it wouldn’t be possible to live up to its obligations — in this case, a $7.75mm repayment to its pre-petition lender on or before April 30. This thing is like whack-a-mole.

The company spent April and May trying to negotiate itself out of its quagmire and hired Raymond James & Associates Inc. ($RJF) as investment banker to pursue a marketing and sale process. The company entered into a series of agreements with Otsuka and its lender to stem the tide but, ultimately, the shot clock ran out:

In light of all of these circumstances, and after having explored multiple options and carefully considering the alternatives, the Board, in consultation with managements and the Debtor’s advisors, made the difficult decision to file for chapter 11 protection in order to preserve the Debtor’s assets and conduct a sale process or other transaction, all in an effort to maintain continuity of business operations (including the Debtor's TennCare initiative) and maximize going concern value for the benefit of the Debtor’s creditors and equity stakeholders. The Debtor anticipates that it will seek approval of appropriate bidding and sale procedures in the early weeks of the Chapter 11 Case.

The pre-petition lender has consented to the use of its cash collateral to fund the case. Now we’ll see if there are any buyers out there who are as impressed with the premise of Digital Medicines as we are.*

*Full disclosure, we’re going purely off of what the debtor describes and have no medical knowledge whatsoever to opine on the efficacy of such initiatives. Sure sounds cool AF though.

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Shannon)

• Capital Structure: $9.5mm secured debt (OrbiMed Royalty Opportunities II LP)

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Goodwin Procter LL (Nathan Schultz, Barry Bazian, Aretm Skorostensky) & Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP (L. Katherine Good, Aaron Stulman)

  • Financial Advisor/CRO: SierraConstellation Partners LLC (Lawrence Perkins)

  • Board of Directors: Shumeet Banerji, Regina Benjamin, Robert Epstein, Frank Fischer, Alan Levy, Ryan Schwarz, Joseph Swedish, Jonathan Symonds, Immanuel Thangaraj, Andrew Thompson

  • Investment Banker: Raymond James & Associates

  • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Prepetition Lender: OrbiMed Royalty Opportunities II LP

  • Large Series A Preferred Equityholder: Spring Ridge Ventures I LP

  • Large Series B Preferred Equityholders: Carlyle Venture Partners II LP, Adams Street V LP, BVCF IV LP

💪 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - 24 Hour Fitness Inc. 💪

24 Hour Fitness Inc.

June 15, 2020

California-based 24 Hour Fitness Inc. (along with ten affiliates, the “debtors”) filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the District of Delaware after it became apparent that it’s hard to sustain a fitness business when, as a practical matter, you’re really 0 Hour Fitness Inc. When you have 3.4mm customers across 445 (leased) locations across the United States, it’s awfully hard for a business that typically does $1.5b in revenue and $191 in adjusted EBITDA to make money when a pandemic rips through the nation and shuts down business entirely. This, ladies and gentlemen, like the few airlines who have filed for bankruptcy to date, is as pure-play a COVID-19 story as they come these days.

Now, that’s to not to suggest that everything was copacetic prior to the quarantine. The business had some pimples on it. The debtors’ CRO cites the selling/operating model’s negative impact on financial performance. But the biggest and scariest pimples are the debtors’ balance sheet and lease portfolio. The former includes $1.4b of funded debt; the latter, 445 locations leased across the country, of which 135 have already been deemed unnecessary and are the subject of a first day executory contract rejection motion (PETITION Note: the debtors denote this as “a first wave.”). When revenues stop coming into the coffers, these tremendous amounts become quite an overhang and a liquidity drain.

The filing, among other things, helps solve for the liquidity issue. The debtors have obtained a commitment for a $250mm new-money senior secured DIP facility from an ad hoc group of lenders. While there is no restructuring support agreement in place here, the ad hoc group is comprised of 63.3% of the aggregate principal amount outstanding under the prepetition credit facility and approximately 73.9% of the face amount of the $500mm in senior unsecured notes. In other words, there’s a solid amount of support here but not enough yet to command the senior class of debt.

Luckily, the debtors gave themselves a form of pre-DIP. Wait. Huh? What are we referring to?

…the Debtors were obliged to close all of their fitness clubs nationwide on March 16, 2020, in response to this national emergency. As a result, the Debtors were no longer able to generate new sources of revenue (by winning new members) and, on or about April 15, 2020, the Debtors suspended billing on account of monthly membership dues.fn

In the footnote, the debtors note:

To date, litigation has been commenced in connection with the Debtors’ monthly billing on a post-March 16 basis, notwithstanding, among other things, the Debtors’ rights under their various membership agreements. The Debtors reserve all rights, claims, and defenses in this regard.

Uh, apparently, 0 Hour Fitness Inc. = 30 Days of Payment Inc. We’ll see whether this short-term liquidity grab created long term customer retention issues.*

You charged your members for time that you did not provide to them. Terrible policy, by a terrible gym. Glad I cancelled my membership and I’m sure many other have/will as well.

— RobertTheAnalyst (@AnalystRobert) June 11, 2020

wow... bruh y'all charged people during mid march and april. 😒 Yeah I'm canceling my shit as well, and build my own home gym.

— TheHo3 (@xFoodStamp) June 11, 2020

Moreover, the fact that they apparently laid off thousands of employees via conference call probably won’t amount to a whole lot of goodwill. Just sayin’.

24 Hour Fitness just fired a lot of us thru a prerecorded phone call. They were silent for months and only gave us 1 week of pay while the gyms were closed. They couldnt tell us why we got fired and why others didnt. They are one of the most unprofessional companies. Fuck 24.

— chino (@edmillest) June 10, 2020

Now it’s wait and see. The debtors have reopened approximately 20 locations in Texas and hope to have the majority of their other non-rejected clubs open by the end of June. We’ll see if the uptick in COVID cases in certain states throws a wrench in that plan. To combat any COVID-related perception risk, the debtors are instituting some new measures:

…the Debtors have taken an innovative approach to the reopening of their clubs, instituting market-leading strategies to keep their members and employees safe, including an app-based reservation system to ensure that their clubs remain in compliance with applicable social distancing guidelines, a touchless check-in system to limit members’ and employees’ contact with surfaces, and cleaning schedules that ensure that entire clubs are sanitized every hour. (emphasis added)

Gosh. We see sh*t like this — the airlines are also making similar statements about newly implemented cleanliness standards — and it really makes us wonder: what the bloody hell were these cesspools doing pre-COVID?!?!? Clearly not enough.

And, yet, otherwise, we have some sympathy for these businesses. This is a brand new paradigm. The debtors indicate that they’re implementing a reservation-based system where people are locked into an hour-max workout after which the gym will be closed for 30 minutes for a “deep clean.” That is not exactly a seamless and frictionless user experience. Moreover, what kind of chemicals are going to be dumped all over the facility every 60 minutes? These are tough issues.

As far as social distancing:

…the Debtors are utilizing space in their clubs in creative ways in order to continue to offer members a range of amenities and services. For example, the Debtors are utilizing their basketball courts to hold group exercise classes, including by relocating stationary bike equipment to continue to offer indoor cycling classes, so that members and equipment can be properly spaced to comply with social distancing guidelines.

Source: First Day Declaration

No offense but does THIS really worth going to the gym for? You can use apps for a fraction of the cost and do this at home…mask-less.

So what now?

The DIP financing will buy the debtors some time to evaluate new trends. Will those people who paid for a month when the gym was closed come back? Will the news about employee treatment effect the “brand”? Will all of those people who bought home gyms or learned to run need to go to a gym? The re-opening notwithstanding, all of these questions will directly impact valuation. Indeed, how do you value this business with so many massive question marks? Well, luckily, we have the debt to get a sense of what that answer might be. And considering that, at the time of this writing, the term loan is bid in the high 20s and the unsecured notes are bid around 3 — that’s right, 3 — it’s pretty clear who is getting (generally) wiped out in this scenario and where the market thinks the value breaks.

*Honestly, this was a dirty move but from the debtors’ perspective, it also totally makes sense.

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Owens)

• Capital Structure: $95.2mm ‘23 RCF, $835.1mm ‘25 Term Loan, $500mm 8% ‘22 unsecured notes (Wells Fargo Bank NA)

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Ray Schrock, Ryan Preston Dahl, Kevin Bostel, Kyle Satterfield, Ramsey Scofield, Jackson Que Alldredge, Jacob Mezei, Alexander Cohen, Sarah Schnorrenberg) & Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Laura Davis Jones, Timothy Cairns, Peter Keane)

  • Directors: Marc Beilinson, Stephen Hare, Roland Smith

  • Financial Advisor/CRO: FTI Consulting Inc. (Daniel Hugo)

  • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC (Tyler Cowan)

  • Real Estate Advisor: Hilco Real Estate LLC

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Ad Hoc Group

    • Legal: O’Melveny & Myers LLP (John Rapisardi, Adam Rogoff, Daniel Shamah, Diana Perez, Adam Haberkorn) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Mark Collins, Michael Merchant, David Queroli)

  • Prepetition Agent: Morgan Stanley Senior Funding Inc.

    • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Alfred Xue)

  • DIP Agent: Wilmington Trust

    • Legal: Covington & Burling (Ronald Hewitt)

  • Senior Notes Indenture Trustee: Wells Fargo Bank NA

    • Legal: Reed Smith LLP (Eric Schaffer, Luke Sizemore, Mark Eckard)

  • Large equityholders: AEA, Fitness Capital Partners LP, 2411967 Ontario Limited

🍔 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Maines Paper & Food Service Inc. 🍔

Maines Paper & Food Service Inc.

