🚀New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - Vector Launch Inc.🚀

Vector Launch Inc.

December 13, 2019

🚀Another Example of the Tech Hype Machine Getting a Fast and Furious Reality Check (Short “Founder Friendly?”; Long #BustedTech)🚀

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We’ve been rather bored with energy and retail distress these days and so we looked on with great interest when Arizona-based Vector Launch Inc. and its subsidiary, Garvey Spacecraft Corporation, filed for bankruptcy in the District of Delaware. Sure, sure, it’s not a big name like McDermott International ($MDR) — the excitement there awaits us in ‘20 — but it’s meaningful nonetheless. Why? Because Sand Hill Road is known for its moonshots. And they often come crashing down to earth. Just not usually in bankruptcy court.

Yet this one did. Vector, a space technology company that was producing rockets and satellite computing technology, has an interesting history. Founded in 2016 by two of the original team members behind Elon Musk’s SpaceX, the company shared Mr. Musk’s vision and penchant for exaggeration. The company launched in 2016 and, in retrospect, the laudatory coverage of the ambition is laughable. Here’s Techcrunch:

With small rockets carrying single 20-40 kg payloads launching weekly or even every few days, the company can be flexible with both prices and timetables. Such small satellites are a growing business: 175 were launched in 2015 alone, and there’s plenty of room to grow. It’ll still be expensive, of course, and you won’t be able to just buy a Thursday afternoon express ticket to low earth orbit — yet.

Customers will, however, reap other benefits. There are less restrictions on space: no more having to package your satellite or craft into a launch container so it fits into a slot inside a crowded space bus. Less of a wait between build and launch means hardware can be finalized weeks, not years, in advance — and expensive satellites aren’t sitting in warehouses waiting for their turn to go live and get that sweet return on investment.

Sounds dope AF, we admit. Even more exciting, Techcrunch reported that Vector hoped to make its first real flights in 2017. At the time, it had raised government grant money (DOD and NASA) and a small amount of angel money. Straight out of the Musk playbook: fund your company and get rich off of the government teat. Brilliant.

But you don’t get government money without pedigreed founders and highfalutin promises to change the world (literally via rockets). Just imagine how that package looks to the outside investment community.

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Investors are knocking down the front door looking to get in, he said, though he declined to name any. Perhaps they smell profitability: Vector’s business plan has it cash positive after just a few launches.

Oof. That bit looks REALLLLLLY REALLLLLY bad now, huh? It gets worse.

Here are some of the things that subsequently transpired:

  • The company finalized an agreement to conduct 21 launches for Finland-based Iceye’s commercial Synthetic Aperture Radar satellite constellation. 👍

  • Quartz published a flattering piece about the shift to smaller rockets, giving heavy prominence to Vector. 👍

  • The company won $2.5mm worth of contracts from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and NASA. 👍

  • The company announced a Tucson headquarters and manufacturing plant, celebrating the potential creation of 200 jobs with the hope of reaching as many as 500; the “direct economic impact of the facility could be $290 million over five years” (citing $2.5mm in contracts and revenue in ‘16 and $160mm-worth of signed contracts for launches “once the plant starts producing rockets…”). 👍

  • Vector announced “an agreement with York Space Systems, an aerospace company specializing in small and medium class spacecraft, to conduct six satellite launches from 2019 through 2022 with the option for 14 additional launches”; the contract was reportedly worth a staggering $60mm. 👍

These guys were rockin’ and rollin'.

But, wait, there’s more!

  • After several more government grants and a number of angel infusions, the company finally raised a $21mm Series A round in June 2017 — which included money from vaunted Silicon Valley venture capital firm, Sequoia Capital (as well as Shasta Ventures and Lightspeed).

  • By August of 2017, the hype machine was in full effect. Here is a CNBC piece championing the company’s first completed “mission.” Around the same time, Techcrunch, The Los Angeles Times and Ars Technica all wrote about the promise of small rockets. Size doesn’t matter, they said!!

  • By October 2018, the company was back fundraising; it secured a $70mm Series B raise from Kodem Growth PartnersMorgan Stanley Alternative Investment Partners and participation from its existing trio of VC firms. Now nothing and nobody could get in these guys’ way!!!!!