June 10, 2020

Sooooooo…this is a different one. Maines Paper & Food Service Inc. and 12 affiliates (the “debtors”) filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the District of Delaware. For a company with a 100-year history — starting with the sale of “nickel candy” to local grocers on through an expansion into fountain supplies, toys and paper products in the 40s and then further expansion into foodservice in the 70s — it seems safe to say the last two years have been as active as any. Indeed, this bankruptcy filing marks the culmination of a two-year roller-coaster process.

Let’s talk about the foodservice business. The debtors operate in over 30 states; they have 10 distribution centers and 3 retail stores across the Northeastern, Midwestern and Southern regions of the US. They have two primary business units. First, their foodservice supply chains solutions unit (the “QSR Business”) provides centralized purchasing and distribution services for QSR (“quick service restaurant”) chains like Burger King ($QSR), Tim Hortons ($QSR), Wendy’s Co. ($WEN), Applebees ($DIN), IHOP ($DIN) and Chilis. For these clients, the debtors manage (i) sourcing and purchasing of food product, (ii) delivery to their distribution centers and (iii) from there, shipping to individual franchisees. They’re not a food producer; they’re not a food seller. They are as middle man as you can get.

The second segment is the logistics services business unit (the “Darden Business”) which services restaurants owned by Darden Restaurants Inc. ($DRI). This business is similar to the QSR Business but for the fact that Darden procures its own foodservice products and the debtors merely handle the logistical side of making sure that the food then gets to DRI’s many restaurant brands.

The restaurant space — as we’ve documented time and time again — has been very challenging for years. Long-time PETITION readers will recall that we’ve highlighted on multiple occasions how rising wages, labor shortages and trucking challenges were nibbling away at already-relatively-low margins. As a servicer to restaurants, the debtors, too, suffered from these issues. Per the debtors:

Even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Debtors faced several years of significant operating pressures resulting from industry-wide truck driver and warehouse labor shortages. During 2018, the foodservice distribution industry specifically, and the distribution & logistics industries more generally, experienced a significant labor shortage, primarily due to the robust labor market. For the Company, these labor shortages caused delivery-related challenges and amplified expenses due to a greater reliance on independent contractors and increases in overtime and shrink cost. The Debtors took steps to identify and implement a number of cost-rationalization initiatives together with scheduled customer resignations in order to manage their costs and address these challenges. However, the cumulative effect of these operational challenges was severe: the Debtors experienced a $29.9 million pre-tax loss in 2018 and a $25.9 million pre-tax loss in 2019.

The debtors’ owners, the Maines Brothers, started waving the white flag in the summer of ‘18. They hired advisors and attempted to divest the company.

They weren’t successful. While a sale didn’t happen, the debtors and their advisors were able to recapitalize the business and otherwise shore up liquidity. At that point the company complemented its existing asset-backed revolving credit facility with a term loan (issued by a non-debtor and secured by certain real estate) and a promissory note issued to an affiliate of Darden. Moreover, the debtors were able to obtain price increases and a small cash infusion from two of its then-largest QSR Business customers (presumably QSR and DIN). These improvements set the company up for a second bite at the sale apple.

And, indeed, by February ‘20, the company received letters of intent that, combined, would have led to the sale of the business in parts. One buyer wanted the QSR Business; another the company’s NY-based corporate headquarters and the Darden Business. About a month and a half away from closing COVID-19 entered the mix.

To say that COVID-19 crushed the debtors’ business would be an understatement. Customer volumes instantly fell by up to 87%. All of the debtors’ end customers were shut down. This is the part of the aforementioned roller-coaster where the seat belt breaks and yet the car is riding up a monstrous ascent. The company’s proposed buyers balked and the PNC Bank NA ($PNC), as agent under the ABL, exercised control over the company’s cash and withdrew its support of the going concern transaction. To make matters worse, several large customers terminated their distribution agreements.

But that’s not all. Lineage Bluebird Debtco LLC, an affiliate of Lineage Foodservice Solutions LLC, saw an opportunity and seized it. Like, literally. They took out PNC in April ‘20 and commenced a partial strict foreclosure of the company’s assets. Get out those Article 9 textbooks folks. What this means is that they took title to the company’s primary assets, i.e., inventory and receivables, its corporate HQ, and other real estate. They then entered into a foreclosure agreement pursuant to which they forgave $80mm of senior secured debt under the ABL, contributed $7.5mm in cash to fund a post-foreclosure wind down in court and another $2mm to pay holders of general unsecured claims pursuant to a plan of liquidation (PETITION Note: trade debt totals over $100mm, exclusive of special first day relief). Lineage also made job offers to the ~850 Maines employees. Lineage is pushing for plan confirmation within the next 90 days which, no doubt, will include releases.

After this untimely sequence of events, it appears the releases are the best the Maines Brothers can hope for at this juncture.

*****

One other point here. In some respects this is a decent result because at least the employees get to keep their jobs. But it’s important to acknowledge the cascading effects stemming from the foreclosure of this business and subsequent consolidation into a competitor.

The most illustrative way to see this is via the debtors’ executory contract rejection motion. While it’s largely possible that a number of these contracts would not have been assumed and assigned in conjunction with the Feb ‘20 sale transactions, it’s equally plausible that many of them would have been. COVID-19 struck and all of that went out the window. In turn, now all of the business that the debtors’ contract counterparties had looks to follow. Most likely, that business is simply redundant to Lineage.

By way of illustration, the debtors are now rejecting, among other things:

• Multiple retail store leases, undoubtedly contributing to the struggles that landlords already face;

• Multiple distribution center leases … ditto above (though, we’d think distribution center leases may have a better rebound scenario);

• Several other real estate leases (i.e., cold storage centers, nurseries, farms);

• Recycling and waste treatment contracts; and

• Vehicle lease and, separately, vehicle maintenance contracts.

Multiply this throughout the economy and it’s easier to understand why the market finally corrected a bit this week after a huge euphoric run.

---

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Owens)

• Capital Structure: $10.329mm RCF (Lineage), $10mm promissory note (Darden Direct Distribution Inc.), $1.7mm unsecured term note (M&T Bank)

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Laura Davis Jones, David Bertenthal, Timothy Cairns, Maxim Litvak)

  • Director: James D. Decker

  • Financial Advisor/CRO: Huron Consulting Group (John DiDonato, Mark Western, David McCormack, Abhimanyu Gupta)

  • Investment Banker:

  • Claims Agent: Stretto (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Lineage Logistics Inc.

    • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Peter Gilhuly, Nacif Taousse) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Michael Nestor)

  • Restaurant Brands International Inc.

    • Legal: Genovese Joblove & Battista PA & Chipman Brown Cicero & Cole LLP (William Chipman Jr., Mark Olivere) & Genovese Joblove & Battista PA

  • PLM Fleet LLC f/k/a MAC Trailer Leasing Inc.

    • Legal: McCarter & English LLP (Matthew Rifino)

⛽️ New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Vista Proppants and Logistics LLC ⛽️

Vista Proppants and Logistics LLC

June 9, 2020

You wouldn’t know it from the equity price action in oil and gas this week but lest there be any confusion: generally speaking, oil and gas is still very much f*cked.

In case we need to review:$XOG - rumored to be a bankruptcy filer. In grace period due to missed interest payment.$CHK - obvious.$BORR - ???$WLL - already in chapter 11 bankruptcy.$VAL - rumored to be a bankruptcy filer. In grace period due to missed interest payment. pic.twitter.com/K0XB1bUJ3R

— 💥PETITION💥 (@petition) June 8, 2020

Privately-held (The Lonestar Prospects Holdings Company LLC and First Reserve) Texas-based Vista Proppants and Logistics LLC (along with its affiliate filers, the “debtors”) is yet another victim of the oil and gas malaise. Its principal business is producing mine-to-wellhead high-quality, fine-grade “Texas Premium White” frac sand for end users in TX and OK. The business includes mining (via debtor subsidiary Lonestar Prospects Management LLC), trucking (via debtor subsidiary MAALT LP, and transloading (via debtor subsidiary MAALT Specialized Bulk LLC). The company operates three mines in Texas, twelve transloading terminals in TX and OK, three trucking facilities in TX, and a fleet of approximately 100 “last-mile” transport vehicles. Spoiler alert: when oil prices break through the floor and everyone cuts back capacity, there ain’t a whole lot of need for frac sand. Toss in a little COVID into the mix — further decimating the oil and gas space — and, well, here we are in bankruptcy court. The debtors have shut down their mining operations and aren’t engaging in any trucking and transloading activity.

As you might expect, even with all of the cost cutting initiatives under the sun, not operating can have an effect on liquidity. And indeed that’s the case here: the debtors ran out of money to service their operations and their $357+mm of debt (Ares Capital Corporation ($ARCC)). The bankruptcy filing avails the debtors of $11mm of DIP financing and provide an opportunity for the debtors to pursue a sale of their assets to Ares or a third-party buyer.

The other thing this bankruptcy filing does is provide the debtors of the same opportunity that previous frac sand provider, Emerge Energy Services, took advantage of in bankruptcy court. That is, the rejection of railcar leases. These fixed cost contracts make no sense for the debtors anymore as they simply don’t have the volumes to transport. Indeed, the debtors have already filed a slate of contract rejection motions.

Along those lines, this isn’t the first frac sand chapter 11 bankruptcy and it likely isn’t the last either.

---

*For the avoidance of doubt, ARCC placed this sucker on non-accrual previously. Notably, Bloomberg reported on various comments that Ares’ CEO Michael Arougheti said this week at the Morgan Stanley Virtual U.S. Financials Conference:

“There is a little bit of a risk that people are underestimating the level of distress in the small business and consumer landscape absent the government support,” Michael Arougheti, chief executive officer at Ares Management Corp. said. “When you look at the government aid programs, they’ve generally been structured to get us through June and July, and after that is a big question mark.”