Well, except Sequoia Capital.

Per the company’s CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY PAPERS(!!!!):

“In early August 2019, a member of Vector’s board of directors…appointed by Sequoia…abruptly resigned and informed Vector that Sequoia had decided to no longer support Vector via funding for future operations. Almost immediately after the…resignation, the Debtors’ CEO resigned. The fallout from Sequoia’s decision and the CEO’s resignation spooked the investor community and doomed the Debtors’ efforts to raise additional capital.”

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There’s more:

These events could not have been timed more poorly for the Debtors. In addition to preventing the Debtors from attracting new capital, they occurred when the debtors had almost expended all of the capital from their prior capital raises. Indeed, the Debtors’ cash balances barely exceeded their secured debt, which principal amount totaled $11.5 million.

HOLD ON. So, the company lit $70mm of new funding on fire in less than a year and didn’t have enough money to clear its secured debt. And SECURED DEBT? Where was the press release for that?!?!

After evaluating its options, the Board determined that if it did not immediately cease operations, the Debtors would be unable to pay their employees if their secured lenders declared a default and froze the Debtors’ cash (which is precisely what occurred). With no access to capital to fund ongoing business needs and to satisfy the Debtors’ outstanding secured debt, the Board voted to cease operations and to terminate most of the Debtors’ employees and pay all owed wages…

This ain’t exactly WeWork but still. Life comes at you fast: one moment you’re a media darling garnering all kinds of favorable coverage, raising millions upon million of dollars with investors “knocking down the door” and, the next, your pesky venture capitalists are pulling the plug and high-tailing for the exits!

Less than two weeks later, the Debtors’ secured lenders froze the approximately $12 million in cash deposited in the Debtors’ bank accounts as expected. The Debtors’ secured lenders subsequently swept the cash from Debtors’ bank accounts, leaving the Debtors with no cash, a single employee (the acting CEO), and, after assessing fees and other charges, approximately $500k in secured debt. The Debtors’ remaining assets essentially consisted of three leased facilities, transporter-erector launcher, launch vehicle parts (including rocket engines and ground support equipment), satellite computer technology, patents, and other intellectual property.

So much to unpack here.

First, what the hell is a “transporter-erector launcher” and where does Johnny get one?

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Second, at what point did this thing sh*t the bed so badly that it needed to tap a credit facility? That it had to (maybe?) jettison its founder-CEO?? Tap bridge financing???

It turns out that TriplePoint Capital LLC committed to lend the company $15mm back in October 2018 alongside the company’s Series B raise (PETITION Note: this is not in and of itself crazy…many startups take on venture debt in conjunction with a fundraise generally as a safety net; usually they hope NOT to use it because they’ll just go on to their next equity raise). The loan was secured by basically all of the company’s collateral and was structured as two draws in equal $7.5mm installments. With the sweep, TriplePoint ensured that its claim would be minimized: at the time of filing, they are owed $500k.

To bridge to a filing, the company secured a $500k bridge loan from Lockheed Martin Corporation — now the proposed stalking horse purchaser. The company also issued $1.6mm in convertible notes in connection with what it thought would be a Series C raise prior to Sequoia backing out. Whoops.

The big question, then, is why did Sequoia so abruptly quit the board and split?* Why, then, did the CEO, James Cantrell, quit the next day? It sounds like there’s a lot more here to uncover:

Mr. Cantrell subsequently filed a lawsuit against Vector claiming that he was terminated. The Debtors dispute Mr. Cantrell’s claims regarding his departure. Moreover, the Debtors believe they hold claims against Mr. Cantrell that they intend to pursue for the benefit of the Debtors’ creditors.

Some shady-a$$ sh*t must’ve been discovered around August 5. Just as fervently as investors were, at one point, trying to invest in this company, parties in interest were now eager to save themselves. Silicon Valley Bank (over $4mm owed) and TriplePoint issued notices of default and swept the Debtors’ cash (PETITION Note: that’s why they say that possession is half the battle!).

Lockheed is the White Knight here salvaging what’s left of this hot mess. It provided the bridge loan; it will provide a $2.5mm DIP (yay bankruptcy pros getting paid!); and it will purchase the debtors’ GalacticSky assets for $4.25mm. The offer is cash and equity.