Vista seems apropos of that comment. The question is whether Vista is also the canary in the coal mine for BDC investments. Bloomberg also noted:

The firm’s portfolio companies have received capital injections from equity owners to support business, he said. Within its credit holdings, Ares has been able to negotiate stronger covenants and higher loan prices. The firm is “cautiously optimistic” of receiving debt payments in June, he said.

Set your alarms.

---

• Jurisdiction: N.D. of Texas (Judge Morris)

• Capital Structure: $357.5mm Term Loan (Ares Capital Corporation), $21.9mm ABL (PlainsCapital Bank), MAALT Facility

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Haynes and Boone LLP (Stephen Pezanosky, Ian Peck, David Staab)

  • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Gary Barton)

  • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Ares Capital Corporation

    • Legal: Sidley Austin LLP (Dennis Twomey, Charles Persons, Juliana Hoffman)

  • Lonestar

    • Legal: Jackson Walker LLP (Kenneth Stohner Jr., Vienna Anaya)

  • PlainsCapital Bank

    • Legal: Foley & Lardner LLP (Holland O’Neil, Thomas Scannell)

🚘 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - APC Automotive Technologies Intermediate Holdings LLC 🚘

APC Automotive Technologies Intermediate Holdings LLC

June 3, 2020

North Carolina-based APC Automotive Technologies Intermediate Holdings LLC and 12 affiliates (the “debtors”) filed prepackaged chapter 11 cases in the District of Delaware. The debtors have been around, in some form, since 1927; they are family-run automotive aftermarket parts suppliers of underbody products for passenger vehicles and light to heavy-duty and commercial vehicles. The current iteration of the business results from a 2017 merger of legacy business AP Exhaust Intermediate Holdings LLC with CWD Holding Corporation (“Centric”) — a transaction designed to give the debtors “substantial market share as a supplier of automotive aftermarket brake and chassis parts.” Customers include Autozone Inc. ($AZO), O’Reilly’s Automotive Inc. ($ORLY) and many other large sale aftermarket players.

Almost immediately, the debtors ran into issues. The debtors note:

Between 2017 and 2019, the market presented significant challenges including historically high PGM costs, a difficult international trade environment, increased import tariffs, and a consolidating customer base, all of which negatively impacted the Debtors’ revenue and profit margins. These challenges, combined with an over-leveraged balance sheet, led to multiple ratings downgrades by credit ratings agencies. Nonetheless, the Debtors successfully navigated the last several years of headwinds through a combination of efforts, including optimizing operations, reducing expenses, maximizing liquidity, and de-leveraging their balance sheet.

Margins fell off a cliff. AP Exhaust’s segment EBITDA declined by $23.2mm while Centric’s dropped by $14mm. Liquidity fell by over $44mm. Because of this, the debtors engaged in a liability management exercise in late 2019 that, with the participation of their term lenders, resulted in a $14mm reduction in interest expense and $40mm of additional liquidity. It wasn’t enough. Liquidity issues persisted.

COVID-19 was a cherry on top. As sales fell off a cliff, the debtors woke up to the fact that their balance sheet wasn’t sustainable. Negotiations ensued between them and the term lenders on a consensual restructuring that has culminated in a restructuring support agreement and these prepackaged chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. The plan will shed $290mm of funded debt and general unsecured claimants (most of which are from China) will ride through with payment in full.

The aforementioned funded debt originated out of the 2017 merger. At the time, the debtors had:

• $75mm ABL (Wells Fargo Bank NA),

• $315mm in first lien term notes,

• and $125mm of second lien term notes.

The term notes were rejiggered pursuant to the 2019 out-of-court “liability management” exercise and replaced by $348mm in term loans split among:

• $25mm A-1 new money loans

• $155mm A-2 term loans,

• $25mm A-3 new money loans (with a PIK feature adding principal as reflected in the chart below), and

• $142.2mm term B loans which, pursuant to the term credit facility waterfall, are subordinate to the term A debt.

• Preferred stock issued to affiliates of Crescent Capital on account of the second lien term notes.*

All of this is reflected in this chart here:

To understand the mechanics of this, it’s important to note a few things:

1. Wells Fargo Bank NA ($WFC) got paid $10mm out of the new money financing at par, decreasing its exposure to the debtors. It is the sole ABL lender.

2. The separate A- tranches reflect participation in the 2019 transaction. The A-1 term loans are held by firms that were first lien term lenders that provided $25mm in new money. This includes a variety of CLOs like Apollo Credit Management CLO LLC and THL Credit. The A-3 term loans are held by private equity sponsors, Harvest Partners VII LP and Audax Group, which also provided $25mm of new money financing.

3. Term lenders who consented to the new money financing but did not participate did not get the benefit of the improved payment priority. Hence the term loan B. This includes a slate of funds and CLOs including Axar Capital Management, Sound Point Capital Management, Angelo Gordon, and MJX Asset Management LLC, among others.

After attempting another out-of-court refinancing that would have required — and could not get — 100% consent from term lenders, the debtors pivoted to a prepackaged bankruptcy filing. With 74% consenting (in excess of the requisite bankruptcy threshold for acceptance by a class), the debtors intend to fly through bankruptcy in approximately one month. They hope to do so armed with a DIP ABL Facility (which will convert into an exit ABL) and a $50mm DIP Term Facility (which includes a 5% commitment fee and a fee for 35% of the reorganized equity and will convert into a senior secured term loan facility upon exit). Holders of Term A loans will walk away with the equity (which basically just means that the pre-2019 equity loaned their way into a position of converting those new money loans back into equity). The B loans are getting zeroed out (the latter getting warrants if they consent to the plan of reorganization). Thanks for coming guys. Meanwhile all equity interests are also getting wiped out. Crescent Capital may want to do something about their fair value mark here:

Source: 10-Q

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Sontchi)

• Capital Structure: See chart.

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Jonathan Henes, George Klidonas, Neda Davanipour, Judson Oswald) & Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg LLP (Domenic Pacitti, Michael Yurkewicz, Morton Branzburg)

  • Financial Advisor: Weinsweig Advisors

  • Investment Banker: Jefferies Group LLC (Jeffrey Finger)

  • Claims Agent: Stretto (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Pre-petition ABL Agent: Wells Fargo Bank NA

    • Legal: Greenbert Traurig LLP (David Kurzweil, Dennis Meloro)

  • ABL Lenders

    • Legal:

  • Pre-petition Term Loan Agent: Wilmington Trust NA

    • Legal:

  • Term Loan Lender Group

    • Legal: King & Spalding LLP (W. Austin Jowers, Michael Handler, Peter Montoni) & Chipman Brown Cicero & Cole LLP (William Chipman Jr., Mark Olivere)

  • Consenting Sponsor: Audax

  • Term A-1 Lenders: Apollo Credit Management CLO LLC, Redding Ridge Asset Management LLC, Murray Hill Funding II LLC, CBAM CLO Management LLC, Special Situations Investing Group Inc., THL Credit, Ellington CLO Management LLC

  • Term A-3 Lenders: AG Grey Goose Holdings LLC, Harvest Partners VII LP, VAP Holdings Inc.

  • Term B Lenders: Axar Master Fund Ltd., Star V Partners LLC, BCIC Senior Loan Partners LLC, Flatiron CLO 2015-1 Ltd., TCI Capital Managment II LLC, Sound Point Capital Management LP, AG Diversified Income Master Plus LP (Angelo Gordon) along with separate accounts for Kaiser Foundation Hospitals and James River Insurance Company), UBS AG, Nassau 2017-I Ltd., MJX Venture Management II LLC

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Libbey Glass Inc.

Libbey Glass Inc.

June 1, 2020

We first wrote about Libbey Glass Inc. ($LBY) back in a November 2019 Members’-only briefing. Given that (a) the company is a manufacturer and distributor of glass tableware and ceramic dinnerware and (b) many of the company’s end user channels were in distress themselves (e.g., foodservice and retail), we noted (i) that performance was declining, (ii) the companies leverage ratio was increasing, and (iii) the company just generally looked pretty darn f*cked. This week the Ohio-based company and 11 affiliates (the “debtors”) filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the District of Delaware.

In November we wrote:

There are a number of trends that are taking hold currently that may be disruptive to a company that manufactures and distributes glass tableware (i.e., shot glasses, tumblers, stemware, mugs, bowls, etc.) and ceramic dinnerware products (i.e., servicing utensils and trays) to food service distributors, mass merchants, department stores, retail distributors, houseware stores, breweries and other end users of glass container products. First, people don’t go to department stores or houseware stores anymore (in case you hadn’t heard, check out the stock performance of every department store in the US and, for good measure, Bed Bath & Beyond ($BBBY)). Second, millennials aren’t drinking as much as Generation Z did. Third, people are ordering food more frequently and cooking and hosting dinner parties far less often than they did prior to VC-subsidized companies like UberEats ($UBER), Postmates and Caviar coming along. Indeed, per the company’s most recent report:

In U.S. foodservice, restaurant traffic for Q3 as reported by Black Box was down 3.6% compared to down 1.3% in Q3 of 2018.

All of these things are headwinds to a company like Libbey Glass ($LBY), an Ohio-based company founded in 1888. The longevity of the business is uber-impressive, but the year is currently 2019, and sh*t is unforgiving out there: Libbey is starting to look a bit troubled.

We continued:

The company reported Q3 net sales of $192.4mm, a decline from Q2 but a YOY increase of 0.9%. It continued to have a net loss on declining gross profit and margin. Adjusted EBITDA and net cash both improved. The company is currently in the midst of an operational restructuring pursuant to which it reduced SG&A by $2.4mm. While the US and Canada are, despite the aforementioned trends, proving resilient, the company continues to struggle in Latin America and EMEA. The company issued weaker go-forward guidance.