Interestingly, despite all of this, optimism abounds here. The debtors note that they hope to pursue the Lockheed sale followed by other sales of assets:

If consummated, the Debtors believe that the proceeds from Sales will provide for payment in full of the Debtors’ secured obligations, administrative expense claims, and priority claims. In addition, the debtors believe there will be sufficient funds for (i) a liquidation trust to pursue the Debtors’ claims against certain parties, including its former CEO and (ii) distributions to general unsecured creditors.

That claim against the former CEO ought to be interesting. Stay tuned.😬

*Axios’ Dan Primack wrote:

Per a source: Sequoia decided to stop investing due to a high burn rate and the company not meeting projections. That decision was followed by two lenders opting against giving Vector new debt lines — something Sequoia didn't instruct, but which Vector nonetheless blames on the VC firm.

Case Data:

  • Jurisdiction: (Judge Dorsey)

  • Capital Structure: $500k (TriplePoint Capital LLC), $500k (Lockheed Martin)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP (Hugh Ray III, Jason Sharp, William Hotze) & Sullivan Hazeltine Allinson LLC (Elihu Allinson Ill)

    • Financial Advisor: Winter Harbor LLC (Shaun Martin)

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition Lender ($500k): TriplePoint Capital LLC

      • Legal: McDermott Will & Emery LLP (Darren Azman, Daniel Thomson) & Bayard PA (Justin Alberto)

    • Prepetition Lender ($500k) & Stalking Horse Purchaser ($2.5mm): Lockheed Martin Corporation

      • Legal: Hogan Lovells LLP (Christopher Donoho, John Beck, Jennifer Lee & Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Robert Dehney, Andrew Remming, Paige Topper)

    • Large Equityholders: Kodem Growth Partners, Sequoia Capital, Shasta Ventures V LP, Lightspeed Venture Partners XI LP, DNX Ventures

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors: Valcor Engineering Corporation; (ii) Rincon Etal Investments, Inc.; (iii) Expanding TFO I, LP; (iv) M4 Engineering Inc., and (v) Gas Innovations

      • Brown Rudnick LLP (Bennett Silverberg, Kenneth Aulet) & Potter Anderson & Corroon (Christopher Samis, L. Katherine Good, D. Ryan Slaugh)

      • Financial Advisor: Dundon Advisors LLC (Matthew Dundon, Philip Preis)

New Chapter 11 Filing - Tintri Inc.

Tintri Inc.

7/10/18

On June 23 in "#BustedTech (Short Busted IPOs…cough…DOMO), we wrote the following: 

Tintri Inc., a publicly-traded ($TNTR) Delaware-incorporated and Mountain View California based provider of enterprise cloud and all-flash and hybrid storage systems appears to be on the brink of bankruptcy. There's no way any strategic buyer agrees to buy this thing without a 363 comfort order. 
In an SEC filing filed on Friday, the company noted:

"The company is currently in breach of certain covenants under its credit facilities and likely does not have sufficient liquidity to continue its operations beyond June 30, 2018."

Furthermore, 

"Based on the company’s current cash projections, and regardless of whether its lenders were to choose to accelerate the repayment of the company’s indebtedness under its credit facilities, the company likely does not have sufficient liquidity to continue its operations beyond June 30, 2018. The company continues to evaluate its strategic options, including a sale of the company. Even if the company is able to secure a strategic transaction, there is a significant possibility that the company may file for bankruptcy protection, which could result in a complete loss of shareholders’ investment."