This declining performance is becoming problematic considering the company’s capital structure:

- $100mm ‘22 ABL ($47.7mm outstanding as of Q2, a substantial increase over Q1, and $49.4mm outstanding as of Q3); and

- $378mm ‘21 Term Loan B.

At the time of this writing, the TLB was quoted in the high 70s, certainly distressed territory. To make things a bit more interesting, the ABL has a springing maturity to 1/21 if the term loan is not refinanced by then. With adjusted EBITDA at $67.3mm as of Q2, the company was 5.8x levered. Q3 performance had a slight positive impact there. Still, things generally are going in the wrong direction.

Nailed it. The company notes:

Throughout 2019 and the start of 2020, the Debtors’ business was impacted by global competition in all of the Debtors’ distribution channels, fluctuating business and consumer confidence in the United States and Europe as a result of increased economic and political uncertainty from various factors including ongoing trade tensions between the United States and China and the potential for a Brexit no-deal in Europe, as well as slowing economies in Europe, China and parts of Latin America. Other factors impacting the Debtors’ business during 2019 and the start of 2020 were continued declines in United States and Canada foodservice traffic with take-out and delivery increasing in popularity relative to in-restaurant dining; continued migration of consumer purchasing from brick-and-mortar stores to online commerce, particularly in the United States, Canada and Europe; shifting consumer preferences in Europe from mid-tier retailers (where sales of the Company’s Royal Leerdam® products have been concentrated) to discounters; and increased competitive pressures in Latin America, as Chinese manufacturers divert sales of their products from the U.S. market to Latin America in order to avoid the increased tariffs imposed by the United States on Chinese imports. (emphasis added)

Consequently, total revenues were down $16mm in fiscal ‘19. Due to non-cash impairment charges, the company incurred a net loss of $69mm, up from $8mm in ‘18.

This declining performance is problematic considering the company’s capital structure and the debtors’ inability to proactively address its debt despite attempts to refinance the term loan:

• $100mm ‘22 ABL ($47.7mm outstanding as of end of Q2, $49.4mm outstanding as of end of Q3, and now $66.9mm outstanding plus letters of credit and other reserves leaving a smidgeon of liquidity); and

• $378mm ‘21 Term Loan B.

To make matters worse, the ABL has a spring maturity: this means that if the term loan isn’t refinanced by January 2021, the ABL, which otherwise does’t mature until 2022, springs forward and becomes due and outstanding.

That was BEFORE the coronavirus did this to sale:

If refinancing was challenging before well…yeah, good luck with that. Per the company:

The Company engaged in discussions with the Lender Group around an amend-and-extend transaction. However, the Lender Group’s concern over the impact COVID-19 would have on the Company’s business ultimately prevented those discussions from resulting in a transaction. The Company also informed the Lender Group of certain inbound merger and acquisition proposals from strategic buyers. These proposals were not pursued because, among other reasons, they were insufficient to pay the Company’s Prepetition Term Loans in full, thus requiring lender consent, and the Lender Group did not believe it was in the Company’s best interest to pursue such a transaction.

So here we are. The debtors are in bankruptcy. And this addresses one issue: through a $100mm DIP ABL (rollup) and a $60mm new money DIP Term Loan, the debtors have shored up liquidity. The DIP has aggressive milestones baked in including confirmation of a plan of reorganization no later than 100 days after the petition date. Next, the debtors may use the weapons provided pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code to address their collective bargaining agreements and other retiree programs ($48mm unfunded liability). Moreover, they have potentially valuable excess interest expense, net operating losses and other tax attributes to protect.

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Silverstein)

• Capital Structure: see above.

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (George Davis, Keith Simon, David Hammerman, Anupama Yerramali, Madeleine Parish, Blake Denton, ) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (John Knight, Russell Silberglied, Paul Heath)

  • Independent Directors: Timothy Pohl, Patrick Bartels Jr.

  • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Brian Whittman)

  • Investment Banker: Lazard (Jason Cohen)

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • DIP ABL and Prepetition ABL Agent ($100mm): JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

    • Legal: Goldberg Kohn Ltd. (Dimitri Karcazes, Prisca Kim, Joseph Zizzo) & Womble Bond Dickinson US LLP (Matthew Ward)

  • DIP Term and Prepetition Term Agent ($60mm): Cortland Capital Market Services LLC

    • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (Michael Messersmith, Seth Kleinman, Sarah Gryll, Lucas Barrett) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Blake Cleary, Kenneth Enos)

  • Counsel to the Lender Group

    • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (Michael Messersmith, Seth Kleinman, Sarah Gryll) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Blake Cleary, Kenneth Enos)

⛽️ New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Templar Energy LLC ⛽️

Templar Energy LLC

May 31, 2020

Templar Energy LLC (and six affiliates, the “debtors”), an Oklahoma City-based independent oil and gas exploration and production company that operates primarily in the Greater Anadarko Basin of Western Oklahoma and the Texas Panhandle, filed a prepackaged plan of liquidation early Monday morning — the culmination of a multi-year effort to stave off the inevitable.

A quick flashback. Four years ago oil and gas companies were collapsing into bankruptcy left and right. After oil and gas prices fell hard, the oil and gas tide rolled out and left a lot of investors stranded naked on the beach. Most funds were of the view that this was just a hiccup. One fund after another raised billions after billions of dollars thinking that energy was “where it’s at.” We now know how off-kilter that thesis was.

Some companies back then were luckier than others. Thanks in large part to its relatively simple and highly concentrated capital structure and a clear demarcation of value based on prevailing commodity prices of the time, in September 2016, Templar Energy was able to consummate an out-of-court restructuring that extinguished $1.45b of second lien debt. Repeat: $1.45 BILLION of second lien debt — a tremendous amount of value destruction a mere four years after the company’s formation. Of course, as with all things there are nuances here. “Value destruction” is a relative phrase that applies to the par holders of the debt when originally issued. Certain second lien lenders who participated in the out-of-court restructuring may very well have purchased the paper for cents on the dollar once the par guys had to pull the ripcord. Destruction there, therefore, is a function of price. There’s no way to know (from publicly available information) whether any of the original holders of second lien paper came out ahead upon receiving $133mm in cash and 45% of the equity in exchange for their second lien paper. It’s certainly possible that some did.

It’s also highly probable that some didn’t. Take Ares Management LLC, Bain Capital and Paulson & Co. Inc. for instance; they each participated in a rights offering for participating preferred equity in the company in exchange for $220mm dumped into this turd (plus $145mm placed by legacy equity holders). Given that the RBL IS NOW IMPAIRED here, clearly that equity check hasn’t borne fruit. It was also used to pay the aforementioned $133mm of cash recovery so … suffice it to say … this does not seem like one that the aforementioned funds will be referencing in future LP-oriented marketing materials.

Emanating out of that ‘16 transaction is the debtors’ current $600mm RBL. This time around, it is the fulcrum security. The debtors note, “Critically the claims under the RBL Facility are deeply impaired.” And the RBL lenders have no intention of owning the assets — predominantly leases with various oil and gas mineral owners covering non-exclusive working interests in approximately 2,165 oil and gas wells over approximately 273,400 continuous acres of property. Let’s be clear here: first lien lenders generally aren’t in the business of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracking. Of course, right now, the debtors aren’t really in the business of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracking. At least technically speaking. Given where oil and gas prices are — thanks Putin/MBS on the supply side, COVID-19 on the demand side — the debtors aren’t even conducting any drilling. Typically they operate anywhere up to 13 rigs at a time. All of which is to say that the lenders’ position explains why this is a sale + plan of liquidation case rather than a second debt-for-equity play.*

To aid the debtors’ attempts to continue pre-petition sale efforts post-petition, certain of the RBL Lenders have committed to a $37.5mm DIP (with a 0.5-to-1 $12.5mm rollup). Pursuant to a restructuring support agreement, the RBL lenders have agreed to receive their pro rata share of any net sale proceeds and all remaining cash held by the debtors’ estates as of the plan effective date minus (i) cash needed to repay the DIP, (ii) wind down funds, and (iii) monies placed into a professional fee escrow. Royalty owners, materialman and mechanics’ lienholders will be paid in full. General unsecured claimants and equity will get wiped.

*We should note — to hammer home the point — that one of the events that hammered the debtors’ liquidity position was the RBL lenders’ April 1, 2019 redetermination down of the RBL borrowing base to $415mm. This regularly scheduled redetermination analysis created an immediate $22mm “deficiency payment” liability for the debtors as it had $437mm borrowed at the time. The debtors stopped making those payments in November 2019. They’ve been in a state of forbearance with the RBL lenders ever since.

$37.5mm DIP with $12.5 rollup

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge )

• Capital Structure:

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Paul Basta, Robert Britton, Sarah Harnett, Teresa Li) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, Jaime Luton Chapman, Tara Pakrouh)

  • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC

  • Investment Banker: Guggenheim Securities LLC (Morgan Suckow)

  • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • DIP Agent ($37.5mm): Bank of America NA

  • Consenting RBL Lenders

    • Legal: Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (Amy Kyle, Andrew Gallo) & Richards Layton & Finger PA

    • Financial Advisor: RPA Advisors LLC

  • Large Class A equityholders: Ares Management LLC, Paulson & Co. Inc., Bain Capital, Lord Abbett, Archview Investment, Bank of America, Seix Advisors, Bardin Hill/Halcyon Loan Invest Management, Oppenheimer Funds

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - PQ New York Inc. (a/k/a Le Pain Quotidien)

PQ New York Inc.