And yesterday the company's CEO resigned from the company. All of this an ignominious end for a company that IPO'd almost exactly a year ago. Check out this chart:
Source: Yahoo! Finance

Source: Yahoo! Finance

Nothing like a $7 launch, a slight post-IPO uptick, and then a crash and burn. This should be a warning sign for anyone taking a look at Domo — another company that looks like it is exploring an IPO for liquidity to stay afloat. But we digress. 
The company's capital structure consists of a $15.4mm '19 revolving credit facility with Silicon Valley Bank, a $50mm '19 facility with TriplePoint Capital LLC, and $25mm of 8% convertible notes. Revenues increased YOY from $86mm in fiscal 2016 to $125.1mm in fiscal 2017 to $125.9mm in fiscal 2018. The net loss, however, also moved up and right: from $101mm to $105.8mm to $157.7mm. The company clearly has a liquidity ("net cash") covenant issue (remember those?). Accordingly, the company fired 20% of its global workforce (~90 people) in March (a follow-on to a 10% reduction in Q3 '17). The venture capital firms that funded the company — Lightspeed Venture Partners among them — appear to be long gone. Silver Lake Group LLC and NEA Management Company LLC, unfortunately, are not; they still own a good amount of the company.
"Isn't cloud storage supposed to be all the rage," you ask? Yeah, sure, but these guys seem to generate product revenue largely from sales of all-flash and hybrid storage systems (and stand-alone software licenses). They're mainly in the "intensely competitive IT infrastructure market," sparring with the likes of Dell EMCIBM and VMware. So, yeah, good luck with that.
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Alas, the company has filed for bankruptcy. This bit about the company's financial position offers up an explanation why -- in turn serving as a cautionary tale for investors in IPOs of companies that have massive burn rates:

"The company's revenue increased from $86 million in fisca1 2016 to $125.1 million in fiscal 2017, and to $125.9 million in fiscal 2018, representing year-over-year growth of 45% and 1 %, respectively. The company's net loss was $101.0 million, $105.8 million, and $157.7 million in fiscal 2016, 2017, and 2018, respectively. Total assets decreased from $158.1 million as of the end of fiscal 2016 to $104.9 million as of the end of fiscal 2017, and to $76.2 million as of the end of fiscal 2018, representing year-over-year change of 34% and 27%, respectively. The company attributed flat revenue growth in fiscal 2018 in part due to delayed and reduced purchases of products as a result of customer concerns about Tintri's financial condition, as well as a shift in its product mix toward lower-priced products, offset somewhat by increased support and maintenance revenue from its growing installed customer base. Ultimately, the company's sales levels have not experienced a level of growth sufficient to address its cash burn rate and sustain its business."

With trends like those, it's no surprise that the IPO generated less capital than the company expected. More from the company:

"Tintri's orders for new products declined, it lost a few key customers and, consequently, its declining revenues led to the company's difficulties in meeting day-to-day expenses, as well as long-term debt obligations. A few months after its IPO, in December 2017, Tintri announced that it was in the process of considering strategic options and had retained investment bank advisors to assist it in this process."

As we previously noted, "[t]here's no way any strategic buyer agrees to buy this thing without a 363 comfort order." And that is precisely the path that the company seeks to take. In its filing, the company indicated that it plans to file a motion seeking approval of the sale of its assets and bid procedures shortly. The filing is meant to provide the company with a chance to continue its efforts to sell the company as a going concern. Alternatively, it will look to sell its IP and liquidate. Triplepoint has agreed to provide a $5.4mm DIP credit facility to fund the process.  Savage.  

Meanwhile, today's chart (at time of publication):

Source: Yahoo! Finance

 

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Carey)
  • Capital Structure: $4.7mm RCF (Silicon Valley Bank), $56mm term loan (TriplePoint Capital LLC), $25mm '19 convertible notes.     
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Henry Kevane, John Fiero, John Lucas, Colin Robinson)
    • Financial Advisor: Berkeley Research Group LLC (Robert Duffy)
    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • First Lien Lender: Silicon Valley Bank
      • Legal: Riemer & Brownstein LLP (Donald Rothman, Paul Samson, Alexander Rheaume, Steven Fox) & (local) Ashby & Geddes PA (Gregory Taylor)
    • Second Lien Lender: TriplePoint Capital LLC
      • Legal: McDermott Will & Emery LLP (TImothy Walsh, Riley Orloff, Gary Rosenbaum) & (local) Polsinelli PC (Christopher Ward, Jeremy Johnson, Stephen Astringer)
    • Proposed Purchaser: DataDirect Networks Inc.
      • Legal: Manatt Phelps & Phillips LLP (Blase Dillingham, Alan Noskow) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (John Knight)

Updated 7/12/18 at 2:09 CT