May 27, 2020

New York-based and Belgium-company-owned PQ New York Inc., otherwise known to most as Le Pain Quotidien, filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the District of Delaware (along with 104 affiliates) to effectuate a sale of assets to LPQ USA LLC, an affiliate of Aurify Brands. Aurify Brands incubates in-house brands (e.g., Melt Shop) and harvests previously-created brands too (e.g., Five Guys Burgers and Fries). It intends to re-open no fewer than 35 of LPQ’s 98 restaurants (and, to this end, has already filed a lease rejection motion delineating which leases, subject to a negotiation between landlords and the proposed purchaser, are subject to rejection). LPQ USA LLC provided the debtors a $522k bridge loan pre-petition and roll that loan up into a $3mm post-petition DIP credit facility to fund working capital needs during the course of the cases.

This is not a pure COVID story. The debtors financial performance began to decline pre-pandemic as customer preferences shifted away from the casual dining concept towards other concepts like “grab n go.” This trend, combined with management turnover and lack of investment at the store level, led the debtors to begin exploring strategic alternatives for their European and US-based businesses in Q3 of 2019.

Let’s put some numbers around this. In 2018, the debtors had $175mm of sales and $4.4mm in EBITDA. In 2019, sales dropped to $153mm and EBITDA swung by over $20mm to -$16.8mm. Even worse? There was no hope on the horizon. With expensive leases and eroding same store sales, the debtors forecast negative EBITDA through 2023 absent a severe operational restructuring. Prior to COVID slamming the economy and shutting everything down, the debtors had already determined that a bankruptcy filing would be necessary to help negotiate lease terms with landlords, secure funding, and pursue a sale. The shutdown just postponed things for a while.

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Dorsey)

• Capital Structure: $522k bridge loan

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Richards Layton & Finger PA (Mark Collins, Michael Merchant, Jason Madron, Brendan Schlauch)

  • Financial Advisor/CRO: PwC (Steven Fleming)

  • Investment Banker: SSG Advisors LLC

  • Real Estate Advisor: RCS Real Estate Advisors

  • Claims Agent: Donlin Recano & Company Inc. (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Stalking Horse Purchaser: LPQ USA LLC

    • Legal: Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP (Steven Reisman, Cindi Giglio) & Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg LLP (Domenic Pacitti, Morton Branzburg)

🚘 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Advantage Holdco Inc. (a/k/a Advantage Rent-a-Car) 🚘

Advantage Holdco Inc.

May 26, 2020

Florida-based Advantage Holdco Inc. (along with six affiliates, the “debtors”) is the second car rental business to file for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the last week. The debtors list at least $500mm in liabilities against $100mm-$500mm in assets. Rut roh. They also noted that “[a]fter any administrative expenses are paid, no funds will be available to unsecured creditors.” RUT ROH.

Get ready for the “private equity bros destroyed car rental” argument: Catalyst Capital Group Inc., a Toronto-based private equity firm, owns, through affiliates, 100% of the debtors’ equity after purchasing assets (from The Hertz Corporation as luck would have it) out of the 2014 Simply Wheelz LLC d/b/a Advantage Rent-a-Car bankruptcy and merging it with a subsequent acquisition of E-Z Rent-a-Car in 2015. As powerful as private equity firms tend to be, however, they, despite what some might think, didn’t conspire to shutdown the global economy. By extension, they didn’t have any hand in the pandemic stopping nearly all air travel — affecting, in turn, businesses like Advantage that depend on customers coming in and out of airports (much like Hertz). Nor did they have any control over people deciding not to go visit Las Vegas, Nevada — perhaps one of the gnarliest cities in the world — where Advantage also happens to have certain hotel partnerships it leverages to rent cars to people who want to say…blow sh*t up in the desert. Shocking we know! PE doesn’t control G-d.

Unlike Hertz, Advantage tends to target the leisure-discount segment of the rental car sector. Similar to Hertz, though, it generates predominantly all of its revenue from vehicle rentals (from airports mostly), ancillary products like insurance and navigation services and the wholesale disposition of automobiles previously used in the rental fleet. Sound familiar? Only so much room for creativity in this business model, broheims.

In 2019, the debtors did ~$271.5mm in revenue with $165.1mm attributable to rental and $106.4mm to the other stuff we previously noted. Which just goes to show how much of a money maker that bullsh*t insurance you always debate is.

There’s more bankruptcy Inception at play here: The Hertz Corporation ($HTZ) once owned this company but divested it to avoid antitrust scrutiny. Earlier this week, HTZ filed for bankruptcy. Not it is also involved in this bankruptcy; it is the debtors’ 11th largest general unsecured creditor. Whoops.

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Dorsey)

• Capital Structure: $30.2mm unsecured loan (Aberdeen Standard Investments Inc.)

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Cole Schotz PC (Justin Alberto, Norman Pernick, Patrick Reilley, J. Kate Stickles)

  • Financial Advisor: Mackinac Partners (Matthew Pascucci)

  • Claims Agent: Epiq (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Tuesday Morning Corporation ($TUES)

Tuesday Morning Corporation

May 27, 2020

Dallas-based Tuesday Morning Corporation ($TUES) is 80% open now — just in time to start closing 230 of its brick-and-mortar locations (132 in a first phase and 100 more in a follow-up phase) and commence liquidations sales while in bankruptcy. This, in a nutshell, ladies and gentlemen, sums up the plight of retail today.

Home goods retailer Tuesday Morning filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on Wednesday morning. https://t.co/RDv22dvvxt

— Lauren Thomas (@laurenthomas) May 27, 2020

One of the debtor affiliates is named "Days of the Week Inc." so they're actually covered.

— 💥PETITION💥 (@petition) May 27, 2020

If you tune in to CNBC or Bloomberg, one could be forgiven for thinking that a retailer like TUES might actually do relatively well during shelter-in times. It specializes in upscale home furnishings, textiles and housewares for crying out loud. According to the talking heads, everyone is spending time at home judging the inadequacy of their living accommodations — a process that ought to serve as a real boost to home furnishing specialists ((e.g., Restoration Hardware Inc. ($RH)) and home improvement companies ((e.g., Home Depot Inc. ($HD) and Lowe’s Companies Inc. ($LOW)). Not so much for TUES, apparently: the total lack of online presence and the company’s 100% reliance on in-store sales certainly didn’t help matters. The pandemic and related fallout “…resulted in a near-total cessation of new revenue beginning in March 2020.” Repeat: Near. Total. Cessation. Yikes.

Indeed, the debtors’ website serves a very limited purpose: it has a store locator. One literally cannot transact on the site. That said, there does appear to be pent up demand: the company reports that since re-opening its stores on April 24, comp store sales for the reopened stores have been approximately 10% higher than the same period in fiscal ‘19. Perhaps people DID, in fact, identify a lot of things they wanted to remedy at home! And they’re clamoring for that “treasure hunt” experience, y’all!!

What’s somewhat sad about that is, looking at the debtors’ list of top 40 unsecured trade creditors, nearly every vendor they do business with is US-based. In fact, the debtors source 80% of their inventory from US vendors. These store closures and the attendant loss of volume will cascade through the economy. Sigh.

Anyway, we previously wrote about the company in February upon the company’s Q2 ‘20 earnings report. We noted:

Quick coverage of this Dallas-based off-price retailer because, well, it’s performing like dogsh*t. The company reported Q2 ‘20 numbers last week. They. Were. Not. Good.

Nope. Like, not at all. Here are some highlights:

- A 4.1% decrease in net sales YOY driven primarily by a 3% decrease in comp store sales;

- A 3.7% decrease in the size of the average ticket, offset only somewhat by a 0.7% increase in customer transactions (read: more people buying less stuff — not exactly a testament to inventory quality);

- Declining gross margin (down 1.9%);

- Operating income down $5.2mm for the Q and $6.3mm for the 1H of fiscal ‘20;

- Cash is burning, down $6.5mm from June 2019.

The company blamed this piss poor performance on the shortened holiday calendar (how predictable) and uber-competition within that period that resulted in heavy promotions.

We further noted that the company had 175 leases rolling off in the next 12 months and, therefore, “…this is more a lease story than a bankruptcy story.” Whoops. Our crystal ball didn’t pick up on COVID-19. We further noted:

The company has no maturities prior to 2024 and has significant room under its $180mm revolving credit facility ($91.4mm of availability). Still, this thing needs its performance to turn around or it will be dancing with several other distressed retailers soon enough.

“Soon enough” came quicker than we anticipated.

The problem is that not only did the shut-down completely shut the revenue spigot, it also led the debtors to default, as of March 2020, under their revolving credit facility (“RCF”). The RCF Credit Agreement had a provision prohibiting the debtors from “suspend[ing] the operation of its business in the ordinary course of business.” Ever since, they have been in a state of continued negotiation and forbearance with their RCF enders, JPMorgan Chase Bank NA ($JPM), Wells Fargo Bank NA ($WFC), and Bank of America NA ($BAC).

That negotiation has borne fruit. The debtors obtained a DIP financing commitment of $100mm which will consist of some new money as well as a “gradual” roll-up of pre-petition funded debt ($47.9mm + $8.8mm LOCs). The debtors will pay a 2% upfront fee, a 0.5% unused commitment fee and customary letter of credit fees. “The interest rate under the DIP Documents is, either (at the Debtors’ option), (a) a 3 month LIBO Rate (2.0% floor) + 3.00% per annum or (b) CBFR (2.0% floor) + 2.0% per annum, payable on each applicable Interest Payment Date, in cash, provided that no Interest Period may extend beyond the Maturity Date.”

So what now? The debtors main assets are their inventory, a Dallas distribution center and corporate office, and equipment; they also have upwards of $100mm in net operating losses. There isn’t a lot of debt on balance sheet: this is not an example of a private equity firm coming in and dividending all of the value out of the enterprise. Rather, the crux of this case in the near-term will be, as we noted back in February, about the rejection of hundreds of leases and the stream-lining of the debtors’ footprint to a leaner operation. The crux longer-term, however, will be whether there’s any reason for this business to exist. Will the lenders enter into an exit facility? Will there be a plan of reorganization that will allow the debtors to emerge as reorganized debtors? Will there be a sale of substantially all of the assets? The chapter 11 bankruptcy process will be used to hopefully find answers to these questions.

• Jurisdiction: N.D. of TX (Judge Hale)

• Capital Structure: $47.9mm funded RCF + $8.8mm LOCs

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Haynes and Boone LLP (Ian Peck, Stephen Pezanosky, Jarom Yates)

  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP (Barry Folse, Ray Adams, Wilmer Cerda, JR Bryant)

  • Investment Banker: Stifel Nicolaus & Co. Inc. & Stifel Nicolaus-Miller Buckfire & Co. LLC (James Doak)

  • Real Estate Advisor: A&G Realty Partners LLC

  • Liquidation Consultant: Great American Group LLC

  • Claims Agent: Epiq Corporate Restructuring LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • DIP Agent: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

    • Legal: Vinson & Elkins LLP (William Wallander, Bradley Foxman)

  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

    • Legal: Montgomery McCracken Walker & Rhoads LLP (Edward Schnitzer, Gilbert Saydah Jr., David Banker) & Munsch Hardt Kopf & Harr PC (Kevin Lippman, Deborah Parry)
      
      

✈️ New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - LATAM Airlines Group S.A. ($LTM) ✈️

LATAM Airlines Group S.A.

May 26, 2020

COVID-19 is starting to notch a long list of corporate victims. Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings have NOT been in short supply the last two months. Yet while many of the debtors may cite COVID-19 as a factor leading to the bankruptcy filings, in the super-majority of cases it was merely a contributing factor. The icing on the cake, if you will. From our vantage point, prior to the last week, there had only been (arguably) four pure-play COVID-19 chapter 11 bankruptcy filings:

• Ravn Air Group Inc. — COVID-19 effectively shut down Alaska and CARES Act funds were unavailable to stave off a filing.

• Alpha Entertainment LLC (XFL) — COVID-19 cold-stopped all sports mid-season.

• GGI Holdings LLC (Gold’s Gym) — COVID-19 shuts down gyms nationwide.

• Avianca Holdings SA — COVID-19 and mandated government shutdowns hindered all travel and flight bookings went negative.

Those were just the appetizer. This week things got VERY, VERY, REAL. The Hertz Corporation ($HTZ) became one of the largest chapter 11 bankruptcy filings EVER because COVID-19 put a stop to air travel — the thing that HTZ is most dependent upon in its business. This caused used-car values to fall through the floor and, in turn, effectively blow up the company’s securitization structure. And then LATAM Airlines Group S.A. ($LTM) became the second large latin american airline to file. This should not have been a surprise to anyone.

On May 13 in “✈️ Airlines, Airlines, Airlines ✈️ ,” we wrote about (i) the airline bailout debate engulfing folks in the US, (ii) the Avianca bankruptcy filing, (iii) Virgin Australia’s voluntary administration filing in Australia (after the Aussie government refused to partake in a bailout), (iv) Norway’s attempts to deal with Norwegian Air Shuttle SA’s ($NWARF) troubles, and (v) Boeing Corporation ($BA) CEO Dave Calhoun’s flippant remarks that “it’s probable that a major [US] carrier will go out of business” — yet another example of people confusing the concepts “filing for chapter 11 bankruptcy” with “going out of business and disappearing from the face of the earth.” For the avoidance of doubt, no, they are not necessarily the same thing (outside of retail anyway). In what was not exactly our boldest call, we noted that there would be more COVID-19-spawned action to come — particularly, in the near-term, in Latin America:

Which leaves Latin America’s other air carriers in a bad spot, including Latam Airlines Group SA (the finance unit of which has debt bid in the 30s and 40s), Gol Linhas Aereas Inteligentes SA ($GOL)(the finance unit of which has debt bid in the low 40s), and Aerovías de México SA de CV (Aeromexico)(which has debt bid in the 30s). Will one of these be one of the next airlines in bankruptcy court?

Early in the morning on May 26th, LATAM Airlines Group SA (“LATAM Parent, and with 28 direct or indirect subsidiary debtors, the “Debtors”) filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York. It is the fourteenth-largest airline in the world (measured by passengers carried) and Latin America’s leading airline; it services 145 different destinations in 26 countries. Including 20 aircraft leased to non-debtor third-parties, the company has a total fleet of 340 aircraft.

Source: First Day Declaration. Docket #3.

On the strength of this fleet, in 2019, the company did $10.1b in revenue with over $1b of operating cash flow after investments (for the third straight year) and $195.6mm of net income. While the majority of said revenue comes from passenger services, the company also supplements revenues with cargo-related services to 151 destinations in 29 countries (11% of revenue but growing quickly). With four consecutive years of net profits, the company was, as far as airline companies go, doing very well — particularly in Brazil (38% revenue), Chile (16%) and the United States (10%).

Contributing to the positive performance trend is the fact that the company has apparently been executing its business plan quite well. It has rejiggered its cost structure; established new routes; reduced fleet commitments; and upgraded operational execution and customer experience (including the implementation of a frequent flyer program).* Improved operational performance gave the company flexibility in other parts of the business. Notably, the company decreased leverage by $2b — dropping its leverage ratio from 5.8x to 4x. It also reduced its capital fleet commitments by $6.3b from 2015 to 2019. Everything was going in the right direction.

But then COVID-19 caused a 95% reduction in LATAM’s passenger service. All of the business plan execution in the world couldn’t have prepared the Debtors for such a meaningful drop off. To state the obvious, this created an immediate liquidity strain on the business and instantly called the Debtors’ capital structure into question. To address the liquidity situation, the Debtors drew down the entirety of their secured revolving credit facility giving them $707mm total cash on hand (plus another $621 held by non-debtor affiliates). Here is the rest of the Debtors’ largely unsecured capital structure:

The rubber is going to meet the runway with a lot of the aircraft leases. The finance leases are all entered into by special purpose vehicles (“SPVs”) which then lease the planes to LATAM Parent which then subleases the aircraft to other opcos including certain of the Debtors. The SPVs finance the acquisition of aircrafts through various banks, pledging the owned aircraft as collateral. The principal amount outstanding under the various SPV financings is $3.3b.

Meanwhile, the operating leases are entered into with third-party lessors like AerCap Holdings N.V., Aircastle Holding Corporation Limited and Avolon Aerospace Leasing Ltd. The Debtors have negotiated rent deferrals with these parties but, generally, they pay $44mm/month in rent and, all in, have $2.9b in aircraft-related lease liabilities.

Similarly, certain aircraft purchase agreements are likely to be grounded. The company has agreements to purchase 44 aircraft from Airbus S.E. and 7 aircraft from Boeing.

The Debtors seem primed to leverage certain bankruptcy tools here. First and foremost is right-sizing the fleet, which means a lot of the aforementioned agreements will be (or are likely to be) on the chopping block. Indeed, the Debtors have already filed a motion seeking to reject around 19 of them.

Two significant shareholders have agreed to fund $900mm of super-priority DIP financing which will be part of a larger $2.15b DIP Facility (PETITION Note: reminder that Avianca has not sought approval of a DIP credit facility…yet). Given that many Latin American countries have suspended air travel for months (i.e., Argentina through September, Colombia through August) and the US recently announced it would deny entry to non-citizens from Brazil, the Debtors will need this financing to complement the cash already on hand to stay afloat.

Like Hertz and Avianca, it looks like this one will linger in bankruptcy court for awhile as all of the various parties in interest try to figure out what a business plan looks like in a post-COVID world.

*Notably, the company brags that it was able to “…increase available seat kilometers (or ASKs, used to measure an airline’s carrying capacity) by approximately 11%…” which, in turn, contributed to an increase in passengers carried from 68mm to 74mm per year and increased its operational margin from 5% to 7%. This is confirmation of what we already knew: to juice revenues airlines have been engaging in sardine-packing experiment, squeezing as many passengers into a flight as possible. And it worked! Query, however, what will happen to ASKs in a post-COVID-19 world. 🤔

• Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Garrity Jr.)

• Capital Structure: see above

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP (Richard Cooper, Lisa Schweitzer, Luke Barefoot, Thomas Kessler, David Schwartz) & Togut Segal & Segal LLP (Albert Togut, Kyle Ortiz)

  • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc.

  • Investment Banker: PJT Partners LP

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Large equityholders: Cueto Group, Delta Air Lines Inc. ($DAL), Chilean Pension Funds,

  • Large Equityholder: Qatar Airways investments UK Ltd.

    • Legal: Alston & Bird LLP (Gerard Catalanello, James Vincequerra)

  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

    • Legal: Dechert LLP (Benjamin Rose)

    • Conflicts Legal: Klestadt Winters Jureller Southard & Stevens LLP

⛽️New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Unit Corporation ($UNT)⛽️

Unit Corporation

May 22, 2020

Oklahoma is where a lot of the action is at. Unit Corporation ($UNT) is a publicly-traded Tulsa-based holding company that, through three operating segments, offers (i) oil and gas exploration and production, (ii) contract drilling and (iii) midstream services. Like every other oil and gas company under the sun, this one has too much funded debt. $789mm to be exact, split between a $139mm RBL facility and $650mm in ‘21 subordinated unsecured notes. And like every other oil and gas company under the sun, it cannot sustain its capital structure. For months now, the debtors have been the bankruptcy equivalent of deadbeats — bouncing from one standstill agreement to the next so as not to get hit with a meaningful on-schedule redetermination liability that they wouldn’t be able to satisfy (PETITION Note: this is particularly relevant because they had already been hit by a “wildcard” or “off-schedule” redetermination in January, knocking their borrowing base down $75mm. Instant liability! Yay!!). On brand, the debtors likewise couldn’t afford their semi-annual May 15 interest payment.

Why the bankruptcy now? Well, you’ve seen this movie many times already in the last month or so. You’ve got a starring role for Vladimir Putin. And a starring role for MBS. And you’ve got a few plagues for added drama: first, plummeting commodity prices and then a global pandemic. These factors negatively impacted liquidity and sparked a number of strategic processes including (a) the sale of 50% ownership in Superior Pipeline Company to SP Investor Holdings LLC for $300mm in spring of 2018 and (b) an attempted up-tier exchange of the subordinated notes into newly issued 10% senior secured notes and 7% junior notes. The debtors, however, were unable to successfully obtain the requisite number of tenders. Not only would the exchange have extended the debtors’ maturity profile and eliminated short-and-medium term refi risk, it would have removed the danger that the debtors would trigger a springing maturity in their RBL. Oh well.

Luckily the debtors got themselves an agreement with 70% of the subordinated noteholders and the RBL lenders on the terms of a consensual financial restructuring transaction — like, as the shotclock was about to go off (read: when the standstill agreement expired on May 22, the filing date). The deal includes, among other things, (i) a $36mm new money DIP credit facility, (ii) a debt-for-equity swap by the noteholders for equity in each of reorganized Unit Corp and the upstream and contact drilling opcos, (iii) a new $180mm exit facility from the RBL lenders in exchange for a 5% exit fee paid in post-reorg equity in reorganized Unit Corp. (PETITION Note: apparently the RBL lenders have no interest in owning equity in contact drilling services), and (iv) payment in full in cash or reorganized equity to general unsecured claimants depending upon which entity they have a claim against. Notably, equityholders who do not opt out of releases will receive out-of-the-money warrants exercisable for an aggregate of 12.5% of the interests in the reorganized Unit Corp entity.

We’d be remiss if we didn’t highlight one other aspect of these cases. As is all the rage these days, management got away with an amended incentive structure on the eve of bankruptcy that enriched them all to the tune of $900k. Sweeeeeet. Meanwhile, they spent a good chunk of November ‘19 through April ‘20 sh*tcanning their employees and promising them 4 weeks of severance for every year of service up to 104 weeks. While this is admittedly a pretty rich severance plan, it appears that the restructuring support agreement memorializing the above-referenced transaction proposes to renege on this policy and instead provide merely four to 13 weeks severance to employees. You’ve gotta love these oil and gas execs: they’re wildly proficient at destroying value but still manage to always siphon some off for themselves. It’s awesome.

• Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Jones)

• Capital Structure: $139mm RBL facility (BOKF NA), $650mm in ‘21 subordinated unsecured notes (Wilmington Trust NA)

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Vinson & Elkins LLP (Harry Perrin, Paul Heath, Matthew Pyeatt, David Meyer, Lauren Kanzer, Zachary Paiva, Emily Tomlinson)

  • Financial Advisor: Opportune LLP (Gary Pittman)

  • Investment Banker: Evercore Group LLC (Bo Yi)

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • RBL Agent: BOKF NA

    • Legal: Frederic Dorwart Lawyers PLLC (Samuel Ory) & Bracewell LLP (William A. Trey Wood III)

    • Financial Advisor: Huron Consulting Group Inc.

  • Ad Hoc Group

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Lauren Tauro)

    • Financial Advisor: Greenhill & Co. Inc.

🔋New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Exide Holdings Inc.🔋

Exide Holdings Inc.

May 19, 2020

Georgia-based Exide Holdings Inc. and four affiliates (the “debtors”), among the world’s largest producers and recyclers of lead-acid batteries used in cars, boats, golf carts and more, filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the District of Delaware earlier this week. The filing sparked an entire industry to ask “is it a Chapter 22 or a Chapter 33?” The answer, depending upon your look-back period, is the latter. The fairer answer is probably the former and even that was 7 years ago with emergence 5 years ago (PETITION Note: the Exide Creditors’ Liquidating Trust had to make a notice of appearance in these new cases so, there’s that). Going back nearly two decades seems to be an impossible standard to hold any business to but 5-7 years seems much fairer.

Since we’re discussing labels, here’s another one: failure. Per the debtors:

Notwithstanding the Company’s efforts to implement its business plan following its emergence from the 2013 Chapter 11 Case and the support of its new owners and lenders, the Company continued to face liquidity, performance, and operational challenges that were more persistent and widespread than anticipated. Coupled with adverse industry and market factors as well as substantial environmental costs, these challenges have resulted in reduced liquidity.

Sooooo…that sucks. We admit it: we were hoping that this was a disruption story. That Elon Musk and the increasingly large cohort of lithium-ion battery using OEMs pushing out electric vehicles were putting the lead-acid battery manufacturers out to pasture. But that is not a state reason for this chapter 3…uh…chapter 2…uh, whatever the f*ck this is. Rather, the debtors state that their post-emergence liquidity issues stem from (a) mounting environmental remediation costs and litigation, (b) rising production costs (PETITION Note: because the debtors shut two recycling facilities, they are now subject to pricing pressures from outside manufacturers rather than just using their own recycled inputs), (c) operational inefficiencies caused by legacy mixed-use facilities, and (d), of course…wait for it…COVID-19. Duck for COVID-cover folks! The debtors say that the pandemic’s impact on demand for product is the cherry on top.

The debtors’ capital structure doesn’t help. Look at this beaut:

With that much funded debt, the debtors’ leverage ratio stands at 9.2x. Debt service averages approximately $26.8mm/year.

So, confronted with all of these factors, the debtors have been engaged in a marketing process since 2018. The continued deterioration of the business, however, ultimately led to a restructuring path and now the debtors intend to use the bankruptcy process to effectuate a sale of (i) the entire business or (ii) the Americas business and/or (iii) the sale of its Europe/Rest-of-World business or (iv) a liquidation (PETITION Note: the debtors fall into chapter 11 largely separated into four main business groups). The Ad Hoc Group has submitted a binding credit bid for the Europe/ROW business group which will serve as a stalking horse bid; they have also committed $15mm in DIP financing to service certain non-debtor affiliates in Europe with an additional $25mm DIP commitment for the administration of the cases coming from Blue Torch Capital LP. The debtors hope to go “effective” by the end of August: this means that everyone has a lot of work to do to try and and locate a buyer for the rest of the debtors’ businesses in the interim.

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Sontchi)

• Capital Structure:

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Ray Schrock, Jacqueline Marcus, Sunny Singh, Samuel Mendez, Alyssa Kutner, Jason Hufendick) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Daniel DeFranceschi, Zachary Shapiro, Brendan Schlauch)

  • Independent Directors: Alan Carr, William Transier, Harvey Tepner, Mark Barberio

  • Financial Advisor/CRO: Ankura Consulting (Roy Messing)

  • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Prepetition ABL Agent: Bank of America NA

    • Legal: Otterbourg PC (Daniel Fiorillo, David Morse, Jonathan Helfat)

  • Indenture Trustee

    • Legal: Arent Fox LLP (Andrew Silfen, Jordana Renert)

  • DIP Agent ($40mm): Blue Torch Capital LP

    • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Robert Klyman, Matthew Bouslog, Michael Farag) & Cole Schotz PC (Norman Pernick, Patrick Reilley)

  • Ad Hoc Group

    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Alice Belisle Eaton, Robert Britton, Eugene Park, Claudia Tobler, Jacqueline Rubin, Douglas Keeton, David Weiss, David Giller) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, Sean Greecher, Andrew Magaziner, Ian Bambrick)

  • Large equityholders: Mackay Shields LLC, AllianceBernstein LLP, D.E. Shaw Galvanic Portfolios LLC, Neuberger Berman Group LLC

  • Exide Creditors’ Liquidating Trust

    • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (Dane Kane, Konstantinos Katsionis)

💊 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Akorn Inc. ($AKRX) 💊

Akorn Inc.

May 20, 2020

Akorn Inc. ($AKRX), a specialty pharmaceutical company based in Illinois that develops, manufactures and markets generic and branded prescription pharmaceuticals, finally filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy.

Why “finally?” Well, back in January 2019 the company, in conjunction with an announcement of new executive and board appointments, noted that restructuring professionals (Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP, PJT Partners LP and AlixPartners LLP)* were assisting with the formulation of a business plan and discussions with stakeholders. In December 2019, the publicly-traded company acknowledged in an SEC filing that bankruptcy was on the table, sending the stock into a 33% freefall. Subsequently, in February 2020, the company announced in connection with its Q4 and annual earnings that it had reached an agreement with its lenders to execute a sale of the business “potentially using Chapter 11 protection.” A sale, however, could not generate sufficient value to cover the outstanding funded indebtedness under the company’s term loan credit agreement. Shortly thereafter in March, the company defaulted under said agreement and the company and its lenders pivoted to discussions about a credit bid with an ad hoc group of term lenders serving as stalking horse purchaser of the assets in chapter 11. Alas, here we are. The company and 16 affiliates (the “debtors”) “FINALLY” find themselves in court with recently inked asset purchase and restructuring support agreements in tow. The debtors will use the bankruptcy process to further their sale process and market test bids against the term lenders’ proposed $1.05b credit bid; they hope to have an auction in the beginning of August with a mid/late-August sale hearing.

The sale process, however, is not where the excitement is here.

We are now in an age — post COVID-19 — where M&A deals falling apart is becoming commonplace news and debates about force majeure and “material adverse effect” rage on in the news and, eventually, in the courts. In that respect, Akorn was ahead of the curve.

In April 2017, Akorn and Fresenius Kabi AG ($FSNUY), a massive German healthcare company, announced a proposed merger with Akorn shareholders set up to receive $34/share — a sizable premium to the then prevailing stock price in the high-20s. (PETITION Note: for purposes of comparison, the stock was trading at $1.26/share on the aforementioned announcement of annual earnings). Akorn shareholders approved the merger but then the business began to suffer. Per the debtors:

…Akorn began to experience a steep and sustained drop-off in financial performance drive by a variety of factors, including, among other things: consolidation of buyer power leading to price reductions; the FDA’s expedition of its review and approval process for generic drugs, leading to increased competition and resultant additional price and volume erosion; and legislative attempts to reduce drug prices.

Almost exactly a year later — after all kinds of shady-a$$ sh*t including anonymous letters alleging data integrity and regulatory deficiencies at Akron facilities and sustained poor financial performance — Fresenius was like “we out.” Lawsuits ensued with Akorn seeking to enforce the merger and Fresenius parrying with “material adverse effect” defenses. The Delaware Chancery Court agreed with Fresenius.

This is America so lawsuits beget lawsuits and Fresenius’ announcement that the merger was at risk spawned (i) federal class action litigation against Akron and certain of its present and former directors and officers and (ii) federal and state law derivative litigation. Akorn ultimately settled the class action litigation but four groups of hedge funds opted out and continue to pursue claims against Akorn. Meanwhile, Akorn lost its appeal of the Delaware Chancery Court decision and a decision on Fresenius’ claims for damages remain reserved. Fresenius has at least a $74mm claim.

This litigation overhang — coupled with the debtors’ $861.7mm in term loans (emanating out of strategic acquisitions in 2014) — is what drives this bankruptcy. The debtors believe that, upon resolution of these issues, it is well-positioned to thrive. They had $682mm revenue in ‘19 and $124mm of adjusted EBITDA. In Q1 ‘20, the company achieved adjusted EBITDA of $59mm (PETITION Note: “adjusted” being an operative word here). Large wholesale distributors like AmerisourceBergen Corporation ($ABC), Cardinal Health Inc. ($CAH), and McKesson Corporation ($MCK) are large customers. The U.S. healthcare system is shifting towards generics and big brand-name pharmaceuticals are rolling off-patent and “driving generic opportunities.” Pre-petition efforts to find a buyer who shares the debtors’ optimism, however, proved unfruitful.

Armed with a $30mm DIP commitment from certain of the term lenders in the ad hoc group, the debtors will swiftly determine whether the prospect of owning these assets “free and clear” will generate any higher or better offers.

*Kirkland & Ellis LLP, in its quest for 32,892,239% restructuring market share, ultimately displaced Cravath.

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Owens)

• Capital Structure: $861.7mm ‘21 Term Loans (Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB)

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Patrick Nash, Nicole Greenblatt, Gregory Pesce, Christopher Hayes) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Paul Heath, Amanda Steele, Zachary Shapiro, Brett Haywood)

  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

  • Investment Banker: PJT Partners LP (Mark Buschmann)

  • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Term Loan & DIP Agent ($30mm): Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

    • Legal: Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP

  • Ad Hoc Group of Term Lenders

    • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher (Scott Greenberg, Steven Domanowski, Jeremy Evans, Michael J. Cohen) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Robert Brady)

    • Financial Advisor: Greenhill & Co. LLC (Neil Augustine)

  • Large equityholders: Blackrock Inc., The Vanguard Group, Akorn Holdings LP, Stonehill Capital Management LLC

🚘 Special Edition: The Hertz Corporation ($HTZ) 🚘

The Hertz Corporation

May 22, 2020

Go here for our free a$$-kicking write-up about the situation.

• Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Walrath)

• Professionals:

  • Legal: White & Case LLP (Thomas Lauria, Matthew Brown, J. Christopher Shore, David Turetsky, Ronald Gorsich, Aaron Colodny, Doah Kim, Jason Zakia) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Mark Collins, John Knight, Brett Haywood)

  • Canadian Legal: McCarthy Tetrault LLP (David Galainena)

  • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Michael Buenzow)

  • Investment Banker: Moelis & Co.

  • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • Barclays Bank PLC

    • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (George Davis, Suzzanne Uhland, Christopher Harris, Adam Goldberg, Heather Waller, Adam Ravin, Andrew Sorkin) & Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Derek Abbott, Andrew Remming)

  • Indenture Trustee: Wells Fargo Bank NA

    • Legal: Foley & Lardner LLP (Mark Hebbeln, Harold Kaplan) & Dorsey & Whitney LLP (Eric Lopez Schnabel, Alessandra Glorioso)

  • Ad Hoc Group of Litigation Creditors

    • Lega: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (John Fiero, Colin Robinson)

  • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

    • Legal: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP (Thomas Moers Mayer, Amy Caton, Daniel Eggermann, Alice Byowitz) & Benesch Friedlander Coplan & Aronoff LLP (Jennifer Hoover, Kevin Capuzzi, John Gentile)

⛽️New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Hornbeck Offshore Services Inc. ($HOSS)⛽️

Hornbeck Offshore Services Inc.

May 19, 2020

Hornbeck Offshore Services Inc. and 13 affiliates (the “debtors”), providers of marine transportation services to petroleum exploration and production, oilfield service, offshore construction and US military customers, filed prepackaged chapter 11 bankruptcies in the Southern District of Texas. Judge Isgur and Judge Jones must be thinking “Thank G-d”: for the judges, “prepackaged” is the operative word here and a quickie case amidst some of these melting ice cubes (e.g., J.C. Penney) must be a welcome breath of fresh air.

Hornbeck is one of those companies that people have been watching ever since 2015 — mostly on account of (i) the idea that offshore drilling had become prohibitively expensive in a falling commodity price environment and (ii) thanks to years of capital-intensive vessel construction programs and vessel acquisitions, an over-levered balance sheet. The good news is that, because of those programs/acquisitions, the company is relatively well-positioned with a nimble and younger fleet (76 vessels in total) — a fact that’s surely recognized by the company’s future equity holders. The bad news is that, with this much debt, even Hornbeck couldn’t postpone the inevitable bankruptcy ad infinitum when oil is where it is. Per the company:

Despite the Company’s relative strengths in its core markets, recent industry trends have had a materially adverse impact on the offshore energy industry and on the Company in particular. While the Company is accustomed to, and built for, the cyclical nature of the oilfield services industry, the recent downturn in the industry has lasted nearly six years, much longer than any previous cycles in the deepwater era, and has put pressure on the Company’s ability to repay or refinance its significant debt obligations.

This is what the funded debt looks like:

Despite that ghastly capital structure and the unfriendly market, Hornbeck, unlike other players in the space like Tidewater Inc. and GulfMark Offshore Inc., managed to stay out of bankruptcy. To do so, it pulled every lever in the book:

• Stacking of vessels to right-size the size of the available fleet relative to demand? ✅

• Defer drydocking costs? ✅

• Onshore and offshore personnel pay cuts? ✅

• Selectively taking on assignments, avoiding long-term Ks and insurance risk? ✅

This is all great but of course there’s still that monstrosity of a balance sheet. In tandem with the operational restructuring, the company has been pursuing strategic balance sheet transactions since 2017 — some more successful than others. The most recent attempt of out-of-court exchange offers and consent solicitations was in early February and though it got a super-majority of support from holders of the ‘20 and ‘21 notes, it failed to meet the required 99% threshold to consummate the deal. On March 23, the date of the bottom of the stock market (irrelevant…just a fun fact), the company terminated the offers. After a long road over many years, bankruptcy became more of a reality.

And so here we are. With the amount of support indicated on the offers, this thing set up nicely for a prepackaged plan. Regarding the plan, there’s a whole lot going on there because of the way the exit facilities are contemplated and the fact that there are Jones Act compliance issues but suffice it to say that the plan treats the first lien lenders as the fulcrum security. The second lien lenders will get a tip and the unsecured noteholders essentially walk away with a small equity kiss and warrants. The company will require liquidity on the back end of the chapter 11 and so the plan also contemplates a $100mm rights offering in exchange for 70% of the reorganized equity.

The debtors will fund the cases via a $75mm DIP credit facility which includes $56.25 million funded by certain secured lenders and $18.75 million funded by certain unsecured noteholders.

• Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Jones)

• Capital Structure: $50mm ABL (Wilmington Trust NA), $350mm first lien facility (Wilmington Trust NA), $121.2mm second lien facility (Wilmington Trust NA), $224.3mm ‘20 unsecured notes, $450mm ‘21 unsecured notes

• Professionals:

  • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Edward Sassower, Ryan Blaine Bennett, Ameneh Bordi, Debbie Farmer, Emily Flynn, Michael Lemm, Benjamin Rhode) & Jackson Walker LLP (Matthew Cavenaugh, Kristhy Peguero, Jennifer Wertz, Veronica Polnick)

  • Financial Advisor: Portage Point Partners LLC

  • Investment Banker: Guggenheim Securities LLC

  • Claims Agent: Stretto (*click on the link above for free docket access)

• Other Parties in Interest:

  • DIP Agent ($75mm): Wilmington Trust NA

  • Counsel to the Consenting Secured Lenders

    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, Darren Klein, Stephanie Massman)

  • Counsel to Consenting Unsecured Notes

    • Legal: Milbank LLP (Gerard Uzzi, Brett Goldblatt, James Ball)

  • Large equityholders: Cyrus Capital Partners LP, Fine Capital Partners LP, William Hurt Hunt Trust Estate